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Abstract
This account of the 1945-51 Governments emphasises the extent to which its
two principle tasks - economic recovery and the containment of
communism - coloured its approach to events in the docks. I argue in the
first chapter that the Government enjoyed immensely significant support
from the TUC in marshalling working class support for the economic
recovery and anti-communism. The ensuing chapters look at how the
relationship between the Government and the Unions was affected by
developments in the docks, an area of vital economic importance given the
export-driven strategy for recovery. In the second chapter I examine the
long history of the docks, and point out that the Government's tasks were
complicated by the long-term failure of its closest ally from 1945, the
Transport and General Workers' Union, to organise its docks membership
thoroughly. In the enclosed world of the docks, the workforce traditionally
adhered to a system of local and sectional loyalties, rather than the national
and industrial loyalties demanded by the TGWU. The implications of this
tradition, as they were felt in the 1945-1951 period, I examine in three
chapters on separate unofficial dock strikes. These all resulted from
industrial disputes, yet Government and Trade Union leaders were anxious
to portray them as resulting from political subversion. In Chapter Six I
argue that this false characterisation was designed to deflect attention from
the Union's difficulties in the docks, and also from a number of problems
arising from the introduction of the 1947 Dock Labour Scheme. As both of
these institutions, the Union and the Scheme, were regarded as essential to
economic recovery, the Government was anxious to protect them from
public scrutiny. The genuine problems, the real causes of the unofficial
action, are also discussed in this analytical chapter. In the final chapter I
point out that the continuous portrayal of the strikes as political rather
than industrial challenges, eventually caused a great deal of tension
between the 1950-51 Government and the TGWU. This considerable private
strain is at odds with the conventional historiographical picture of the
1945-51 Governments' relations with the TUC. In addition to qualifying the
existing historical understanding of the 1945-51 Governments, this account
also reappraises an important and often misunderstood general theme, the
relationship between the Labour Party and the Trade Unions.
I hereby declare that the preparation and composition of
this thesis was entirely my own work.
James K. Phillips
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CHAPTER 1
LABOUR IN POWER 1945-51
1945 AND 'THE GREAT ALLIANCE'
For the British Labour Party and its supporters the summer of 1945 was a
period of unprecedented triumph and optimism. Following long periods of
defeat and frustration between the wars, the labour movement had
benefited immeasurably from its participation in the defeat of Nazi
Germany and Japan, and now seemed on the verge of formidable
achievement at home. Michael Foot evokes the spirit aroused by these
developments in the opening lines of his second volume of Aneurin Bevan.
Veterans of the labour movement who had renewed their faith after each
successive disaster - the collapse of the Triple Alliance in 1921, the General
Strike in 1926 and the defection of Ramsay MacDonald in 1931 - had 'special
cause for exultation' and, with the European conflict over and the war in
Asia reaching conclusion:
No socialist who saw it will forget the blissful dawn of July 1945. ... Eyes
were fixed on the promise of a new society. Suddenly the vision of the
Socialist pioneers had been given substance and historic impetus by the
radical political ferment of wartime. 1
The scale of Labour's victory was indeed stunning. With 393 seats the party
had earned a Commons majority of 146 over the other parties combined, and
office with power for the first time: 'LABOUR IN POWER!' proclaimed the
Daily Herald. The Times, if not as tetchy as the Savoy woman diner who,
according to one of the many apocryphal stories that surround the 1945
result, is said to have announced that the country would not stand for the
election of a Labour Government, was sceptical nonetheless. The paper's
editorial on the morning after the declaration of the results makes for
illuminating reading. Emphasising strongly Labour's duty to transcend its
apparently sectional, historical basis, it projected the conventional wisdom
about the Labour Party and Labour Governments that has very rarely been
unpicked: namely that Labour ministers have to govern in a 'national
interest' that precludes the realisation of trade unionists' aspirations. In
1 Michael Foot, Aneurin Bevan II 1945-60, p. 17.
expressing a charge depressingly familiar to students of Labour Party
history, The Times effected a curious mixture of the blunt and the evasively
bland:
At a bound the Labour Party have overleapt the barrier which hitherto has
held them perpetually in a minority and almost continually in opposition.
Their mandate now is national, not sectional. It has been furnished for a
national programme, not for narrow doctrines or extreme experiments. The
close and characteristic connexion of the Labour Party with certain
specialised groups within the community has at last and suddenly ceased to
prevent them from securing the suffrages and support of the broad mass of
the British people, and it is of decisive importance in the calculations
which confront their leaders to-day that they should embrace only those
aspirations which are commonly accepted by the millions of men and
women who have voted for them.2
This conventional wisdom about the nature of the relationship between the
Labour Party and the Trade Unions attained fresh lustre in the sixties and
seventies, and apparently still carries public currency in the early 1990s.
In the wake of Labour's fourth successive defeat in April 1992 the party
appointed an investigative body to review the party-union links which, it
was felt, might have significantly contributed to the party's continued
electoral unpopularity. The Times leader writer's analysis was, however,
extremely misleading. Prior to 1945 Labour's history had indicated the
development of a very different relationship between the party and the
unions from that allowed by the image of 'union barons' and 'fixers' in
'smoke-filled rooms', propagated by The Times leader writer in 1945, and
not dispelled by recent commentators.^ Lewis Minkin, appointed in 1992 to
2The Times, 27 July 1945; emphasis added.
3 To offer two recent examples, one from serious historical writing and the
other from radio broadcasting: Ben Pimlott's Harold Wilson surveys the
myths without disabusing them, noting, for example, that when Heath's
retinue searched 10 Downing Street for 'the ingredients of a celebratory
supper' after dislodging Labour at the 1970 General Election, 'all they found
in the larder was warm beer and sandwiches, a symbolic legacy, they felt,
of the vanished era.' (p.560). In the BBC Radio 4 series 'Brothers', written
and narrated by Anthony Howard and broadcast between 5-19 January
1993, Heath's personal contribution was limited to a denial that beer and
sandwiches had been administered to TUC leaders during his premiership.
'We offered them a very good lunch and some excellent wine', he said. The
series, devoted to 'the turbulent history' of the British trade unions since
1945, overall served to perpetuate the myths surrounding the party-union
relationship. The second episode, on the struggles over Barbara Castle's
1969 White Paper In Place of Strife, was called 'Get Your Tanks Off My
Lawn!', despite Hugh Scanlon's assertion that these words, credited to
Wilson, had never been uttered.
the body investigating the future party-union relationship, has
contributed immeasurably to the understanding of its history, with his
recently published and highly acclaimed analysis, The Contentious
AllianceA
At the outset of his work Minkin emphasises the inestimable
historical significance of Labour's ties with industrial organisations, both
to socialist political culture and to the wider political environment:
For over 80 years this relationship has shaped the structure and, in various
ways, the character of the British Left. Every major group and party in
British politics has had to take account of what Keir Hardie called 'the great
alliance', whether they regarded it as 'great' or not.^
Minkin indicates that critics of the relationship have opposed the
apparently sectional commitment to the values and aspirations of trade
unionism. Socialist critics - Marxist and non-Marxist - have argued that the
influence of a defensive trade union culture has constrained the Labour
Party, narrowing the potential for radical economic and social
transformation.^ On the right the alliance has been held to represent a
dangerous political and industrial threat to the constitution and the
economy, with Labour in office dispensing special favours to powerful but
unaccountable trade union leaders.
Minkin offers a sturdy defence of the party-union linkage, denying
that Labour's trade union origins obliged the party leaders, in opposition or
office, to observe a parity of strategy and vision with their trade union
counterparts. Interpreting the party's history in the context of Minkin's
analysis strongly brings out this theme, that the political and industrial
leaders of the 'labour movement' often pursued divergent aims, and that
conflicts between the respective leaderships did arise which were often
resolved in favour of the 'politicians'.
^Lewis Minkin, The Contentious Alliance. Trade Unions and the Labour
Party.
^ Ibid, p.xii
^Ralph Miliband, Parliamentary Socialism-, John Saville, The Labour
Movement in Britain .
ESTABLISHMENT OF SEPARATE SPHERES 1900-1940
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Labour was established at the beginning of the twentieth century with
credentials that set it apart from traditional Westminster political parties.
Although formally a partnership between trade unions and a number of
socialist political societies, the role of the unions was paramount; for the
industrial organisations could offer the essential numerical and financial
support which the ILP, the Fabians and the SDF simply could not. Moreover,
the Labour Representation Committee's stated aim of securing independent
parliamentary representation for the pursuit of 'trade union principles
and ideals' was a specific commitment to the sectional interest of the
organised working class. Minkin sharply observes that the nature of this
genesis provided the labour movement with a wide range of familial and
biological metaphors, perhaps the most remarkable being Ernest Bevin's
characteristic remark that the party had been produced 'out of the bowels
of the trade unions'.^
Bevin made this observation at the 1935 Labour Party Conference, by
which time the original party-union relationship, and with it the nature of
the Labour Party, had long undergone considerable changes. Lewis Minkin
defines the sum of these changes as the establishment of a relationship
between two separate but mutually compatible partners, each with their
own recognisable and different interests and responsibilities. This is
ascribed to a number of loosely related but mutually reinforcing factors,
the most important being the movement's ideological unity. Both partners
have shared a commitment to Parliamentary democracy, and also believed
that the state was politically neutral and therefore of immense potential
benefit to working people. From around 1900 unions provided the financial
and numerical support which made the party viable, participated in the
selection of its candidates and in the formulation of its policy, but made
little attempt to interfere in the day to day running of the parliamentary
organisation. Such abstention was encouraged as unions grew, through the
First World War and after, and as the burdens of trade union leadership
became more onerous. With a dwindling number of senior trade unionists
on Labour's benches, the Parliamentary party become more diverse in its
social composition, with an increasing number of professionals and non-
trade-unionist intellectuals reinforcing the separation of the political and
^Quoted by Minkin, op. cit., p.3.
the industrial. This diversity reflected the party's changing political
identity. After 1922, when Labour's vote outstripped its affiliated union
membership for the first time, the party was decreasingly dependent on
the votes of trade union members and their families. As Minkin points out,
these different bases of support required 'differing obligations and
concerns' from the alliance's respective partners, with the party
increasingly having to address the aspirations of those outside the
organised industrial working class as it sought political power.^
This divergence did not, of course, imply division within the labour
movement. Minkin contends that any tension between the industrial and
political was defused by an informal system of rules which developed
organically across the first three decades of the Party's existence. These
'rules' - never rigidly codified but implicitly recognised by the unions and
the party nevertheless - were based on the core trade union values of
freedom, unity and solidarity, and emphasised the partners' individual
rights and collective obligations. 'Freedom' implied that in any dispute the
union concerned was entitled to protect its members without interference
from other unions or politicians; the unions' autonomous position in
industrial matters was to be observed by the party, and in return the
unions would be content to leave politics to the 'politicians'. 'Unity' and
'solidarity' - the watchwords of strength in the labour movement - required
trade unions to marshall support behind the Parliamentary leadership, and
in the stormy interwar years to protect the disappointing Labour
Governments against criticism from the left.9
These values were determined by the historical essence of the TUC.
Minkin argues that whilst generally adhering to a wide range of social,
economic and political goals, the TUC has held a single over-riding priority
at every stage of its development. This 'primary consideration' has been the
'defence of trade unionism', which usually involved a narrowly defined
'economist' strategy of seeking improved working conditions. However,
when wider political developments interfered with this priority, the TUC
was prepared to broaden its strategy. For instance, it was this 'principle of
priority', as Minkin calls it, which had underpinned the TUC's support for
the foundation of the party at Westminster. And in the 1930s it was the
realisation that fascism directly threatened trade unionism which
^Ibid., pp.9-15.
9Ibid„ pp.27-39.
motivated Bevin and Citrine in their successful efforts to commit the TUC,
and in 1935 the Labour Party, to collective security and rearmament. This
fundamental issue, trade union priority, is equally illustrated by Labour's
experiences in office, in 1924 and from 1929-31, which offer interesting
illustrations of the complex inter-play of forces within the alliance,
highlighting the points of potential conflict as well as ultimate harmony
between the two partners.
With the formation of the minority Labour administration on 21
January 1924, the potential for conflict between the political and industrial
wings of the movement, implied by the increasing divergence of their
respective core supports, was brought immediately to the fore. On 16
February the TGWU leader Ernest Bevin authorised a national dock strike
by 110,000 workers in pursuit of a wage increase and a guaranteed working
week. MacDonald's Government was greatly alarmed and responded by
preparing to operate the 1920 Emergency Powers Act. With the threatened
imposition of Lloyd George's strike-breaking legislation, Bevin called the
strike off, having won the wage claim but on decasualisation having to
accept the compromise of a Court of Inquiry. The following month, facing a
strike by London tramway workers, the Government actually obtained the
King's signature on another Emergency Powers Proclamation, although
this stoppage was called off on the following day, 31 March. Bevin and
other senior trade unionists were furious with the Government's actions,
which flouted the freedom of workers to protect their individual liberties
and rights via collective strike action, and apparently abused the very
trade union autonomy which the Labour Party had been created to protect.
The episode indicated that Labour Ministers were anxious both to convince
middle class opinion that Labour in power would administer no special
favours to its trade union allies and to notify the unions that their
industrial interests would not interfere with Labour's obligations to the
wider community, and the outcome was a sharpened division between the
movement's separate industrial and political spheres. Responding to
criticism that the TGWU strikes were jeopardising the first Labour
Government and the future success of socialism, Ernest Bevin had denied
that a 'policy of industrial truce' would benefit the administration:
There is work to do on the industrial field as well as in the political arena.
While it is true that the two are to some extent part of the same effort, we
must not lose sight of the fact that governments may come and
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governments may go, but the workers' fight for the betterment of
conditions must go on all the time.* 0
Bevin's pragmatic prescience was borne out by the subsequent five years
of Conservative Government, with the TUC and the Labour Party engaged in
visibly separate spheres of activity, most notably during the General
Strike. This process was of course encouraged by the Conservatives'
'revenge' for the General Strike, the 1927 Trade Unions and Trade Disputes
Act. In replacing the principle of contracting 'in' rather than contracting
'out', the legislation physically loosened the relationship between the
Labour Party and the unions.
The relationship between the 1929 Labour Government and the trade
unions further exemplified the governing 'rules' of behaviour and the
strain which they could come under. TUC leaders, including left-wingers
like the miners' secretary Arthur Cook, did much to deflect criticism of the
minority administration's failure to attack unemployment and abolish the
1927 trade union legislation. 1 * However, with Bevin increasingly
concerned about the wisdom of the Government's priorities, as large-scale
unemployment continued to undermine the size, strength and confidence
of the labour movement, the TUC gradually withdrew its uncritical support
from the administration. The 'principle of priority' duly pressed the TUC
into action during the great crisis of August 1931, mobilising internal
Cabinet opposition to the unemployment benefit cuts on 20 August 1931.
The 'solidarity' of the alliance also ensured that the unions would provide
what Bevin described as a 'ballast' role for the party. Labour's morale,
which had been steadily eroding since 1929, was badly bruised by the
Government's downfall, MacDonald's defection and the crushing electoral
defeat which followed. In the face of this collapse the TUC brought comfort
to the movement, acting decisively on two important questions: in insisting
upon the expulsion of MacDonald and Snowden from the Labour Party on 28
September, and in opposing the National Government's record on
unemployment after Labour's parliamentary strength had been reduced to
just 46.
The unions' stabilising role at a moment of crisis was not, as Minkin
records, 'without its clear quid pro quo'; and in the wake of 1931 a number
l^Alan Bullock, The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin Volume /, pp.243-4.
'Ipaul Davies, A.J. Cook, pp.169-71.
of important new 'rules' defining the nature of the partnership in the
unions' favour were established, the most pertinent being that the political
leadership would never again commit itself to a governing coalition or
political alliance without first seeking the movement's approval. 12 This
realignment of forces within the partnership was commensurate with the
TUC's new position as the alliance's senior figure, its relative industrial
muscle compensating for Labour's political weakness. At the same time it
represented affirmation of the unions' historical priorities and position as
the party's anchor. On 10 November 1931 an inquest into the crisis was
conducted at a joint meeting of the General Council and the NEC. In
remarking upon the failure of the Government to consult the TUC at an
earlier stage, Walter Citrine restated the origins and consequent
obligations of the party:
They (the General Council) did not seek in any shape or form to say what
the party was to do, but they did ask that the primary purpose of the
creation of the party should not be forgotten. It was created by the Trade
Union movement to do those things in Parliament which the Trade Union
Movement found ineffectively performed by the two-party system. 1 3
This restatement of the TUC 'principle of priority' was characteristic of the
relationship between party and unions which had emerged since 1900, the
partnership of two separate but highly compatible forces. During the
interwar years the TUC's contribution had been vital, holding the alliance
and the party together after 1931. This allowed the party time in which to
recover, time in which it sought to entertain a broader community interest,
within which the values and aspirations of trade unionism could be
sustained. This search was given a tremendous fillip by the Second World
War.
l^Minkin, op. cit., pp.39-40.
^Walter Citrine quoted in V.L. Allen, Trade Unions and the Government;
Allen also observes that at the joint meeting of the GC and the NEC on 10
November 1931, the General Council expressed its views 'no longer as a
suppliant but as a representative of the principal partner in a weakened,
shocked, though wiser labour movement', p.258.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR
In the twentieth century, according to one common view, war has been the
great motor-force of economic, social and political change, accelerating
and bringing to fruition deep-set historical trends. In Britain the Second
World War certainly shifted the balance of political and industrial power in
favour of the labour movement. There were a number of reasons for this.
The political character of the war was undeniably confusing, as Ernest
Mandel's Marxist account testifies, with a bewildering array of conflicting
and arguably contradictory interests characterising the nations and
colonies which stood together against Germany, Italy and JapanJ 4 Yet in
Britain the dominant public theme was the stated need to defeat Nazi
Germany. The democratic anti-fascist rhetoric and the common sacrifices
that this venture entailed, promoted a much stronger sense of social
cohesion than had been evident in interwar Britain. The rationing that
brought 'fair shares' was apparent testimony to the organising powers of
the community - a development and a belief further encouraged by the
wartime alliance with the Soviet Union. With the Soviet Union's command
economy sustaining a victorious military repulsion of the Nazi invasion,
fresh credibility became attached to the notion of economic planning, but
long before the Red Army's advance on Berlin began, large sections of the
British public had begun to disassociate themselves from the Conservatives.
The pre-war appeasers, the 'guilty men', had kept millions on the dole
instead of rearming to resist Hitler and defeat fascism. 1 ^
These political and social developments were complemented in
labour's favour by the shifting economic position of the working class.
With manpower as the ultimate 'scarce resource' during the national
emergency, and Ernest Bevin at the Ministry of Labour, the trade unions
attained unprecedented political and economic power, and in the process
grew in size and confidence. In July 1945 the Labour Party duly won a
stunning victory in the General Election and the first majority Labour
Government was formed. These were years, as Minkin puts it, of 'solid
achievement', * 6 biit Minkin also points out that the war revealed
14-Ernest Mandel, The Meaning of the Second World War, especially pp.85-
95.
l^Paul Addison, The Road to 1945, especially pp.127-64; Angus Calder, The
People's War, p. 158.
l^Minkin, op. cit., p.54.
considerable tensions within the labour alliance, with the informal rules
which underwrote its existence being called into question along with many
other political, economic and social relationships during the peculiar
conditions of total war. These tensions revealed some of the potential
conflicts which would inform the partners' relationship after July 1945.
The TUC had reordered its priorities in accordance with the new
situation of Labour serving in the Coalition. With Bevin at the Ministry of
Labour, union leaders gladly contributed to the war effort, making
concessions on dilution and industrial conscription. Most notably, they
accepted the 1940 emergency regulation, Conditions of Employment and
Compulsory Arbitration (or Order 1305 as it was more commonly referred
to), and its 1944 punitive amendment. Regulation 1AA, These outlawed the
right to strike. Regulation 1AA carried as punishment for inciting strike
action in an essential service five years' penal servitude and/or a £500
fine; but the TUC accepted the order, and made a number of short-term
concessions on industrial production during the national emergency, in
which the future of the British working class as much as the British
Empire was at stake. These were the very terms with which Bevin justified
Regulation 1AA. He indicated in the House of Commons that all sectional
claims and interests were subordinate to the task of national military
victory, and restated an Anglo-centric trade unionist position on the anti-
Nazi struggle:
When Fascism and Nazism had to be really faced in England - and this is a
justification for the National Government - we, at least, did not pick one
class to face it as they did in poor Austria; we have stood as a nation against
the vile thing. Let us stand united until it is defeated. 17
Such TUC concessions were, of course, rewarded with considerable
privileges in return. As Minister of Labour Ernest Bevin presided over a
reformist regime that inflated industrial morale and maximised
productivity by improving working conditions and the social status of
working people. To this end measures such as the 1943 Catering Wages Act,
the 1944 Disabled Persons Act and the 1945 Wages Councils Act were
brought forward. Reform also encompassed the partial decasualisation of
labour in the dock industry. This was something to which Bevin had long
been personally committed, and the industry's casual regime was
17Parliamentary Debates, Vol.399, 1131, 28 April 1944.
particularly ill-suited to the requirements of war.' ^ Moreover, with
manpower defined by Bevin as the single most valuable industrial
commodity - and accepted as such by his War Cabinet colleagues - the role
of the trade unions, as organisers of this manpower, was recognised as
indispensable in planning and rallying support for industrial strategy.
Minkin points out that the TUC's historic claim 'to represent the working
people in all matters affecting their conditions of life and labour' was now
formally conceded, '9 along with the principle of equal status in a tripartite
system of collective bargaining.2 0
This enhancement of the TUC's status led to considerable tension
within the labour alliance. The pragmatism of the TUC leaders and their
determination at all times to secure the 'best available outcome' for trade
union members has been noted. As trade unionists had benefited from their
experiences under the wartime coalition, and with Labour's industrial and
political leaders not expecting in 1943 to defeat the wartime hero Churchill
in a post-war election, for trade unionists the 'best available outcome'
would be the maintenance of the coalition after the war. Bevin himself
clearly believed that he might continue to serve in peace-time as Minister
of Labour under Churchill.2' Minkin believes that this line of reasoning
might have persuaded Bevin that the TUC could represent a political
alternative to the Labour Party, given its access to Government, its
representation in Cabinet and the clear gains which the direct relationship
had won.22 Certainly Bevin was highly ambivalent about his relations with
the party. Angered by back-bench criticism during the Beveridge Report
debate in February 1943, he withdrew from party activities altogether,
attending neither PLP meetings nor the 1943 Party Conference.
Disparaging the purpose of 'playing the party game' he only returned in
order to press his position on Regulation 1AA on the PLP in April 1944.
Throughout the war Bevin plainly shared the premier's belief that he was
'^V.L. Allen, Trade Union Leadership, pp.172-7; Alan Bullock, The Life and
Times of Ernest Bevin Volume II Minister of Labour 1940-45, pp.58-9;
Minkin, op. cit., p. 57; Gordon Phillips and Noel Whiteside, Casual Labour.
The Unemployment Question in the Port Transport Industry, p.225.
'^Minkin, op. cit., p.57.
20Reith Middlemas, Politics in Industrial Society, pp. 271-7.
2'Addison, op. cit., p.234.
22jyiinkin, op. cit., p.60.
in the War Cabinet to represent the trade unions and not the Labour
Party 3
This process greatly antagonised the Labour left. Aneurin Bevan felt
that in strengthening the state's coercive powers against striking workers
and apparently entertaining the idea of a peace-time Coalition, Bevin was
endangering the Labour Party's long-term future.2^ Given Bevin's evident
ambivalence towards the Labour Party in 1943 and 1944, this fear was not
completely unfounded. Indeed it was further grounded on the legal action
which had been taken by the authorities against striking workers since
the imposition of the Emergency Regulations in 1940 - most notably against
1000 coal miners at Betteshanger Colliery in Kent in 1942 - and the
strengthening of the Government's emergency powers with the amended
Regulation 1AA in 1944.
On the latter initiative Bevan and other leftist critics were as much
dismayed by the manner and reasoning that surrounded its implementation
as the regulation's draconian provisions themselves. The crucible of
industrial conflict in 1944 was the coal-mining industry, with 1.85 million
days lost to strike action between 28 January and 11 April. Implying that
strikes were being fomented by 'Trotskyites' and other 'anti-war people'
intent on disrupting the allies' invasion preparations, Bevin secured the
agreement of the TUC and employers on 11 April for Regulation 1AA
without refering the matter to Parliament. In the House of Commons Bevan
attacked Bevin for by-passing Parliamentary democracy in this way, an
action representing 'the enfranchisement of the corporate society and the
disfranchisement of the individual'.25 in the same debate the
Common Wealth MP, Sir Richard Acland, ridiculed Bevin's
implication that the miners' action had been underwritten by political
subversion. The Trotskyist organisation concerned had a membership of
500, a fortnightly paper with a circulation of less than 5,000, and a head
office with weekly expenses - including wages - of £10: it could not possibly
have nurtured a strike involving tens of thousands of miners.2 6
23Bullock, V.II , 230-4.
^Michael Foot, Aneurin Bevan 1 1898-1945, pp.460-1.
23Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 399, 1072, 28 April 1944.
2 ^ Ibid., 1144. The organisation concerned was the Revolutionary
Communist Party, product in February 1944 of a merger between the
Workers' International League and the Revolutionary Socialist League - the
latter recognised by the Fourth International since 1939. A historian of the
far left in Britain, John Callaghan, notes that in 1944 the RCP's membership
This conflict did not, of course, lead to the TUC abandoning the party:
the values of loyalty and solidarity were too ingrained, the respect for
majority decision absolute. Bevin duly conceded to the demand expressed at
the December 1944 Party Conference, that Labour fight the 1945 General
Election independently. Any trade union misgivings about abandoning the
coalition might have been assuaged by the sentiment which Bevin himself
had expressed in 1924, when accused of jeopardising the first Labour
Government: whilst governments would come and go, the struggle for
improved workers' conditions would not. This struggle had certainly been
hindered by the Conservative and National Governments between the wars,
but the unions had prospered nevertheless. Clearly the election of a
majority Labour administration would be richly preferable, but with the
new strength and confidence engendered by the war years the unions did
not question their ability to survive further periods of Conservative
Government.
THE NEW SITUATION
The strong current of Labour's history towards the cultivation of a national
rather than a sectional identity, had been greatly underestimated by The
Times leader which greeted the arrival of Labour in office on 27 July 1945.
It was a theme restated by Clement Attlee during the election campaign. In
response to Churchill's notorious 'Gestapo' speech, which had equated
democratic socialism with Nazism, Attlee characterised Labour as the
natural party of Government in Britain:
The Conservative Party remains a class Party. In twenty years in the House
of Commons I cannot recall more than half a dozen from the ranks of the
wage earners. It represents today, as in the past, the forces of property and
privilege. The Labour Party is, in fact, the one Party which most reflects in
its representation and composition all the main streams which flow into
the river of our national life.2 7
The Parliamentary Labour Party which assembled to hear the King's
Speech on 15 August reflected this diversity and apparently indicated that
was only 400, and that a number of its members believed the appellation
'Party' to be ludicrous for such a small organisation; British Trotskyism,
pp.27-9.
^Attlee's broadcast was on 5 June 1945; quoted in Kenneth Harris, Attlee,
pp.256-7.
as Labour's electoral support grew, so its dependence on trade union and
manual working class candidates and support diminished. Of the 393
members 259 were new to the House; the 119 trade union sponsored
members constituted 31 per cent of the total, as opposed to 51 per cent in
1935 and 76 per cent after the 1931 catastrophe.2 8 On the same theme
Margaret Cole estimated on behalf of the Fabian Society that around 150
Labour MPs came from manual working class occupations; of the numerous
professional groups present in the PLP there were now 49 university
lecturers or school teachers, 44 lawyers, 25 journalists, 15 doctors and, in
the party opposed to the Conservatives' 'property and privilege' there was
even room for 25 company directors.29 Given Labour's reliance on miners
in the 1931 Parliament, for Minkin the most telling of these statistics was
that ex-teachers now exceeded ex-miners in the Westminster ranks.3 0 One
former schoolmaster, the new Home Secretary Chuter Ede, was greatly
pleased at this transformation in the PLP's character. On 28 July he noted
in his diary that 'the new Party is a great change from the old. It teems
with bright, vivacious servicemen. The superannuated Trade Union official
seems hardly to be noticeable in the ranks.'3 1
Whilst the proportion of trade unionists was down compared with the
previous Parliament, Attlee acknowledged the tensions that had arisen in
1924 and 1931 within the alliance by installing a greater share of former
trade unionists in his Cabinet than in previous Labour Governments. He
took great care, he told his press secretary Francis Williams, to balance
'intelligentsia' with trade unionists. Thus nine of his twenty Cabinet
Ministers were trade unionists.3 2
The 'mixed constitution' of the Cabinet and Labour's victory at the
polls restored the equilibrium of the labour alliance which had been
disturbed during the war. With the great lynchpin of the trade union
movement, Ernie Bevin, centrally positioned within a majority Labour
Government, and the channels of communication between the movement's
industrial and political leaderships open as never before, the unions were
2&Henry Pelling, The Labour Governments 1945-51, p.43.
29Margaret Cole's Fabian estimates taken from Kenneth O. Morgan, Labour
in Power, p.60.
30jvlinkin, op. cit., p.71.
21 Kevin Jefferys (ed.), Labour and the Wartime Coalition. From the Diary of
James Chuter Ede 1941-1945, p.229.
^^Francis Williams, A Prime Minister Remembers, p.84.
again willing to devolve 'political' responsibility upon the politicians.
There was no doubting the joy with which union leaders greeted the result.
In the Transport and General Workers' Record, Acting General Secretary
Arthur Deakin heralded the arrival of the 'great day which the pioneers of
our Movement could see only in their dreams'.3 3
This restoration of good will between the party and the unions would
prove to be of immeasurable importance to the Government. Ostensibly an
entirely new situation had been created by the electoral verdict,
presenting Labour with unprecedented power and opportunity. Without
the need to co-opt Liberal support, which had trammelled previous Labour
administrations, the huge majority allowed Attlee's Government to press on
with its manifesto commitments. Indeed the two or three years which
followed July 1945 was a period of considerable achievement. Amidst a
flurry of administrative and legislative activity, a number of interwar
labour movement demons were exorcised: the 1927 Trade Disputes and Trade
Unions Act was repealed, and the Coal Mining Industry and the Bank of
England nationalised, along with the railways and the water, gas and
electricity services. A comprehensive system of social insurance was put
into place; and the greatest post-war Labour totem of all, Aneurin Bevan's
National Health Service, was erected on 5 July 1948.
Nonetheless, there were two central problems which the
Government could not legislate away. The war which had been central to
Labour's victory also bequeathed the new administration two huge
dilemmas: a troubling economic perspective and the question of the post¬
war international settlement. The latter proved to be particularly
problematic as the tensions of the Cold War gathered and intensified, with
the quest for agreement between Britain, the USA and the USSR
complicated by the other urgent matter of restoring Europe's shattered
economy. In seeking a way out of these dilemmas the Labour Government
saw fit to enlist help from outwith the Parliamentary Labour Party, with
secret cross-party discussions on foreign affairs often conducted between
the old war-time comrades Attlee, Bevin, Churchill and Eden.34 Perhaps of
greater significance, however, was the contribution of the TUC in
marshalling support for the Government's economic and international
strategies.
33Transport and General Workers' Record, August 1945.
3^Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin Foreign Secretary 1945-51, p.98.
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES
Authoritative published sources estimate that Britain lost approximately
one quarter of its national wealth during the Second World War. This
damage was largely due to the heavy loss of earnings on both visible and
invisible trade. Owing to the needs of war mobilisation, export industries
were deliberately run down after 1939, so that in 1945 manufacturing
exports were 30 per cent of their 1938 level. This deficiency was
exacerbated by the significant diminution of Britain's invisible exports, a
traditionally valuable source of national income. In terms of shipping
tonnage the net loss arising from the war was 28 per cent; foreign assets
had also been lost, the earnings on which had been equivalent to the sum
typically spent on around one quarter of the nation's imports. Collectively
these circumstances confronted the country with a trade deficit which
would only be balanced, and imports of food and raw materials restored to
pre-war levels, if Britain could increase its exports to between 50-75 per
cent above the 1938 figure.^ 5
These difficulties were severely compounded by the American
decision to terminate the Lend-Lease arrangements by which Britain had
been meeting its import expenses. Truman's somewhat precipitate action,
which came on 21 August only six days after V-J Day, left Britain with no
alternative other than to negotiate a new loan agreement with the USA in
order to finance its external deficit and maintain the livelihood of the
nation. Such an agreement, with Keynes operating on the Government's
behalf, was duly negotiated and signed, largely on American terms, in
Washington DC on 6 December.
This extremely grim perspective did not, however, greatly deflect
the Government during its first year in office. Optimism naturally flowed
from the spectacular electoral victory, and in office Labour was buoyed by
its initial legislative achievements and the exuberance of the Chancellor of
the Exchequer, Hugh Dalton. Dalton introduced his first Budget, in
November 1945 - when the Washington Loan negotiations were still
unresolved - with, he told the House of Commons, 'a song in my heart'.3 6
The Chancellor continued to go cheerfully about his business throughout
35Alec Cairncross, Years of Recovery, pp.6-9.
36Quoted in Peter Hennessy, Never Again. Britain 1945-1951, p.90.
1946. With the maintenance of rationing and a general shortage of
consumer demand, exports boomed. In November they reached 111 per cent
of the 1938 total, prompting Dalton to rashly predict: 'If we keep going
together as we have since V-J Day, the shortages and frustrations which
still afflict us will disappear like the snows of winter, and give place to the
full promise of springtime.'3 7
The following year, 1947, saw an enormous change in Britain's
economic fortunes and, for the Government, according to Kenneth O.
Morgan, it was 'a year of almost unrelieved disaster'.3 8 An immensely
harsh winter maximised the effects of a coal crisis which caused massive
short-term disruption to industrial activity, with two million workers
temporarily unemployed.39 This was succeeded by an even more damaging
summer financial storm, and in October the optimistic Dalton - the song
extinguished from his heart - gave way to Sir Stafford Cripps - the
harbinger of austerity - at the Treasury. The symbolism of the switch in
personnel can perhaps be overstated. It had, after all, been Dalton who had
initially recognised Britain's contracting global capacity and forced the
issue of withdrawing economic aid to Greece and Turkey in February
1947 40 Moreover, whilst Peter Hennessy states that no Chancellor 'before
or since' Dalton 'has been such a soft touch for social-spending
ministers',41 Cripps did not appreciably reverse the social welfare progress
which Dalton had financed. Nevertheless, from the autumn of 1947 the
Government re-emphasised that recovery was contingent upon restricting
imports and expanding exports - a conjunction requiring a great deal of
public co-operation and restraint. With Cripps, for Kenneth O. Morgan the
embodiment of 'a new morality and sense of public rectitude',4 2 as
Chancellor, the Government was plainly better equipped to appeal for such
popular support than when served by the less prudent figure of Dalton.
The apparent recovery in 1946 had masked the precarious nature of
Britain's post-war economic life, for despite the boom in exports, the
balance of payments deficit was still £344 million.4 3 This fragility was
■^Quoted in Ibid., p.214.
3^Morgan, op.cit., p.331.
39Ibid., pp.331-33.
49Hennessy, op.cit., p.93.
41 Ibid.
^Kenneth O. Morgan, Labour People, p. 164.
43Hennessy, op.cit., p.214.
exacerbated by the Anglo-American economic relationship's
disequilibrium. Generally speaking, to pay for vital US imports Britain used
up dollars which it could not recoup, as the bulk of British export markets
lay outside the dollar trading area.44 British weakness was illustrated
during the summer of 1947, as the 1945 loan rapidly ebbed away. With
uncertainty surrounding the outcome of Anglo-American negotiations on
US Secretary of State Marshall's proposals for a European Recovery
Programme, the British Treasury prepared a series of austerity measures.
These are discussed by Peter Hennessy in his recent study of Attlee's
Britain, which attaches particular importance to a Treasury document
drawn up by Otto Clarke, 'Marshall Proposals. Alternative Action in event of
breakdown'. Clarke, lately described by his then colleague Alec Cairncross
as the only Treasury official with 'any real flair for general economic
policy',45 stated in his memorandum that without American aid Britain
would have 'to ride the storm with lower imports', but in order to maintain
public morale a programme for independent recovery by 1950 would have
to be put in place. This would necessitate a 'famine' food plan with
compulsory direction of labour to agriculture over the next three years,
and a drastically reduced building programme to save timber, steel and
manpower for export requirements. With no further dollars, elsewhere in
Whitehall it was estimated that the daily ration would be reduced to 1,700
calories - 1,000 less than the wartime minimum.4 6
This difficulty was cruelly exacerbated by the commencement of
sterling convertibility, in accordance with the 1945 loan agreement, on 15
July 1947. A spectacular run on the pound ensued, forcing the Government
to suspend convertibility on 21 August. Cairncross notes that the outflow of
dollars and gold in 1947 increased fourfold on 1946, $4,100 million as
opposed to $900 million.47 in the Cabinet meeting which decided in favour
of suspension on 17 August, Chancellor Dalton noted that on 11 August
alone, $150 million had been lost.4 8
After Cripps became Chancellor on 13 November 1947, Britain's
economic recovery was essentially based on producing enough exports to
44cairncross, op.cit., p.65.
45ibid., p.55.
46Hennessy, op. cit., pp.300-2.
47cairncross, op. cit., p. 121.
48pRO: CAB 128 CM(47)71, 17 August 1947. The departmental locations of the
acronyms attached to the PRO sources are provided separately.
earn the dollars required to maintain imports of food and the raw materials
which were necessary for the maintenance of full employment. This
strategy duly placed fresh demands not only on British manufacturing
industries, but also on the nation's docks through which these exports and
imports had, of necessity, to pass. The strains which this strategy induced
are explored in the bulk of this thesis, which explores the Government's
reaction to the unofficial dock strikes which disrupted British economic
life after 1945.
Broadly speaking, the Government's long-term economic strategy
was largely successful however, being prosecuted with indispensable
support from two sources. Of primary assistance was the US Treasury,
which provided Britain with many of the dollars for which it was
desperate. However, in minimising the costs of the export drive the Attlee
Government enjoyed immensely significant help from its labour alliance
partner, the TUC.
The Government expended a great deal of diplomatic activity in
smoothing relations with the USA after the abandonment of convertibility
in August 1947, which formally contravened the 1945 agreement. However,
the US administration could not afford to be too impatient. International
tension sharpened considerably in 1947, and the view crystalised in
Washington that the best insurance against communist ascendancy.in
Western Europe would be for the United States to guarantee financially the
continent's economic recovery. This perception was given fresh credence
by the communist coup in Czechoslovakia, with the passage of Truman's
Economic Cooperation Act through the Senate on 13 March 1948 only days
after news of the death of Jan Masaryk, Czechoslovakia's anti-communist
and Anglophile Foreign Secretary, in mysterious circumstances in
Prague.^ 9
Otto Clarke's worst-case scenario was duly avoided, with President
Truman signing the Economic Co-operation Bill that would guarantee
European recovery on 3 April 1948. This provided the dollars which formed
a basis for British recovery until the end of 1950. On 25 June the first
meeting between British and American officials on the European Recovery
Programme took place, Leslie Rowan of the British Committee for European
^ 9 Henry Pelling, Britain and the Marshall Plan, p.25; recent research
suggests that Masaryk was murdered by a NKVD-trained Sudetan Czech,
Major Augustin Sram, Robin Bruce Lockhart, 'Who Killed Jan Masaryk?',
History Today, September 1992.
Economic Cooperation welcoming Thomas K. Finletter, Chief of the US
European Cooperation Act mission in London, to the Treasury.
The British and the US Treasuries maintained close contact
throughout the European Recovery Programme's 1948-50 period, most
notably during the 1949 financial crisis, when the post-1947 economic
advance was temporarily halted by a depression in export markets. This
reinflated Britain's gold/dollar and trade deficits, precipitating another
exchange crisis and, eventually, led to the devaluation of sterling from
$4.03 to $2.80 in September. In July US Treasury Secretary John Snyder
held talks in London with Cripps on the disequilibrium between the dollar
and sterling areas, and on 31 August Bevin and Cripps set out across the
Atlantic to inform the US Government of the Cabinet decision to devalue
which had been taken two days previously.^ 0 These talks, held in
Washington, and the devaluation itself, diminished the disequilibrium
between the dollar and sterling areas, and led to a remarkable reversal in
Britain's economic fortunes. In 1947 the gold and dollar deficit totalled
£1,024 million, and the current account deficit £381 million. Through a
shift in the pattern of external trade, with less imports from and more
exports to North America, and through attaining the necessary increase in
overall export activity, up to 80 per cent in excess of the 1938 level, by 1950
the Government had converted these deficits into substantial surpluses:
£308 million and £307 million with respective regard to gold/dollars and
the current account. These restored balances enabled Britain to opt out of
Marshall Aid at the end of 1950, two years earlier than planned.^ 1
Whilst US finance was clearly instrumental to this recovery,
throughout the vital period of Marshall Aid the Labour Government also
enjoyed crucial support from the Trades Union Congress in pursuing its
anti-inflation, export-driven recovery programme.
During Dalton's Chancellorship, the TUC's economic behaviour had
hardly deviated since its response to the wartime coalition's 1944 White
Paper on Employment. This had been to state that the responsibility for
maintaining employment belonged to the Government, which should seek
no sacrifices from trade unionists in pursuing this duty. A TUC 'Interim
Report on Post-War Reconstruction' duly insisted that 'the TUC would have
^Bullock, Ernest Bevin Foreign Secretary 1945-51, pp.706-10 and 716-7;
Pelling, Marshall Plan , pp. 81-85.
^ 1 Bullock, Foreign Secretary, p.718; Cairncross, op.cit., pp.66-86.
at all times to consider whether it was, on balance, better that the objective
[of full employment] should be modified rather than that methods
incompatible with the rights of work people and the objectives of Trade
Unionism should be used to achieve it.'3 2
Even after the election of a Labour administration, the TUC remained
cautious about abandoning its traditional functions and accepting new
obligations. The TUC was a member of the tripartite National Joint Advisory
Council, but Russell Jones has justly characterised this as solely an
'educative forum'.33 Indeed, prior to 1948 it is difficult to identify the type
of mechanical links between the TUC and the state - implied, for instance,
in Keith Middlemas's corporate triangle of union leaders, employers'
representatives and Whitehall bureaucrats3 4 . which would have allowed
the unions to directly influence Government policy. Certainly union
leaders supported the efforts of their labour movement partners, but links
were through the party rather than Whitehall, and union leaders' efforts
in this direction were largely confined to reminding members that the
economic situation was extremely serious. In September 1945, for instance,
Arthur Deakin told readers of the Transport Workers' journal that: 'Without
a flourishing export trade it will be impossible for the people of this
country to raise their own standard of living and at the same time make
their full contribution in co-operation with other nations in the effort to
raise working class living standards throughout the world.'3 3
Such exhortations were undoubtedly significant, but the TUC's
central contribution to economic recovery came after the 1947
convertibility crisis. In November 1947 Cripps informed Cabinet that a
successful export drive would only be obtained if accompanied by effective
wage and price restraint. With a minimum of goods and services available
on the market, general increases in money wages could not be justified. A
wider availability of goods and services would not result, but a build up of
inflationary pressure would take place, further jeopardising Britain's
external deficit as the money cost of exports rose and their marketable
value duly declined. Although it was not the Government's place to
^^Quoted in Russell Jones, Wages and Employment Policy 1936-1985, p.30.
53Ibid„ p.35.
^Middlemas, op.cit.
33 Transport and General Workers' Record, September 1945.
intervene directly in fixing individual incomes, it was essential that firm
guidelines be laid down for those to whom this duty did fall.^ 6
The TUC were informed of this developing strategy at a meeting with
Attlee on 17 November.^7 The General Council responded towards the end of
1947 with an 'Interim Report on the Economic Situation'. This conceded the
potential need for restraint, but insisted upon the unions' prerogative to
police any regulations that were introduced: 'any attempt on the part of an
outside body to regulate or directly control wage movements would have
disastrous effects ... if there was to be greater restraint upon wage
movements it could come only from within the trade union movement
itself.8
In February 1948 the Government issued a Statement on Personal
Incomes, Costs and Prices, which brought the essence of Cripps's argument
for an incomes standstill into the public sphere.^ 9 The TUC were provided
with sufficient reassurances concerning the Government's determination
to restrict prices and profits and the voluntary nature of the standstill, and
a special conference of trade union executive councils on 24 March took
the unprecedented step of accepting, by over three million votes, a pay
freeze in peace-time.
The TUC's co-operation over the White Paper on incomes lasted until
September 1950 and, as separate accounts by Alec Cairncross and Russell
Jones testify, was of immense benefit to the Government.60 Between June
1945 and March 1948 wages advanced by 8-10 per cent. In the eighteen
months from March 1948 the increase was only 3 per cent. After the
further shattering of ministerial confidence which devaluation
represented in September 1949,^1 the TUC position on wages became even
more important. On 23 November the General Council recommended an
extension of the freeze, and agreements that pegged wages to the cost of
living were suspended, on the condition that the retail price index did not
rise above 5 per cent. In the twelve months from September 1949 money
56PRO: CAB 129/CP(47)303, 13 November 1947.
57PRO: CAB 128/CM(47)87, 13 November 1947.
5 8tUC 'Interim Report on the Economic Situation', 1947, quoted in Jones,
op.cit., p.154.
59Statement on Personal Incomes, Prices and Profits (Cmd. 7321 February
1948).
60cairncross, °P- cit-> PP-405-6; Jones, op. cit., pp.43-4.
61pimlott, op.cit., p. 146.
wages increased by 1.4 per cent, and with retail prices rising by 3 per cent
real wages were stationary or falling. This was all the more remarkable
when unemployment was below 300,000, with Cairncross and Jones both
noting that hourly wage rates increased from March 1948 no more rapidly
than between 1934 and 1938, when 2 million workers were unemployed.^ 2
These wage and price movements were complemented by the notable
labour productivity improvements which the TUC had overseen: up by 1.6
per cent per annum from 1945-51; by 2.5 per cent per annum from 1948-51
and by 3.5 per cent per annum in the crucial manufacturing sector in
these last three years.6 3
It is worth re-emphasising that the TUC's more active economic role
from 1948-50, which contributed to the remarkable turn-round in Britain's
economic fortunes during these years, considerably qualified its traditional
responsibilities and functions. Trade Union leaders - most notably in the
docks - paid for this departure in terms of growing rank and file
dissatisfaction and unofficial industrial activity. Yet, in marshalling mass
support behind the Government's economic strategy, they were steadily
affirming the labour alliance 'rules' of behaviour. To recap, these required
union leaders to show, when required, 'solidarity' with their political
comrades, whilst at the same time ensuring the 'best available outcome' for
their members. The timing of the new departure was highly significant.
Before February 1948 the TUC was a relatively inactive economic and
political player, content to watch the Government build upon the the great
economic and social gains which the organised working class had made
since 1940. By the middle of 1947, as Ben Pimlott has recently noted, the
Government's main legislative work 'had been achieved, or was in train'.6 4
This progress would now stand or fall on the basis of the Government's
subsequent economic record - a perspective which may have contributed to
the ascendency of Morrisonian 'consolidation' in the spring of 1948. With
the Labour Government weakening before international economic
pressure, the TUC once again - as in 1931 - offered itself as 'ballast' to the
party. By hardening their position on wages after devaluation, TUC leaders
reinforced their determination to defend Labour comrades in office.
Arthur Deakin, Bevin's successor as the TGWU's General Secretary and the
62cairncross, op. cit., pp.405-6; Jones, op. cit., pp.43-4.
63cairncross, op. cit., pp.18-19.
^Pimlott, op. cit., p. 102.
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dominant TUC figure by the beginning of 1948, encapsulated the industrial
leadership's unwavering loyalty to the political leadership. Deakin's
biographer, Victor Allen, emphasises the extent of Deakin's determination
to support the Government, with the General Secretary fully prepared to
jeopardise his own authority amongst his members:
He possessed a deep loyalty to the labour movement which was epitomised
for him by the Labour Government. In his eagerness to support the
Government he stifled much useful criticism of its activities, for he disliked
anything which could be misconstrued by the general public or used for
political purposes. He was more than an advocate. As far as he could he
applied the policy of wage restraint in his own union and incurred the
displeasure of some of his more militant members. At times he risked the
unity of his organisation and faced large-scale unofficial strikes rather
than make expedient concessions. No Government could have had a more
loyal supporter.^ 5
In abandoning its traditional pursuit of seeking an advance in wage
labour's monetary value, the TUC reordered its priorities to secure the best
bargain for its members. Counter-inflationary mechanisms were essential
lest working class living standards be blown away in a whirlwind of rising
prices and incomes. There was the fear that without TUC assistance the
economy, and with it the Labour Government, would collapse. The General
Council was immensely anxious to avoid this, for by the end of 1947 it was
clear that the Labour Government had hugely benefited the unions and the
working class. The repeal of the hostile 1927 legislation, the consultative
avenues to Whitehall, the limited nationalisation package, the wider social
and welfare benefits and, perhaps most valued of all, the maintenance of
full employment, represented a position of considerable material advance
since 1945.66 The hard and practical heads of the TUC were more than
willing to concede their privileges on wages and productivity in order to
defend these more profound advantages.
66y.L. Allen, 'Arthur Deakin (1890-1955)'; Dictionary of National Biography
1951-60. See also Deakin's entry in the Dictionary of Labour Biography III,
112-7, written by David E. Martin and Bryan Sadler. I adopt the custom
hereafter of providing brief bibliographical references or notes for the
less celebrated characters who are central to the developments under
discussion.
6 6 For instance, Modern Records Centre (hereafter
MRC)/MSS. 126/T&G/1/4/13, Chairman Edgar Fryer's Address to the TGWU
Biennial Delegate Conference, 11 July 1949.
The Labour Governments' economic strategy for recovery, based on
promoting exports with the assistance of Marshall dollars and TUC-policed
wage moderation, had largely worked the trick by the end of 1950. Labour's
final year in office was characterised, however, by a much deteriorating
economic perspective. This decline arose from the outbreak of hostilities in
Korea in June 1950. Under immense pressure from the United States, the
Government responded by adopting a massive rearmaments programme.
The package, enshrined in Hugh Gaitskell's controversial first - and only -
budget in the spring of 1951, cost £4,700 million over three years,67 ancj
dramatically reversed Britain's economic progress. By the end of 1951
Britain's trade and gold/dollar imbalances were again soaring,6 8 ancj jn
1952 the Churchill administration decided to phase the defence estimates in
over four years rather than three.6 9
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
Long before the outbreak of war in Korea these two aspects of political
discourse, economic renewal and international friction, had intersected in
Attlee's Britain; the growth of ideological conflict, particularly from 1947,
constituted a definite framework within which Britain sought to rebuild its
own and the wider European economy with US dollars. Ernest Bevin and
Dean Acheson, his favourite US counterpart, shared an appreciation, albeit
from slightly different ideological perspectives, that communism would
best be resisted in Western Europe by a dual strategy. The first requirement
was to rebuild economic life and so restore popular faith in the political
and market institutions of liberal democracy. The second requirement was
the political will and military capacity to defend liberal democracy and
allow it the opportunity to flourish. Bevin and his American allies believed
that it was in the political interests of communism for economic recovery
to be delayed; and from this assumption it was readily concluded that
communists were the active enemies of recovery, and were saboteurs or
'wreckers', concerned with promoting the economic dislocation that would
act as fertile ground for communism. This belief was naturally to chequer
Bevin's view of unofficial strike action in the British docks.
^Morgan, Labour People, p.224.
^Cairncross, 0p. cit., p. 154.
69Kenneth O. Morgan, The People's Peace, pp. 126-7.
Fittingly enough, then, Bevin's assessment of communism's
disruptive nature was initially derived from his long trade union career. In
accordance with trade union values of democracy and loyalty, Bevin
cherished majority decisions and vilified those who refused to observe
them: the communist-instigated National Minority Movement's 'fractional'
industrial activity in the 1920s and 1930s had duly inspired his loathing.
However, in the protracted sessions of the Council for Foreign Ministers
which, mostly fruitlessly, sought to settle the array of international
questions arising out of the war, Bevin found intransigent Soviet diplomats
less easy to deal with than recalcitrant London busmen or Glaswegian dock
workers. This exhausting round of talks and negotiations consumed a total
of about eight working months, starting in London in September to 1945
and closing without resolution in Paris in June 1949. The gloominess of
these gatherings was punctuated by a number of rather more remarkable,
if no less depressing developments.
The attention of students of Cold War history is generally drawn to
Churchill's 'iron curtain' speech at Fulton, Missouri on 5 February 1946.
However, Victor Rothwell has asserted that the Foreign Office majority did
not regard Churchill's remarks favourably, seeing them as 'premature'.7 0
It is of much greater ideological interest, therefore, to consider the
developments which marked the emergence of two potentially
irreconcilable power blocs in 1947. In the spring of 1947 Britain's
economic weaknesses forced the abandonment of its military commitments
in Greece and Turkey, the primary purpose of which since at least 1944 had
been to forestall partisan Communist movements. Determined that
communism would not go unchallenged on the Aegean, Bevin asked the US
Government to assume Britain's obligations in the area. This offer was
famously taken up in Truman's speech to both Houses of Congress on 12
March. The 'Truman Doctrine', as the President's restatement of US foreign
policy principles became known, established a formal commitment to the
global containment of communism. The USA he cast as the guardian of all
'free peoples' who were seeking to choose between the two 'alternative
ways of life': one being based on 'the will of the majority', and the other
'upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority'.7 1
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These comments were made on the same day that a session of the
Council of Foreign Ministers opened in Moscow, but Bullock notes that the
talks were not derailed as a result. However, the President's open statement
that the world now consisted of two competing and ultimately
irreconcilable political systems certainly informed the inflammatory
Soviet response to the Marshall initiative. Speaking on 5 June at Harvard
University, the Secretary of State gave economic substance to Truman's
political observations in March, announcing that the US was prepared to
underwrite a comprehensive recovery programme for Europe.7 2 On 25
June Pravda announced that the programme was 'apparently intended to
solve the American export problem' and, if American involvement in
Greece and Turkey was anything to go by, it would 'amount to interference
in the internal affairs of European states and an infringement of their
sovereignty'.^ 3
It is clear that the US offered Marshall Aid to the USSR in the
understanding that it would be rejected. As Peter Hennessy has shown,
Stalin and Molotov knew that if the US was able to finance an economic
renaissance in Europe, Soviet economic and political domination in Eastern
Europe would be over.74 When European representatives, including
Molotov, met to discuss their response to the Marshall offer in Paris on 27
June, Bevin and Georges Bidault, the French Foreign Secretary, were both
keen to play down their opposition to Soviet participation. Bevin was
anxious not to attract the charge of precipitating an anti-Soviet bloc; whilst
Bidault was preoccupied with the Parti Communiste Francais's status as the
largest single grouping in the National Assembly, and the growing
industrial conflict which the PCF was exploiting if not promoting.75 Yet
privately Bevin and Bidault believed that Soviet participation in the
programme would further obstruct the economic restoration of Europe.
They were both relieved, therefore, when Molotov abandoned the talks on 2
July, repeating Pravda's charges that the programme would constitute
unwarranted interference in European political and economic life. The
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implications of the Soviet walk-out were immediately evident, possibly
because they had been anticipated: 'This really is the birth of the Western
bloc', whispered Bevin to his senior official Piers Dixon,7 6 and the blame
for splitting Europe and the world down the middle could now be attached to
Stalin. A turning point, not just in terms of Britain's economic recovery,
but in the development of the Cold War, had been reached.7 7
The Soviet bloc's formal riposte came in September, with the
establishment in Warsaw of the Communist Bureau of Information and
Propaganda, or Cominform. Comprising the seven ruling parties in
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, the Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia plus the French and Italian parties, the new international was
activated by Stalin to unify communist activity in Eastern Europe and
wring a fresh policy twist from communists in Western Europe. Delivering
the Cominform's foundation speech, Soviet Politburo member A.A. Zhdanov
said that the international situation was characterised by 'the imperialist
and anti-democratic camp having as its basic aim the establishment of the
world domination of American imperialism and the smashing of
democracy, and the anti-imperialist and democratic camp having as its
basic aim the undermining of imperialism, the consolidation of democracy
and the eradication of the remnants of fascism'. This 'Two Camps' thesis was
published in Communist Party newspapers across the world on 5 October,
and complemented on the same day by a statement broadcast from Moscow
which revived the sectarian 'class against class' analysis of the Comintern's
1928-33 Third Period. This drew attention to the 'special place in the
imperialists' arsenal of tactical weapons' which was occupied by
'treacherous' western European socialists, including Attlee and Bevin, who
hid behind a socialist mask in order to deceive the working class.7 8
There were clear limitations to this initiative. Under Stalin's
leadership the activities of the old Communist International had been
bound by the requirements of Soviet foreign policy, operating as a
counter-revolutionary instrument in China in the 1920s and in Spain from
1936. The Cominform was even more more unambiguously devoted to the
Soviet foreign policy. 'So little', notes Isaac Deutscher, 'did Stalin think of
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turning the Cominform into any genuine instrument of international
revolution that he did not ask the Chinese or other Asian parties to adhere
to the new organisation. His chief concern, outside the Soviet "sphere of
influence", was to adjust the policies of the French and Italian Communists
to the new needs of his diplomacy.'7 9
Nevertheless, the establishment of Cominform does represent an
important reference point in the cold war's intensification, for the west
read much into its vilification of French Socialists and British Labourites,
and the task which the new organisation set for Communist Parties in the
'imperialist camp': namely to 'head the resistance to the plans of imperialist
expansion and aggression in all respects - State, political, economic and
ideological'.80 Shorn of Stalinist verbiage, this implied firstly an attempt to
separate social democratic leaders from their working class followers in
the west; and secondly, a threat to disrupt the Marshall Aid-driven process
of European recovery through reconstituted working class movements.
The British Trade Union Movement was fully alive to Cominform's
apparent threat, and the guiding principle that had shaped its position on
economic recovery - the defence of trade unionism - also ensured that the
TUC would strongly support Bevin's anti-communist foreign policy. In the
difficult 1948-49 period which followed the establishment of Cominform
and the collapse of the Council of Foreign Ministers in December 1947, the
crucial European developments to be recounted are as follows: in 1948, the
Communist coup in Czechoslovakia on 25 February, Truman's signature of
the Economic Co-operation Bill on 3 April, the defeat of the anti-Marshall
Aid PCI-PSI alliance in the Italian general election on 18 April, and the
Soviet blockade of Berlin which began on 24 June; in 1949, Bevin's
signature of the NATO Pact on 4 April, and on 12 May the lifting of the
Berlin blockade and the approval of the NATO Pact in the House of
Commons. Throughout these troubled times Attlee's Government enjoyed
full support from the TUC. As on economic questions, Government-TUC
cooperation on international affairs was organised through party rather
than state mechanisms. At Labour Conferences, for instance, block votes
assiduously delivered by the General Council's 'big battalions' - Deakin of
the Transport Workers, Charlie Dukes of the General and Municipal
Workers and Will Lawther of the Mineworkers - annually lent massive
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weight to the defeat of Bevin's foreign policy dissentients.8 1 This support
was derived from the informal rules of the labour alliance, which required
these and other General Council heavyweights to demonstrate 'solidarity'
with their political comrades. The TUC's anti-communism was also derived
from the reordered priorities of trade unionism in the new situation of Cold
War. As in the 1930s when the TUC stance on collective security and
rearmament had been taken to counter the threat of fascism to working
class industrial organisations, so did the TUC in the later 1940s enter the
international fray to defend trade unionism against communism.
There was, in addition, a long history of conflict between
communists and their socialist and labourist opponents in the British
labour movement, dating from the very foundation of the Communist Party
of Great Britain in 1920. The new party had sought affiliation to the Labour
Party, taking Lenin's advice that to work for a Labour Government which
would rapidly discredit reformist socialism - 'support Henderson in the
same way as the rope supports a hanged man' - would readily equip
communism with an avenue to the organised working class. 8 2 With
affiliation to Labour denied them, the CPGB attempted to gain a foothold in
trade unions. To this end, again in accordance with communism's
international tactics, the National Minority Movement was established in
1924. In this initiative the Party enjoyed greater success, with the NMM
candidate and communist sympathiser Arthur Cook elected as Secretary of
the Miners Federation in 1924.8 3 The TUC was greatly antagonised by these
activities, interpreting centrally controlled NMM groups as a threat to
trade union democracy, and the factional 'political' campaigns as
jeopardising labour movement unity.8 4
The wider labour movement was further repelled by the Stalinist
Comintern's Third Period 'Class against Class' analysis, adopted by the CPGB
in 1928, which Cominform was to revive in 1947.85 Labour's industrial
and political leaders were characterised as 'social fascists', with their
8^Minkin, op. cit., p.64.
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attempts to reform capitalism making them the chief enemy of the working
class. As the true identity of the greatest threat to international workers,
Nazism, revealed itself in the thirties, the Comintern analysis was again
transformed and the TUC's patience with communists finally snapped. The
1934 Popular Front campaign launched by communists for concerted
working class and progressive resistance to fascism was rebutted in October
by the TUC's 'Black Circular', which barred communists from Trades
Councils and urged unions to exclude communists from office.86 The labour
movement's general exasperation with the CPGB was compounded in
October 1939, after the Party's Central Committee had belatedly realigned its
position on the war in accordance with the Nazi-Soviet Pact. On 4
September the Daily Worker had proclaimed its fullest support for the anti¬
fascist war, and on 14 September the Party published a pamphlet by
General Secretary Harry Pollitt, entitled How to Win the War. Once the
implications of Stalin's new strategy had been fully absorbed however, on 4
October the Central Committee denounced as 'imperialist' the war in which
the wider labour movement was fighting for its very survival.8 7 With the
Nazi invasion of the USSR in June 1941, the CPGB recast itself as a vigorous
advocate of increased industrial production, and was certainly the fiercest
opponent of unofficial strike action.8 8 The truce with the wider labour
movement was an uneasy one, however, with the CPGB holding out for the
maintenance of a coalition Government long after Labour and the TUC had
recognised the wisdom of fighting the 1945 election independently.
After the war this historical tension was given a fresh twist by the
activities of the World Federation of Trade Unions, of which the TUC was a
founding member. Established at Paris in October 1945 on the foundations
of the 1942 Anglo-Soviet Trade Union Committee, the WFTU sought to unite
trade unionists across international and ideological barriers, but has been
described by Denis MacShane as 'a fascinating paradigm' for students of the
Cold War; established 'to bring together communist and non-communist
86john Stevenson and Chris Cook, The Slump, p.143.
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unions, it fell apart as the Cold War gathered in intensity'.^ 9, Arthur
Deakin assumed the WFTU Presidency in September 1946 against the advice
of Bevin, who warned that the trade union international would gradually
become subordinate to Soviet demands and interests, and that a non-
communist president would lend the de facto communist organisation a
false legitimacy.90 These cautionary words accurately anticipated Deakin's
WFTU presidential experiences. In virtually every sphere of WFTU activity,
from demands that it support a trade embargo against fascist Spain - which
the British Government opposed and which Deakin resisted - to the sending
of international delegations to Asia and Africa, the President detected the
spectre of ulterior communist motive. Meanwhile, communists on the
body's Secretariat, such as Louis Saillant of the French CGT and the Soviet
leader V.V. Kuznetsov, took equal ideological objection to their President's
position on a number of other international developments, most notably
Marshall Aid.
Indeed, it was this very question, the WFTU's response to the
European Recovery Programme, which led to the organisation's demise. At
the Executive Bureau on 20 November 1947 Saillant and his allies resisted
an attempt by James Carey of the American Congress of Industrial
Organisations formally to pronounce WFTU support for the ERP.9' With an
acrimonious session of the Council of Foreign Ministers already underway
in London, the TUC seized the initiative, warning that if the WFTU had not
discussed the Marshall Plan by mid-February, then it would consider itself
free to open discussions with national labour organisations which favoured
the programme. Two days after the Foreign Ministers' meeting had
adjourned without resolution on 15 December, Bevin told Marshall that the
'essential task was to create confidence in Western Europe that further
communist inroads would be stopped', and that in this he was 'much
fortified' by the TUC's initiative.92 Bevin appears to have disingenuously
overlooked his own role in the development of TUC international strategy.
After Saillant had responded to the General Council's December ultimatum
by stating that the Executive Bureau could not possibly meet before 1 April,
the TUC pressed ahead with its threat, and organised a conference of 26
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organisations from 14 countries. Held in London on 9 and 10 March, within
days of the coup in Czechoslovakia,.this gathering established a Trade
Union Advisory Committee to effect liaison with the Committee for
European Economic Cooperation which was administering the Marshall
Plan in London. Henry Pelling notes Bevin's hand in the timing of the
conference in a memo from the Foreign Secretary to his labour attache in
Washington on 19 February: 'I had advocated early in March because this
would have a steadying effect in Europe, and also show America before the
US vote on the ERP where genuine trade unionists stood.'9 3
Bevin also helped to secure the presence at this conference of the
virulently anti-communist American Federation of Labour. The AFL had
refused to join the WFTU because of its communist elements, and had
eschewed any co-operation with its national rival, the CIO, on similar if
clearly unjustifiable grounds. The cold war situation brought the AFL new
opportunities to pursue its intolerance of communism. In 1947 its European
representative, Irving Brown, in concert with the US security forces and
using CIA funds, helped to establish the French break-away labour
organisation Force Ouvriere to undermine the CGT. Brown then approached
Bevin, asking him to push the TUC into an open breech with the WFTU.
Bevin and the TUC were reluctant to do this; as with the shadow boxing over
the European response to Marshall's offer the previous summer, they were
anxious not to allow domestic communist opponents any opportunity to
exploit the embedded hostility of the labour movement to 'splitters'.
However, again operating through his Washington labour attache, Bevin
steadied the AFL with the assurance that he was encouraging the TUC to
organise the London conference.9 4
The breakdown in the WFTU 's internal relations dragged on for
almost a whole year until the anti-communist unions seceded on 17 January
1949. The formal occasion for the final break was communist insistence on
the establishment of centralised trade departments which were plainly
irreconcilable with the western pluralistic tradition of 'separate sphere'
trade union democracy. However, the central impediment to a split had
been removed at the Trades Union Congress in September 1948, when
Deakin had obtained for the General Council plenary powers to proceed on
the WFTU as it saw fit. This allowed the TUC to withdraw constitutionally,
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without drawing accusations of arbitrarily splitting the international body,
and the decision to withdraw was endorsed by at the 1949 Congress by
6,250,000 votes to 1,017,000.95 Having abandoned the WFTU, the General
Council set about cultivating the international links which had been
formally established at the London conference in March 1948. As the WFTU
prepared to transfer its organisational headquarters from Paris to Prague,
the TUC arranged a paving meeting of a new international. This was held in
London on 25 and 26 June 1949, and an International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions was formally launched five months later.9 6
DOMESTIC COMMUNIST INFLUENCE
The TUC's anti-communism also required Deakin and his colleagues to resist
communism within their own organisations. Communism had made very
little electoral headway in Britain. Within the context of Labour's 1945
landslide only two communists, Willie Gallacher in West Fife and Phil
Piratin in London's Mile End, had been elected. Nevertheless, it did appear
to be gaining industrial strength, and from 1947 the General Council was
increasingly concerned, given the course of international and economic
developments, that communists might be able to disrupt seriously Britain's
recovery.
In February 1948, on the day that the wage freeze was launched, The
Times published an article by its Industrial Correspondent on the extent of
communism's industrial progress. This indicated that communism's
industrial base lay in the two large craft unions, with party members
contesting control of the Engineers' Executive and occupying the
presidency and secretaryship of the Electricians. These represented two
potentially significant holdings, with the Engineers carrying a
membership of 723,000 and the Electricians 162,000. However, the overall
balance of TUC forces greatly hindered the prospect of much further
communist advance. In the TGWU - which, with a membership of 1,324,000,
was Britain's largest Union in 194897 - communists had made some
headway. They held 8 seats on the 38-member General Executive Committee
and 3 positions out of 8 on the Finance and General Purposes Committee: an
95Allen, Trade Union Leadership, pp.306-12.
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advance sufficient to place a single communist, Bert Papworth, on the TUC
General Council as a TGWU representative. However, like Bevin before him,
Deakin was a skilful operator in by-passing left opposition, and in 1948
enjoyed the further political advantage of there being no Biennial Delegate
Conference at which communist opponents might have attempted to rally
opposition to the wage freeze and his support for Bevin's 'warmongering'
foreign policy. The Miners' election of a communist, Arthur Horner, as
secretary in 1946 ran against the overall balance of power in the NUM; on
the executive communists held only 6 positions from 28.98 Moreover, the
union's two other dominant personalities, President Will Lawther and the
Northumbrian leader, Sam Watson, largely shared Deakin's assumptions on
the nature of communism and the unions' responsibilities to the Labour
Government. The same could be said of Tom Williamson, General Secretary
of the National Union of General and Municipal Workers, which had never
departed from its 1926-8 position that membership of the CP or National
Minority Movement was 'inconsistent with loyal attachment to the Union',
effectively barring communists from office.9 9
The combined weight of these three unions alone, around three
million votes in an affiliated TUC membership of 7,937,091, was indicative of
the strength of the TUC's anti-communist majorityJ 90 Nevertheless, with
Deakin as its dominant figure, the General Council regarded communist
activity with intense vigilance. A communist General Secretary of the
TGWU was improbable,! 01 but a communist majority on either of the
Union's important committees could not necessarily be ruled out in the
long term. Worryingly for the TUC, communists were still emerging with
success in the spate of trade union electoral activity which had
accompanied, since the war, an unprecedented turnover in the personnel
of trade union leadership. The Times's industrial correspondent pointed
this out: 'In spite of the sharpening cleavage between Communist and non-
Communist based on international divisions, Communists on the whole have
9%The Times, 9 February 1948.
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held their ground in these national elections, and have maintained their
disproportionate influence. '1 02
The General Council's position on the WFTU, ERP, wages and
productivity was vindicated at the TUC conference in September 1948, and
with its authority enhanced, the General Council duly turned attention to
the question of communism's role in the British labour movement. Writing
to TUC General Secretary Vincent Tewson on 26 October, Deakin stated that,
'it was necessary for the General Council to give consideration to the
continued interference by the Communist Party with the working of the
Trades Councils and Trade Unions ... and to decide upon what action should
be taken.'10 3
The General Council on 27 October duly approved the publication of a
short statement 'Trade Unions and Communism'. This emphasised the links
between Cominform's opposition to the Marshall Plan, the Communist
Party's opposition to the economic policy which had been agreed at the
recent Margate TUC, and unofficial industrial action:
The Communist Parties, under the direction of the Cominform, have been
specifically ordered to oppose the Marshall Plan. Statements made officially
by spokesmen of the Communist Party prove beyond question that sabotage
of the European Recovery Programme is its present aim. Communist
influences are everywhere at work to frame industrial demands for
purposes of political agitation; to magnify industrial grievances; and to
bring about stoppages in industry.
It is clear that the Communist Parties are doing their utmost to wreck
the entire recovery efforts of Britain and of the European countries which
have accepted the offer of American co-operation and financial aid. The
General Council of the Trades Union Congress, therefore, direct the serious
attention of all trade unionists to the malignant character of Communist
agitation and organisation. They urge the Executives of all affiliated
Unions, their District and Branch Committees, and responsible officers and
loyal members to counteract every manifestation of Communist influences
within their Unions; and to open the eyes of all workpeople to the
dangerous subversive influences which are being engineered in
opposition to the declared policy of the Trade Union Movement.104
The statement, issued to the press and circulated to the TUC's affiliated
organisations, was re-issued one month later along with a subsequent
statement which the General Council had authorised on 24 November. The
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extended pamphlet, Defend Democracy, strongly re-affirmed traditional
trade union values: it was the duty of every trade unionist to observe
loyally decisions taken by a democratic majority. This was contrasted with
the fractious behaviour of the communist minority, which was not
prepared to accept the majority verdict passed at Margate by the TUC on a
number of issues. In defending political and trade union democracy against
communism, the pamphlet crucially observed: 'It is a matter for
consideration by the Unions whether it is consistent with the obligations of
loyalty to the policy of the Union and to the Movement as a whole that any
member should serve on the Communist Party industrial sub-committees or
on the national committees of the Communist Party whilst holding
executive or delegate office in the Union.'105
The statement thus enabled unions to exclude communists from
official positions; but the initiative's significance transcended the General
Council's desire to exclude communists from union office. The very fact of
the anti-communist initiative emanating from within the labour movement
was perceived by the TUC as indispensable to its success. Exhortations from
the Government, even a Labour Government, would not have the same
impact, and any intervention from employers would certainly prove
counter-productive. The labour alliance 'rules' of behaviour had required
the TUC 'voluntarily' to police the Government's wages policy; these rules
also determined that the industrial organisations of the working class
would be the only effective instruments for marshalling wider ideological
resistance to the communism that threatened the survival of these
organisations. On 28 October Tewson was contacted by a London
manufacturing employer who expressed pleasure at reading the General
Council's 'forthright and realistic' declaration in the evening papers, and
asking, 'if you will provide us with a full copy of it, and allow us to reprint
it and distribute it amongst our workpeople'. This request elicited a highly
significant response from the TUC, with George Woodcock, Tewson's
assistant, replying on 1 November, 'I am very sorry but I do not think that
we can give you permission to reprint the statement for distribution in this
way. It would, I am sure, go a long way to destroy the value of the effect of
105MRC/MSS.292/23.1/27, TUC pamphlet Defend Democracy.
the statement if it were to be reproduced and circulated by an
employer.' * 06
The propaganda offensive was maintained in 1949. The TUC's
withdrawal from the WFTU was accompanied by a second General Council
pamphlet, The Tactics of Disruption, which restated the unscrupulous and
fractious methods of the CPGB as it sought to capture strategic positions in
unions and trades councils.'07 At the same tjme the TGWU, the TUC's largest
affiliate, began its own internal anti-communist campaign, six months
before a Biennial Delegate Conference at which Deakin intended to secure
rule changes that would exclude communists from office. Writing in the
Record, he repeated the charges made against communism in the TUC
pamphlets, and warned that international communism planned to disrupt
Britain's economic recovery with a concerted campaign of strike action in
the year ahead.'08 On the eve of the July Conference he heightened the
debate's temperature, claiming that the on-going unofficial dock strike
vindicated his January forecast. In a Record article entitled 'Trade
Unionism v. Communism: The Gloves Are Off!' Deakin asserted:
We must take active, practical and immediate steps to deal with the menace
in our midst. ... Those people who assume unofficial leadership, who are
constantly to the forefront in every dispute which arises, must be dealt
with and given their marching orders.'0 9
During the conference which followed, Edgar E. Fryer, the Union's
Chairman, re-emphasised the twin dangers of unofficial strike action and
communist interference, and the rule changes excluding communists from
office with effect from 1 January 1950, were duly obtained.''0 Five months
later, the General Executive also initiated disciplinary proceedings against
eight members who had been prominent in the London unofficial dock
strike, which led to three expulsions from the Union in April 1950.' ' '
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The TGWU rule changes, described by the Daily Worker as a
'cowardly decision", 1 12 took effect quickly. Within two months Bert
Papworth was attending his final TUC General Council meeting, the minutes
of which only record - without apparent irony - that:
The Chairman [Tewson] referred to the retirement from the General
Council of Mr Cowley, Mr Wolstonecroft and Mr Burrows and to the
termination of membership of the Council of Mr Papworth. He expressed on
behalf of the Council the good wishes to those members. Mr Papworth
suitably responded. 1 1 3
At the General Council in February 1950 consideration was given to the
possible establishment of a National Anti-Communist Committee. Deakin
rejected the notion out of hand, and with Tewson's support the matter was
dropped. 1 Later in the year, as the Korean War revived international
tension, Deakin would return to the question of communism's role in
British trade unions. Indeed, in the company of the Archbishop of
Canterbury the TGWU General Secretary was to press, in vain, for the
banning of the CPGB. This is discussed in the final chapter of this thesis. In
the spring of 1950 however, with economic recovery underway,
international communism apparently contained, and of course the Labour
Government re-elected - albeit with a drastically reduced majority - the
General Council was happy that its contributions to the labour alliance had
fully been paid.
CONCLUSION
The opening chapter of this thesis has been concerned, essentially, with
the development of two general, closely-related themes. The first concerns
the historical nature of the often misunderstood relationship between the
Labour Party and the Trade Unions, which has never prevented Labour
from laying claim to protect interests beyond its original constituent basis.
The other relates how the 1945 Labour Government was occupied with
perplexing economic and international questions as much as with the
establishment of 'New Jerusalem', and enjoyed valuable support from the
TUC in attempting to cultivate economic regeneration and international
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containment of communism. This assistance from the TUC - coming to its
Government's aid - on economic and international matters, represents the
point at which the twin themes of the labour alliance's historical character
and the nature of the particular Labour Government intersect.
The chapters which follow have a more specific focus: the port
transport industry and dock workers' unofficial strike action in the six
years which followed the 1945 General Election. This discussion, paying due
attention to the difficulties which the Labour Governments experienced in
a particular area of the industrial economy, will bring fresh
understanding to the two themes referred to in the previous paragraph.
Firstly, the governments' pugnacious response to unofficial dock strikes,
which was motivated by broader economic and international (or
ideological) considerations rather than the traditional industrial
assumptions that might have been expected from an administration not
short of trade union experience, revealed Labour's national rather than
sectional aspirations under Attlee and Bevin. Secondly, and more
importantly, the docks provided a particularly stern test for the post-1945
Labour alliance. At a time of great economic emergency, TGWU officials in
the docks were periodically unable to exert the sort of discipline amongst
their members which the Government demanded.
CHAPTER 2
THE SITUATION AT THE DOCKS
THE PORTS AS A SPECIAL CASE
The success of the 1945-51 Labour Governments has been partly measured by
some historians in terms of the relatively calm industrial scene. Kenneth O.
Morgan contrasts the two post-war periods: 178,000,000 working days lost to
strikes from 1918-23, and only 9,730,000 from 1945-50. This phenomenon he
ascribes to the 1945 emphasis on social spending and full employment.
Moreover, a 'decisive commitment was made to removing the discredited
managements of the coal and other industries, instead of returning to the
follies of "decontrol" and private capitalism', as had happened after the First
World War.* These observations - coming from one of the 1945-51
Governments' leading historians - provide an extremely interesting
perspective on the situation at the docks. In the port transport industry
'private capitalism' had been partially fettered since the First World War. The
process of regulation - continuing after 1918 - had been consolidated by Ernest
Bevin during the Second World War, and by the 1947 Dock Labour Scheme. The
latter measure was regarded by the Government and the Transport and
General Workers' Union as a particular triumph, involving significant and
lasting benefit for the workforce. Nonetheless, the industry witnessed a
disproportionate level of strike activity. In the seven calendar years 1945-51,
14.27 million working days were lost in all industries. Of these, 2.89 million
were lost in the docks, where only about 80,000 people were actually employed.
By way of comparison, during the same period 3.97 million days were lost in
the traditionally unruly coal mining industry, where approximately 700,000
men were employed. In crude terms, the average docker was on strike six times
more often than the average coal miner.^ This relatively high level of strike
activity in the docks industry - at a time when its labour relations were
1 Kenneth O. Morgan, Labour in Power 1945-1951, p.499. Morgan's figures, it
perhaps should be said, are a bit confusing. From the Statistical Table
provided in Henry Pelling, A History of British Trade Unionism, pp.261-3, it
would appear that Morgan's 9.73 million days were lost in the five calender
years 1946-50. For the seven calender years 1945-51, the aggregate figure
was 14,260,000. Pelling cites the source of these statistics (Ministry of
Labour Gazette); Morgan does not.
^PRO: LAB 34/60-67, Trade Disputes (All Industries) 1945-51.
undergoing substantial reform - singles this area of the economy out as a
subject of particular historical concern: developments within the industry
between 1945 and 1951 heightened the problems facing the Governments; they
also help to clarify for the historian of these Governments what these
problems were.
The Labour Governments were always extremely sensitive to the
incidence of strike action in the docks, particularly given the industry's
central importance to Britain's economic recovery. With imported food and
raw materials, and manufacturing exports - the trade essential to maintaining
national economic life - of necessity passing through the ports, any
dislocation was extremely unwelcome. When dockers went on strike the
Government sought to remind them of the economic consequences of their
actions; of the price being paid by their comrades in the labour movement and
fellow British citizens in lost imports arising from delays in the turn-round of
shipping. Apart from a celebrated broadcast made by Prime Minister Clement
Attlee during the London dock strike of June 1948,3 however, these appeals
were largely unsuccessful. With persuasion alone generally failing, the
Government was prepared to use more active strike-breaking methods. Large
numbers of troops were deployed in the docks on six separate occasions:
during two strikes in 1945, and once each in 1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950. 'Join the
army and see Smithfield', went one Cockney barb, as troops in and around the
Port of London became a regular sight. Conscripts also saw action in other
major docks - Avonmouth, Bristol, Glasgow, Liverpool and Southampton.4 This
thesis seeks to place the unofficial dock strikes in the context of the
Government's economic and international problems, and for this purpose the
nature of the stoppages, and the extent of the military intervention, will be
explored in separate chapters on three of these six disputes. These three
centred around various ports in October 1945; in London in June 1948; and on
the Avon, the Mersey and in London again between May and July 1949. The
three are singled out, firstly, because they were by far the largest disputes in
the docks during the period, and secondly, because of the significant contrast
in the Government's handling of the three stoppages, as the wider economic
and international problems grew in intensity from 1947 onwards.
All of these strikes were unofficial. Under the wartime emergency
regulation, Compulsory Arbitration Order 1305, which remained in force until
^Kenneth Harris, Attlee , pp.422-3.
^Steve Peak, Troops in Strikes, pp. 83-98.
1951, official strikes were expressly forbidden. In any event the dockers'
official industrial leadership, the Transport and General Workers' Union was,
as a determined supporter of the Labour Government that was bringing
unprecedented economic and social benefits to its members, implacably
opposed to strike action. Yet the willingness of dockers to strike - in defiance
of the law, the Government and their Union leaders - sat readily with the often
turbulent and - for the workforce - sometimes painful history of the industry
since the late nineteenth century.
Fernand Braudel, the celebrated French historian, has emphasised the
importance of interpreting history in as long a historical context as possible.
A human being operates, he wrote, 'in a landscape in which the infinite
perspectives of the long-term, la longue duree, stretch into the distance both
behind him and before'.^ As for the Mediterranean in the Age of Philip II, so
for the Avon, the Clyde, the Mersey and the Thames in the Age of Arthur
Deakin. Preliminary comment on the long-term structural features of British
port labour provides an invaluable initial perspective on the short-term
events which surrounded the 1945 Labour Government's experiment in reform
with the 1947 Dock Labour Scheme. This chapter examines the Scheme's
origins: the immediate impact of wartime developments and the more remote
accumulation of events between the Edwardian era and 1939. This discussion
will bring out the intrinsic problems of dock labour reform, and indicate that
the Scheme did not fully resolve these problems, which, left in abeyance, were
to dog the 1945-51 Labour Governments.
THE LONG-TERM ANTECEDENTS AND ORIGINS OF THE 1947 DOCK
LABOUR SCHEME
The port transport industry was transformed by the huge expansion of British
commercial activity in the nineteenth century; with the handful of harbour
cities that were central to economic life in 1945 - most notably London and
Liverpool - established in their importance by the late Victorian era.6 An
equally significant legacy of the nineteenth century, perhaps, was the system
of casual labour relations, with the bulk of the workforce recruited on a daily,
5Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean in the Age of
Philip II, p.664.
^Gordon Phillips and Noel Whiteside, Casual Labour. The Unemployment
Question in the Port Transport Industry 1880-1970, pp.12-13.
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or even half-daily basis. This had survived the scrutiny of the 1905-14
reformist Liberal administrations, the First World War and the interwar efforts
of the TGWU, as well as the limited 'decasualisation' legislation of 1940-41.
Indeed the 1947 Dock Labour Scheme, a subject of discussion later in this
chapter, also failed to eliminate casualism which was not entirely dispensed
with until 1967 by a later Labour Government.^
Fernand Braudel's assumptions about the nature of human society's
historical development, shaped centrally by imperceptibly changing
environmental factors, might plausibly be applied to the British port transport
industry, and more particularly to the longevity of casual labour in this
industry. While casualism's endurance may be attributed to the conservatism
of employers and dock workers alike, with each side of industry resistant to
reform,& the employers' position in the first instance was informed by the
physical geography of the British Isles. The majority of the islands' ports,
unlike many on Continental Europe, were tidal and the flow of ships into
British harbours was uneven as a result. With another environmental variable
being wind - in terms both of speed and direction - employers were persuaded
that they ought only to recruit workers as and when the presence of ships
required.9 The apparent wisdom of this course was further emphasised by the
fluctuating nature of international trade, and the large reserve army of
labour which was available to them. Employers defended this position on three
other counts: firstly, regular workers were by nature less productive than
casual employees owing to the greater security of their position; secondly, as
employers they believed that a permanent system would deny them their
reserved right to choose specialised workers themselves; and thirdly,
decasualisation would ultimately strengthen the position of organised
labour. 1 "
Employers seeking to maintain this position at the docks faced their
first serious challenge towards the end of the nineteenth century. The year
1889 might reasonably be cited as an important watershed, containing the
great strike of August and September in the Port of London, and the
publication of Charles Booth's preliminary research on social conditions in
^Stephen Hill, The Dockers. Class and Tradition in London , p. 14.
^Jonathan Schneer, 'The War, The State and the Workplace: British Dockers
During 1914-1918', in J.E.Cronin and J.Schneer (eds.), Social Conflict and
the Political Order in Modern Britain, p.97.
9Ibid.
lOphillips and Whiteside, op. cit., pp. 55-57.
London's east end. Although John Lovell has emphasised that important
developments in dock labour organisation had taken place prior to 1889,1 1 the
conjunction of industrial upheaval and the revelation that considerable
economic hardship characterised work and life in the Empire's first city,
prompted at least the beginnings of wider public interest in the docks
industry. 1 2
Booth and other observers in the 1890s indicated the existence in the
docks of a body of steady and reliable men, but it was to other findings in their
work that public attention was largely paid. Booth was concerned, among
many other things, in maximising the employment opportunities for the
reliable men. This involved demonstrating that the casual system allowed
many people who were unwilling or unable to take up regular employment, to
use the docks as a refuge. 1^ Exclusion of these inefficient and rootless workers
was an essential precondition to the eradication of under-employment and
poverty in the dock communities. It was with these occupationally rootless and
therefore demoralised elements that the public equated the dock labourforce
as a whole. As John Lovell has stated, in this period 'waterside work was
regarded by the public less as a genuine industrial occupation than as a
residual employment for the refuse and unemployed of society at large.'1 ^
With casual labour identified as a central obstacle to a more efficient
labour market, its general industrial incidence was a central concern of the
the 1905-14 Liberal Governments. From 1908 the Board of Trade sought the
eradication of under-employment through casual labour by instituting a
national system of labour exchanges. The docks were acknowledged as a
special case, and the Board of Trade opened discussions with the Port of London
Authority, newly-established to govern the capital's docks and waterways,
with a view to opening specific dock agencies with the blessing of port
employers. These would continuously move workers from one engagement to
the next, requiring employers to forego independent recruitment and to
accept the exchanges as their sole source of labour. The Port of London
Authority, strongly reflecting the parsimony and prejudices of the port
employers, excused the lack of progress with this labour exchange scheme on
John Lovell, Stevedores and Dockers, pp.59-91.
1 ^Phillips and Whiteside, op. cit., p.43.
l^Lovell, op. cit., p.121; Phillips and Whiteside, op. cit., p.45.
l^Lovell, op. cit., p.31.
grounds of cost - supposedly prohibitive - and the upsurge of industrial
conflict in 1911 and 1912.15
The Liberals' approach to the general question of poverty arising from
unemployment also involved the social insurance schemes which were
enacted in 1911. This presented difficulties in industries where casual
employment was predominant. Dockers were covered for health insurance
from the start, but not for unemployment insurance until 1920. The array of
complexities involved in this issue are beyond the scope of this study, and in
any event have been discussed at length elsewhere. *6 However, the attempt to
operate health insurance did involve the first experiment in docks
decasualisation. Between 1911 and 1912 in Liverpool, the second largest group
of docks after London, a registration scheme for dock labour was devised by
the labour exchanges' divisional officer, with the co-operation of employers
and the Dockers' Union. Aimed partly at bringing dock workers under the
health provisions of the 1911 insurance legislation, it also aimed to comb out
an estimated redundant surplus of 7,000 from the 27,000 who normally sought
work in the port.
The scheme offered no alteration in the casual methods of hiring
labour, but as a first step to decasualisation it was important enough. The
Liverpool scheme indicated two additional items of significance. Firstly, it
provided evidence that industrial relations in the British docks industry were
characterised by considerable regional diversity. The scheme would not have
been launched in Liverpool had it not been for the relatively positive
relationship between employers and union leaders. After the 1911 strike the
employers, who were primarily shipowners whose export cargoes depended on
a stable industrial atmosphere, were persuaded to allow the National Union of
Dock Labourers to organise their employees and to give Union members
preference of employment.^ This contrasted greatly with the tense situation
in the Port of London, where employers successfully forced a show-down on
the issue of union monopoly of the labour supply less than a year after the
1911 strike. 18 Secondly, at least according to Phillips and Whiteside, the most
serious obstacle to the scheme's success was the angry response it provoked
from the workforce. Many dockers were naturally hostile to the threatened
1 ^Phillips and Whiteside, op.cit., pp.77-85.
16Ibid„ pp.71-111.
17Ibid., p.90.
l^Lovell, op. cit., pp. 180-213.
redundancies, and were also bitter about the apparent new discipline which
registration would exert on their working lives. In the face of widespread
animosity the sponsors of the scheme were forced to dilute their proposals,
easing the credentials for registration required of a prospective docker. The
scheme duly had only a limited impact on the size, attendance and productivity
of the workforce.* ^
The attitude of the Liverpool men in 1912 indicated the ambivalence felt
by dock workers generally towards casual employment. Although dock
workers' living standards continued to advance throughout the first four
decades of the twentieth century,20 during the pre-1940 period the casual
system exposed dock communities to a level of economic insecurity unknown
to regularly-employed workers. Whilst a significant number of skilled
workers were regularly engaged - the permanent men or 'perms' - the vast
majority of work was obtained in perilous and degrading circumstances.
Dockers were obliged to gather at the numerous 'calling-on' points which
were scattered around the nation's harbours, of which in the Port of London
alone in 1914 there were 500.2! These calls were conducted twice-daily, with
the respective foremen of individual port employers choosing the thirteen
individuals that would typically comprise the gang for a particular job. This
manner of recruitment was extremely competitive, and with dockers
struggling to gain the attention of omnipotent foremen, physical violence 'on
the stones' - the call-on stance - was not unusual.2 2 Once engaged the docker
was not even guaranteed the security of a full day's work. The foreman's own
position was dependent on a level of performance from his recruits that would
satisfy his employer, with gangs working for their foremen as much as they
were working for shipowners, dock companies or wharfingers. He duly
retained the power to dismiss morning recruits and re-engage his labour at
the mid-day call. With work over the docker would be paid off, generally from
coins out of the foremen's pocket, usually in the street but often in a dockside
pu b.2 3
Despite these obvious disadvantages of work and life in dock
communities under the casual regime, which included high levels of ill-health
! ^Phillips and Whiteside, op.cit., pp.93-4.
20ibid„ pp.208-9.
2!Schneer, op.cit., p.97.
22Alan Bullock, The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin. Volume I, Trade Union
Leader 1881-1940, pp.117-118.
23ibid.
and poor housing,24 there were a number of positive features which
Edwardian and later reformers tended to overlook. For one thing, the
workforce was far from being the demoralised and rootless body that Booth
and others sometimes implied. John Lovell presents a convincing argument
that in fact a far greater degree of stability surrounded casual dock labour. In
London, 'although casually employed, this labour force was in fact a regular
body. It was composed of men who regularly looked for work at the waterside,
and who rarely sought, and even more rarely obtained, work anywhere
else.'25 This was highly significant, for it contradicted the generally
perceived nature of dock workers as an underclass - a 'motley horde of
unfortunates'.26 Whilst a rootless element did exist, the sizeable majority
followed regular employers and regular types of work within the Port.
According to Lovell the regular accepted that a refusal to move around on a
daily basis to look for work would involve under-employment; but this very
immobility allowed him to specialise in a particular skill, and to cultivate a
relationship with a particular employer. These two factors guaranteed some
work at least, which might not be secured through hopping from one call-on
point to another.22 The liking for specialisation partly informed the Liverpool
men's hostility to registration, which they felt would imply a compulsion to
accept alternative waterside tasks. In London too dockers were hostile to the
notion of greater regulation, with the permanently employed labourer a
figure to be despised. Lovell offers as characteristic a remark made in 1892 by
a London docker, 'if you are made permanent you are made a white slave of
directly; you are transferable from here to there and everywhere.'2 8
The sum of these observations is that, for all its economic hardship,
casualism allowed dockers a greater degree of control over patterns of work
and leisure than that enjoyed by most other groups of industrial workers.
Reviewing the history of dock labour in 1986, a TUC study noted that dockers
held 'a genuine freedom to choose: to choose whether or not to try for work on
a particular morning, and whether or not to accept or reject work which
24Phillips and Whiteside, op.cit., p.36.
25Lovell, op. cit., p.31.
26ibid.
27ibid„ p.32-5
28ibid„ p.36.
might be offered'.29 Dockers were free from the constraint of the rigid six-day
week: skilled piece-workers in particular could frequently earn enough
money in the first part of the week to cover the cost of two or three days'
complete rest at the end of the week.30 As Ross McKibbin puts it, in 'the docks
"come day, go day" was elevated to an art-form'.3 1
The fear that a reformed regime would jeopardise this relative freedom
was confirmed by the greater discipline which characterised dock labour
during the First World War. To break up congestion in the docks and to counter
labour shortages, from 1916 the Government encouraged the extension of
registration schemes to other ports. These varied in scope and size, but by 1920
Glasgow was the only major British port without a register. Dockers were
generally resentful of this trend and, in London at least, registration was
delayed until after the war because the port authorities were aware of how
unpopular it would be. Traditional antipathy to greater regulation was
bolstered by the Board of Trade's appointment, in conjunction with the
introduction of civilian conscription, of port labour committees in thirty-two
ports. Comprising representatives of employers and trade unions, a labour
exchange official and service recruiting officers, these committees controlled
the labour supply via employment registers and certificates which exempted
registered dockers from military conscription. With the assistance of registers,
port labour committees could punish absenteeism by withholding military
exemption, and dockers attended the call-on far more assiduously as a result.3 2
These were new methods of controlling the supply of labour, but the
casual system, by which this supply was deployed, remained intact. The vast
majority of workers still sought engagements on a daily basis, and their
relationships with employers were unreconstructed.3 3 The benefit of casual
labour as perceived by the workforce, the freedom to work or rest when work
was available, had been eroded; but casualism's worst feature - short-term
recruitment via foremen 'on the stones' - had not been similarly undermined.
The casual system and the general ambivalence with which the work
force regarded its reform, represented a serious obstacle to the organisation of
2 9 Denis Delay, Myths about the Origins and Effects of the National Dock
Labour Scheme, TUC paper July 1986. I owe this reference to Mr. Bob
Aspinall of The Museum of London Library.
3^Phillips and Whiteside, op.cit., p.33.
31 Ross McKibbin, The Ideologies of Class, p. 156.
32phillips and Whiteside, op.cit, p.121.
33ibid„ p. 142.
trade unions in the port transport industry. Casualism had created a workforce
that was riven by two intersecting conflicts: local versus national and
sectional versus industrial. In London, for instance, the multiplicity of
waterside trades defied pre-1914 attempts to organise the workforce fully.
Differences between shipworkers and shoreworkers, tugmen and lightermen,
meat porters and corn porters, were vast, and manifested in varying levels of
occupational and material status. This guaranteed that a tradition of industrial
militancy - with impressive outbursts in 1872, 1889 and 1911-12 - was not
supported by a tradition of sturdy and continuous organisation. The rapid
growth of unionisation which accompanied each of these waves of strike
activity was transitory, and 'paper' members were not brought into a vigorous
branch life. Without consolidating members in the culture of trade unionism,
industrial unions withered as the favourable short term conditions for
organisation diminished. Only sectional societies, notably the Stevedores
Union, enjoyed uninterrupted progress from the 1870s onwards. 34 Equally
frustrating for the leaders of the Dockers' Union, established after the 1889
strike, was the absence of national unity amongst dockers, with the instability
of organisation in London reflecting a nationwide trend.3 5 In 1920 London
dockers refused to load the Jolly George with weapons bound for use against
the Red Army in Poland in 1920.3 6 whilst this event can be interpreted as a
display of international working class solidarity, dockers in Britain generally
found little reason even to support their fellow British port workers. An
obvious and noble exception was the 1911 national strike, but an attempt by
the National Transport Workers' Federation - established only as recently as
1910 - to repeat the trick in support of its London men in June 1912, was a
complete failure.3 7
It is within this specific historical framework, low-level organisation
punctuated by occasional outbursts of mass militancy, that the establishment
of the Transport and General Workers Union in 1922 must be interpreted.
Clearly Ernest Bevin, first General Secretary of the new organisation,
constructed the industrial union of port and transport workers on shaky
historical foundations. The TGWU was unable fully to combat the weight of the
industry's long history, either in the first two decades of its existence, or
34Lovell, op. cit., chapters 3-7.
35lbid„ p.217.
36a.J.P. Taylor, English History 1914-1945, p.193.
37Lovell, op. cit., p.201.
indeed in the years after the Second World War. Later chapters of this thesis
will attempt to place the incidence of unofficial dock strikes between 1945 and
1951 in the tradition inherited by Bevin in 1922.
Bevin had earned his nationwide reputation at the 1920 Shaw Court of
Inquiry into dock labour. According to Alan Bullock his position as the
'Dockers' KC' gave him sufficient status amongst the dock labour force to
secure the establishment of the TGWU.38 This reputation did not immunize him
or the Union from the historical problems of labour organisation in the docks.
This became immediately apparent in 1923. After Bevin had settled a reduction
in wages with dock employers, in order to protect his members from rising
unemployment, there was an unofficial strike of some 40,000 workers which
lasted for seven weeks. With the Union refusing to issue strike-pay, the men
were eventually forced back without restoration of their previous pay levels.
Bullock identifies the strike as a serious challenge to the authority of the new
Union's leadership,39 an(j jn London the dispute permanently weakened the
Union's position. In 1922 Bevin had failed to incorporate the Stevedores Union
in the TGWU. After the 1923 strike numbers of dockers moved from the TGWU to
this alternative source of organisation. At the same time the lightermen also
withdrew from the general organisation, at first joining the Stevedores, but
later establishing their own union.4 0
The efficacy of the national and industrial union received greater
lustre in 1924, when Bevin successfully led an official dock strike to the
chagrin of the first Labour Government.4 1 This dispute indicated the potential
for effective national waterside organisation and, as such, reflected the
ambitions of a man who was, undoubtedly, the supreme union builder of the
twentieth century. From an initial membership of 297,460 in 1922 the TGWU
rapidly expanded. Boosted by a series of amalgamations, by 1937 it had
outstripped the Miners' Federation. With a membership of 645,510 it was the
biggest trade union in the world.4 2
This union-building, whatever the general benefits which it brought to
members in a multiplicity of trades, was not without its trials, however. The
very diversity of the organisation tested the leadership as respective trade
38Bullock, I, 122-30.
39Ibid., 212-18.
49Lovell, op. cit., p.214-5.
4 bullock, I, 236-7.
42V.L.Allen, Trade Union Leadership, p.224; Pelling, op.cit., p.204.
groups began to strain in different directions. In the thirties, for example,
Bevin frequently encountered difficulties with London busmen and their
unofficial organisation, the Busmen's Rank and File Committee. These
struggles were not entirely due, as Bevin publicly claimed, to the mischief of
communists, such as Bert Papworth. After rising to prominence as an
unofficial busmen's leader, Papworth subsequently served on the Union's
Executive and the TUC General Council. Bullock notes that when the trouble
began, in 1932 over a wage reduction which Bevin had agreed with the bus
companies, the Rank and File Committee's motivations were economic rather
than ideological. The General Secretary was forced to re-open negotiations and
reclaim most of that which had been forfeited.4 3 in view of later allegations
about communist membership and tactical industrial disruption, it is important
to note that Papworth - whose dissenting voice within the TGWU leadership
was eventually silenced by Arthur Deakin's anti-communist rule changes in
1949 - did not actually join the CPGB until 1937.44
Meanwhile, the docks continued to plague Bevin, with the breakaway of
his Glasgow members in 1932 revealing once again the difficulty of
reconciling local with national interests in an industrial union of port
workers. The trouble began on the question of decasualisation. The TGWU and
its predecessor the Dock Workers' Union were generally keen to sponsor
decasualisation, which provided an opportunity to increase union
membership. In 1916 the 'best available outcome', to use Lewis Minkin's
phrase,45 had been secured through voluntary co-operation over registration
and industrial conscription. This had indeed rewarded the union with a larger
membership, and therefore a stronger position at the negotiating table once
international hostilities, and the industrial truce, were over. A similar
reasoning informed the TGWU's approach to decasualisation, with Bevin
intending that control of employment registers be increasingly devolved on
the Union, so that the TGWU would be able, ultimately, to demand Union
membership as the necessary qualification for registration.46 jn 1930, when
the Labour Government initiated a fresh inquiry into decasualisation, Glasgow
4 3 Bullock, I, 520. Unfortunately the excellent Dictionary of Labour
Biography carries no entry for Bert Papworth, and biographical
information concerning this evidently vigorous and, in some circles,
popular figure, is difficult to obtain.
44Ibid., p.613.
45Lewis Minkin, The Contentious Alliance, p.41.
46phillips and Whiteside, op.cit., p.169.
remained the only major British port not covered by a registration scheme. At
the Inquiry Bevin argued for a national decasualisation scheme, with
registration made compulsory. In return for attending the call-on stands twice
daily, the registered worker would receive a guaranteed weekly maintenance
of 50s. The scheme would be financed by the transfer of unemployment
contributions from State, employers and workers to a special fund which
would be administered by the National Joint Committee for Dock Labour. The
Inquiry revived resistance amongst sections of the workforce to reform, with
the Glasgow Docks Branch of the TGWU leading opponents of changes that
involved, in Bullock's words, 'more organisation and less freedom'.4 7
The Glasgow Branch strongly opposed national registration. On the
Clyde Union organisation was already strong enough to allow branch officials
complete control over the supply and deployment of dock labour. Adherence to
a national scheme would oblige the Glasgow Branch to share this control
jointly with employers' representatives. In 1929, along with dockers in
Aberdeen, the Glasgow men duly established the Anti-Registration League to
protect these advantages, condemning registration as 'a mere instrument of
discipline and coercion'. 4 8 The Branch was in further dispute with the
national leadership over the position of its eight full-time officials. According
to the London leadership the eight were to be centrally appointed rather than
locally elected, as the Branch insisted was its right. After the High Court in
Edinburgh had found in the Glasgow men's favour, the Union Executive
merely invited the 1931 Biennial Delegate Conference to reaffirm the
constitutional position on permanent officials, namely that as Union
employees they would continue to be appointed by the national leadership. The
Clydesiders regarded these two issues, decasualisation and the assertion of
national control, as an unwarranted assault on their authority. The struggle
was partially resolved in 1932 with the secession of the Glasgow Branch, and
the establishment of the Scottish Transport and General Workers Union. This
was a further breach in the big Union's authority, for Bevin could not loosen
the new body's grip on the Glasgow docks, and the STGWU was eventually
admitted to the National Joint Council for Dock Labour in 1944.4 9
47Bullock, I, p.465.
48Anti-Registration League resolution of 2 March 1930; quoted by Phillips
and Whiteside, op. cit., p.226.
49Allen, op.cit.,pp.60-3; Bullock, I, pp.461-8.
The 'longue duree' of the casual system had left an indelible mark on
the docks, with the TGWU attempting with only limited success to organise a
national, industrial workforce that was strongly characterised by local and
sectional divisions, and a historical wariness of increased regulation. The full
extent of these difficulties and the resistance to change would be revealed
during the process of decasualisation begun during the Second World War, and
concluded by the Labour Government in 1947.
WORLD WAR TWO AND THE IMMEDIATE ORIGINS OF THE 1947 SCHEME
The question of decasualisation in the docks, pressed only intermittently
between the wars and extending only as far as the limited schemes of local
registration, was brought urgently to the fore during the Second World War.
The arrival of Ernest Bevin - the 'Dockers' KC' and a persistent advocate of
labour reform in the ports - at the Ministry of Labour in May 1940, guaranteed
that the momentum for change would receive substantial impetus. Equally
important, however, were the circumstances of war which had brought the
TGWU General Secretary into the Government. The urgent need to extract
efficiently the nation's most precious wartime economic resource - manpower
- was as important in the realisation of decasualisation as the Union's
historical commitments to reform. As Angus Calder has suggested, however, it
was typical of Bevin to make of such necessary materials the items of 'rough
social justice'.^ 0
In June 1940, only weeks after assuming office, Bevin introduced the
Dock Labour (Compulsory Registration) Order, which required all dockers to
register and be available for transfer, as it was becoming increasingly
necessary to move shipping from south and east coast ports to the west. As
congestion built up in the ports of north-west England and the Clyde, the War
Cabinet concluded that more stringent measures were required to reverse the
dangerous delays in the turn-round of shipping. In December 1940 Bevin held
talks with the Transport Workers' Acting General Secretary, Arthur Deakin,
and his old comrade from Bristol - now on the Union's Docks Group executive -
Dan Hillman. The three discussed a decasualisation scheme for the north¬
western ports, with Bevin also obtaining the approval of his erstwhile
opponents in the STGWU for the extension of the measure to the Clyde. From
March 1941 all registered dockers on the Clyde and the North Western
50Angus Calder, The People's War, p.269.
Approaches became employees of the Ministry of War Transport on a
guaranteed weekly basis.^ 1
The same month - March 1941 - saw the introduction of the Essential
Work Order. This allowed the Minister of Labour to designate factories and
other economic units as being engaged in essential national work. Under the
Order, no worker employed in a place duly designated could resign or be
sacked without permission from the Labour Ministry's local National Service
Officer. In May 1941 Bevin notified the National Joint Council for Dock Labour
- the body comprising representatives of port employers and trade unions -
that he intended to bring all dockers outside the Ministry of War Transport
Scheme under the Essential Work Order. The Minister requested that the
industry itself provide a decasualisation programme. This initiative was of
great long-term significance, for the scheme consequently worked out by the
respective sides of industry would form the basis of the post-war framework of
employment in the docks. The 1941 scheme was national in character, with a
central corporation - the National Dock Labour Corporation Ltd - established to
finance and administer its provisions. The Corporation comprised an equal
number of representatives of employers and labour, with the Minister of
Labour appointing an independent Chairman and Financial Director. The
Corporation set up Local Boards - again, comprising equally the delegates of
the industry's respective sides - to regulate the labour supply in the ports
under its auspices. Under the new regime dock workers were obliged to attend
the eleven weekly calls and to accept any work available. Those unable to find
work on the stones would report to the Local Board's Manager, who might then
allocate them to an employer in a different part of the docks, or even in a
different port altogether. In return they were guaranteed maintenance, but
failure to comply with the conditions would result in financial penalties or
suspension - and in some cases dismissal - from the scheme. This was a curious
mixture of casual and non-casual methods. Workers received their combined
wages and maintenance payments once a week from the Port Labour Manager.
He in turn received each week from employers the sums of money owed to the
workers, whether they had been casually engaged or centrally allocated. The
cost of the scheme was met by registered employers who were levied according
to the size of their wages bills. The first local scheme, appropriately perhaps,
51 Allen, op.cit., pp.174-5; Bullock, Volume II Minister of Labour 1940-1945,
pp.30-1. The ports of the North Western Approaches were Liverpool,
Birkenhead, Manchester, Preston, Garston, Bromborough, Ellesmere Port,
Partington, Widnes, Runcorn and Western Point.
given Bevin's West Country origins, was introduced in Bristol in December
1941. By February 1943 all but 1,000 dockers in the most marginal of the
nation's ports were incorporated in either the Ministry of War Transport or
the National Dock Labour Corporation Scheme.5 2
It is worth re-emphasising that as Minister of Labour Bevin was
centrally concerned with the efficient deployment of the nation's scarcest
resource - labour. This principle clearly guided his actions on the docks no
less than any other area of the industrial economy.5 3 On 4 December 1941, as
the Bristol Labour Board prepared to launch its scheme, the House of Commons
debated a Government motion on the extension of the Essential Work Order.
Bevin cited developments in the docks as an example of the Order's value to the
war effort:
When we had to face the Battle of the Atlantic we had to do something quickly
for Glasgow and Liverpool in order to help to hold the men. ... That scheme has
reduced the time of turn-round of ships by nearly two-and-a-half days per
ship on the average. That is equal to building nearly 1,500,000 tons of new
shipping. The men and the scheme are entitled to the credit for this. Under the
Order, I have established the Docks Corporation for all the other ports. This is
an entirely new feature. Under this non-profit making corporation, a State-
run company guaranteed by the Treasury, every man will be a permanent
employee and will no longer be casual.5 4
In activating decasualisation proposals that had long been TGWU policy, Bevin
naturally enjoyed the support of his own union. The caretaker leadership was
also at pains to share Bevin's stress on the need for maximum efficiency in the
workplace. In October 1941 Deakin made this appeal in his Union's journal, the
Transport and General Workers' Record : 'Every docker must know of ships
which he helped to load or discharge, but which are now lying at the bottom of
the sea. The tonnage available to carry our increasing requirements of
essential food supplies and munitions of war is getting less ... it is therefore
urgently necessary that we make the best possible use of every ship coming
into port, securing the quickest possible turn-round and discharging or
loading ... .'5 5
Bevin's wartime efforts as Minister of Labour were not, of course, solely
confined to maximising productivity. Accompanying the increased importance
^^Allen, op.cit., pp.175-6; Phillips and Whiteside, op.cit., p.241.
53Bullock, II, 58.
54Parliamentary Debates, Vol.376, 1340, 4 December 1941.
55Transport and General Workers' Record, October 1941.
of working people was a significant advance in their social and economic
status. At the TUC Special Conference in May 1940, called to deliberate its
position on participation in the wartime coalition, Bevin had said, 'if ... our
class rise with all their energy and save the people, the country will always
turn with confidence to the people who saved them ... .'56 This hope was amply
justified, at least so far as the trade unions were concerned; and the
consequent recognition of manpower as the nation's primary economic
resource was not without long-term social implications for the docks. The
wartime schemes gave trade union representatives - as Bevin had anticipated
when devising his decasualisation strategy between the wars - a new position
of power in the industry, which they would be reluctant to forfeit once
international hostilities had ceased. Deakin stated as much in October 1941,
when passing comment on the character of the National Dock Labour
Corporation: 'setting up as it does a form of workers' control, expressed
through the trade union organisations acting jointly with representative
employers, it may be regarded as a great experiment - the principle of which
we may desire to retain.'5 7 Bevin too was eager that these wartime gains
should become a useful element in peacetime reconstruction. He had continued
his House of Commons speech on the value of decasualisation in the docks by
stating, 'I am rather proud of the development of this idea ... . It is capable of
being extended in post-war years to a large number of other industries
without destroying initiative or enterprise. I believe both sides should accept
it now as a permanent feature.'5 8
During the negotiations on the long-term future of the industry which
were conducted during the war, port employers indicated that they were much
less enthusiastic than Bevin and the TGWU to countenance a permanent
scheme on the lines of the war-time models. Due largely to the objections of
employers' organisations, these negotiations yielded no positive results.5 9
Perhaps less expected than these prevarications were signs that the TGWU
might possibly encounter difficulties in securing the full compliance of their
members in pursuing decasualisation. Rumblings of discontent in the docks
were beginning to indicate that the workforce's historical ambivalence
56Ernest Bevin, Special Conference of TU Executives 25 May 1940; quoted in
Minkin, op.cit., p.55.
57Transport and General Workers' Record, October 1941.
58Parliamentary Debates, Vol.376, 1340, 4 December 1941.
59Allen, op.cit., p.177.
towards reform had not been removed at a stroke. Under the war-time schemes
the Ministry of Labour recorded thirty-three separate dock strikes.6 0
The nature of this discontent was discussed in the House of Commons,
three years after the schemes had been introduced. On 5 May 1944 the Joint
Parliamentary Secretary at the Ministry of Transport, Philip Noel-Baker,
restated decasualisation's invaluable contribution to the war effort. In
response Walter Edwards, who as MP for Whitechapel represented many
dockers and their families, pointed out that dockers had disproportionately
borne the brunt of industrial transfers, and politely questioned whether all
transfers had been completely necessary. Serious grievances, he added, were
arising from the requirements of the new regime.6 '
This potential conflict was realised ten months later, when the largest
dock strike of the war disrupted the Port of London. Involving over 10,000
dockers for a week from 1 March 1945, the stoppage ruffled sufficient feathers
at the Ministry of Labour and National Service for an official inquiry into its
origins to be established.6 2 This Inquiry subsequently noted that whilst 'the
influence of a small subversive political section' had been brought to bear in
the spreading of the strike, the stoppage had 'originated in the men's feelings
of resentment against the alleged harsh exercise of discipline under the Port
of London Dock Labour Scheme'. Significantly, the dispute had also recalled
much earlier industrial struggles in London's Victoria Dock. Matters had been
brought to a head, the official report noted, when the London Port Authority
had attempted to move the control point from outside the Victoria Dock Gate to
inside.63 jn November 1890 employers had terminated the practice won during
the 1889 strike where workers were recruited outside the dock gates, causing
much bitterness amongst the men and, in breaking the monopoly of the
Dockers' Union, further weakening the long-term success of industrial
unionism in the port.64 in 1945 as much as 1890, the threatened transfer of the
control point's location seemed to witness a potential strengthening of the
employers' position at the workers' expense.
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The relationship between increased industrial discipline and growing
industrial unrest was partly conceded by Victor Allen, Deakin's sympathetic
biographer. Writing in 1957 Allen stated that, 'the strike indicated that the
war-time schemes in certain instances might have been operating at the
margin of the men's tolerance; that the cost of decasualisation to dockers in
terms of liberty of action could outweigh the social and economic
advantages.'^ That tensions could arise when dockers judged decasualisation
to have had a negative impact on their working lives, did not rest easily with
Deakin's noted belief that the Dock Corporation scheme - under which the Port
of London and 60 per cent of the national labour force was organised -
represented a 'form of workers' control'. The outburst of these tensions in the
March 1945 dispute can certainly be attributed to the workforce's frustration
with wartime controls in a period when the end of the European war was in
sight. However, decasualisation was at the heart of these controls, and with the
Union and its political partners in the Labour Alliance determined that
permanent decasualisation in the docks would be on the reconstruction
agenda, the London strike plainly represented a word of warning with regard
to post-war organisation.
TOWARDS THE POST-WAR SETTLEMENT, 1945-47
Post-war negotiations on the long-term future of the organisation of the port
transport industry were protracted and tortuous. Throughout it was evident
that there were fundamental differences between the positions of the unions
and the employers. The Government, whilst maintaining a public position of
non-intervention, privately exerted pressures consonant with its
determination that a key industrial sector would not be surrendered to market
forces at a time of immense national economic difficulty and international
political instability.
Less than two weeks after being elected, the Government communicated
its intentions to the industry. George Isaacs, the new Minister of Labour and
National Service, wrote to the Chairman of the National Dock Labour
Corporation, Lord Ammon, and indicated that a Bill for the peace-time
decasualisation of dock labour was being drafted.66 An Enabling Bill was duly
65Allen, Trade Union Leadership, p. 186.
66pRO: BK 1/57, Isaacs to Ammon, 10 August 1945. For biographical
information on George Isaacs (1883-1979), see George Eastwood, George
brought forward, the object of which was 'to enable permanent schemes to be
made for ensuring greater regularity of employment for dock workers and
securing that an adequate number of dock workers is available for the
efficient performance of their work'.67 The 1940-41 schemes had been
introduced as important war effort tools, and the Labour Government was also
anxious to portray decasualisation as central to its strategy for economic
recovery. Introducing the Second Reading of the Enabling Bill on 12
November, Isaacs stated that if the wartime systems of decasualisation fell to
the ground without being replaced, with the old casual order restored, 'the
effect would be positively disastrous - disastrous to the industry, to the m e n
and the country'. Clause 2 of the Bill allowed the Minister to introduce his own
proposals for decasualisation if the industry itself failed to produce a scheme
by 31 December 1946. Until new schemes had been introduced, the present
ones would continue, with the Minister adamant that 'there shall be no period
during which a port may be working without a scheme.'68 Lest the House have
been in any doubt as to the reasoning behind the Government's insistence on
decasualisation, Isaacs' Parliamentary Secretary, Ness Edwards, reiterated later
in the same debate that the national interest required an end to casual
employment in the docks. 'We cannot afford', Edwards said, 'inefficiency in the
docks, we cannot afford irregularity of work, we cannot afford a wasteful use
of manpower in the dock industry. Manpower is going to be the bottleneck in
this country in the future, and so we are anxious that this industry shall be put
upon an efficient basis, and shall give regular, continuous and well-paid
employment to those engaged in it.'69 in February 1946 the Bill passed on to
the statute book. A permanent scheme for decasualisation - whether produced
Isaacs. Isaacs gave up the Chair of the TUC to become Minister of Labour
and National Service in 1945, a post he retained until replaced by Nye
Bevan in January 1951. For Lord (Charles) Ammon (1873-1960), see the
entry in Dictionary of Labour Biography I. Like Isaacs, 'Charlie' Ammon
had enjoyed a long career as a trade unionist and MP, before being created
Baron Ammon in 1944, when he became chairman of the National Dock
Labour Corporation. Chairman of the National Dock Labour Board from
1947-50, Ammon was also the Government Chief Whip in House of Lords
from 1945-9. Both Isaacs and Ammon, as Morgan Phillips would surely have
observed, were Methodists.
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by the industry or the Ministry itself - would be put in place by Statutory
Order by 30 June 1947.7 0
The Government legislation was, of course, intended as a fillip to the
negotiations which the National Joint Council of the Port Transport Industry
was conducting on its peace-time future. These negotiations can be interpreted
as falling into three recognisable phases. The first period began in September
1945 with the workpeople submitting a claim for improved pay and conditions,
and ended in December with the settlement of this claim and the passage
through Parliament of the decasualisation legislation. The second period
comprised the calendar year 1946, in which the NJC failed to break its deadlock
on negotiations and the Minister of Labour published his own draft scheme, in
accordance with the Dock Workers Act, as consequence. The closing phase
covered the first six months of 1947, in which the Government considered
objections from the respective sides of industry to this draft, before the Dock
Labour Scheme was launched on 1 July.
The first period of talks was complicated by events arising from a claim
for improved wages and working conditions which the workpeople's side
communicated to the employers' side of the National Joint Council on 3
September. At the core of this programme, the 'Dockers' Charter', was the
demand for an increase in the daily guaranteed wage from 16s to 25s.71 The
NJC gathered on 27 September, but it broke up without progress, the employers
arguing - not altogether plausibly - that they had not had sufficient time since
3 September to prepare their response.7 7 The employers' organisation, the
National Association of Port Employers, privately discussed its reluctance to
negotiate on the workpeople's terms a few days later, concluding that in an era
of decasualisation there was no room for an advance on 16s per day.73 The
employers communicated this premise to the unions at subsequent NJC
gatherings. On the 6 and 7 November NJC meetings, the unions stated a
willingness to settle wages first, and treat other questions at a later date. The
employers rejected this however, noting in their own minutes that 'the wages
claim could not be dealt with in isolation, but must be related to the industrial
70oock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act 1946. Public General
Statutes 1946.
71MRC/MSS.126 T&G/4/1/25, TGWU General Executive Council Report, 1945-
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conditions as these emerged from the proposals for decasualisation and
reorganisation of the industry; only thus would it be possible to assess
correctly the value of the standard basic rate of wages.'7 4 This hard line
reflected, of course, the traditional parsimony of port employers.7 5 It was a
position also strongly influenced, however, by the recent and massive
unofficial dock strike. This had involved nearly half the national workforce,
lasted for the entire month of October and had cost the industry more than one
million working days.76 The stoppage essentially had cautioned the employers
against making any concessions to the workpeople's side of the NJC before the
union leaders concerned had re-established authority within their own ranks.
Despite the predictably adverse response of the port employers, the
strike positively affected the pattern and outcome of the 1945 negotiations. On
the morning of the Enabling Bill's Second Reading, Ernest Bevin wrote to
George Isaacs, offering some interesting thoughts on the general situation.
Following 'some discreet inquiries', presumably with his TGWU colleagues, the
Foreign Secretary wished to advise the Minister that the wages question was
causing immense contention in the docks. If it could only be settled and an
instrument put in place for the maintenance of the war-time schemes, then
the Minister and the industry would enjoy a far more peaceful environment in
which to consider 'the more difficult side of the problem', that of permanent
decasualisation.77 That afternoon Isaacs duly indicated in the House that the
existing schemes would not lapse until they had been replaced with
permanent measures, and on 29 November he appointed Justice Evershed
under the 1896 Conciliation Act to consider the merits of the port employees'
official pay claim. Evershed's Committee duly recommended that the daily
minimum be increased to 19s, Is more than the employers' final offer and 6s
less than the workpeople's original claim. 7 8 \ National Docks' Delegate
Conference accepted the Evershed findings on 14 December,79 whilst four days
earlier the NAPE executive endorsed them as, 'in the circumstances', the best
available.8 0
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With Evershed arbitrating the wage dispute in a manner not wholly
unsatisfactory to each party - the union gaining a settlement independent of
decasualisation and the 19s daily minimum being but Is above the employers'
final offer - the second phase of negotiations began. The 1946 talks on the
permanent scheme for decasualisation were largely fruitless, however, with
the employers and the TGWU holding irreconcilable positions on two
important issues. Firstly, whilst the employers insisted that they be invested
with monopoly control over local schemes, the TGWU held out for a national
scheme under joint administration. Secondly, the two sides could not agree
upon the basis of the workforce's guaranteed maintenance.
The first point of divergence had been raised at the 18 October National
Joint Council, when Sir Douglas Ritchie, the NAPE chairman, insisted that the
right of employers to sole control of the employment registers was a point of
'fundamental' importance.8 1 Following several months of inconclusive debate,
the NAPE secretary, A.F. Macdonald, indicated the sum of the employers'
position on administration of the schemes in a letter to the TGWU Docks
Secretary, Jack Donovan. Firstly, noted Macdonald, the employers were
opposed to the notion of a national controlling body, as the National Joint
Council already provided sufficient central direction. Secondly, they were
determined to resist the imposition of joint administrative control; as
employers were to finance the schemes it would be inappropriate for unions to
have a hand in their administration. This should instead be vested in existing
Port Authorities.8 2
The interests of the Port Authorities were, as Victor Allen has pointed
out, synonymous with those of employers. Under no circumstances, therefore,
could the TGWU allow the employers to exert what would, effectively, have
been 'unilateral control'.88 The Union was determined to maintain in peace¬
time the national system of joint industrial control which had been gained in
1941. Donovan had stated this at the first meeting of the NJC's Decasualisation
Sub-Committee on 20 March 1946, before adding some remarks on the second
point of controversy. Having visited the districts to gather the thoughts of
members, he was convinced that the employers' proposals on the form of
guarantee were also unacceptable.8^ The Union argued that dockers should be
81 Ibid., NAPE EC, 25 October 1945.
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paid 6s for each half-day that they proved attendance but received no work. At
the end of each week, the worker's attendance money and earnings from
normal working hours would be made up to a minimum sum of £4 16s. The
employers' position was that all earnings, including piece-work and overtime,
were to be reckoned against the guarantee, and that this maintenance would
comprise a lunar monthly guarantee of £16.8 5
Macdonald's letter to Donovan at the start of July effectively
acknowledged that the gap between the two sides on administrative control
and the guarantee would not be bridged. On 23 August the NJC informed Isaacs
of their failure to conclude an agreed scheme, indicating the two central
points of controversy.86 isaacs's cautious response was to appoint a Committee
of Inquiry under Sir John Forster KC, which heard evidence from each side of
the NJC before publishing its conclusions in December. On the two pressing
questions Forster found largely in favour of the TGWU's position: the scheme
would be a national one under joint administrative control; and dock workers
would be paid for each half-day that their attendance at the call stand was not
rewarded with work.8 7
THE CHARACTER OF THE 1947 SCHEME
The final phase of the approach to peace-time decasualisation duly began with
the Ministry of Labour preparing a draft scheme in December 1946 along the
lines drawn up by Forster. Overall administration of the scheme was to be
vested in a National Dock Labour Board which would appoint local Dock Labour
Boards to oversee affairs in each port or group of ports. These boards would,
both nationally and locally, be under joint jurisdiction. The National Board was
to consist of ten members, four from each side of industry with an
independent chair and vice-chair. The Local Boards - on which there would be
no such independent representation - were to be responsible for disciplinary
matters and the allocation of labour within ports. Those workers not assigned
an employer on each day comprised a reserve pool of labour, held to be in the
85PRO: MT 81/16, Robert Letch (Port of London Authority) to Aubrey Clark
(Ministry of Transport), 26 June 1946.
86Transport and General Workers' Record, September 1946.
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employ of the Board, and paid an attendance fee on a half-daily basis.8 8 Such
provision, with a majority of workers still likely to be engaged by foremen at
the call stands, represented a significant qualification to the notion of a
'decasualisation' scheme. Although the war-time 'continuity' regulations were
maintained, which required dockers to complete any job to which they had
been assigned and so prevented foremen hiring labour by the half-day alone,
in a sense dock workers were still casual employees. Paradoxically, whilst
bound by the disciplinary requirements of regular employment, dockers did
not enjoy the compensation of the full economic security which regular
employment would bring. Indeed, a later official investigation into the docks
industry concluded that to term the 1947 measure a 'decasualisation scheme'
was misleading.89 At heart the Scheme was, as the TUC recognised four decades
later, 'like its (wartime) predecessors, primarily concerned with the efficient
operation of the labour force. To that end, therefore, it was drawn up so that it
could continue to impose upon the dockers the disciplinary framework
necessary to efficiency. In accepting this framework, the dockers surrendered
something they greatly valued.'9 0
Although these problems were not immediately apparent in 1947,
Isaacs's draft naturally elicited quite different responses from the respective
sides of industry. For the TGWU its appearance was a fitting climax to its
twenty-fifth anniversary celebrations in January 1947. The special glossy-
covered Silver Jubilee issue of the Transport and General Workers' Record,
complete with full page portraits of Bevin and Deakin, proclaimed 'THE LONG
FIGHT FOR DECASUALISATION ENDS IN VICTORY.'91 The employers' reaction
could not have been in greater contrast. With both sides of the industry
invited to lodge their observations on and objections to the Ministerial draft
with the Ministry of Labour, the NAPE fought a bitter, rearguard struggle.
Sending a copy of his organisation's objections to the National Dock Labour
Corporation on 12 April, Macdonald wrote of the employers' 'profound
disagreement with the intention that its [ie the Scheme's] administration
should be entrusted to a national body, with local agencies, on which the Trade
Unions would have equal representation with the Employers'. Macdonald and
8 8 Allen, op.cit., pp.183-6, provides an excellent summary of the
administrative mechanics of the Dock Labour Scheme.
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his colleagues were particularly concerned about the implications of union
officials fulfilling 'certain of the functions which belong to management, and
thus [imposing] on them duties which are alien to their office and must on
occasion be irreconcilable with the natural demands of their constituents'.9 2
The employers' misgivings were rejected by two separate Committees of
Inquiry which were appointed to hear the industry's objections to the
Ministerial draft. The Cameron Inquiry, which ran for six days from 14 May
1947, into the nature of the Scheme's administration, and the Hetherington
Inquiry of 19 May 1947 into the amount and basis of calculation of the
guarantee, both endorsed Isaacs's general principles.93 The Scheme was duly
put into operation, as scheduled in the 1946 Dock Workers Act, by Statutory
Order. With a veteran of the 1929 Labour Government as its chairman, Lord
Ammon, the National Dock Labour Board assumed its duties from the 1 July. The
Board posted large notices around the nation's ports informing the workforce
of the impending changes, and placed adverts to the same effect in the
national press on the days 27-30 June.9 4
During the period of deliberation permitted by the Draft Order, the
employers' organisation had not been the sole source of opposition to the
proposed Scheme. Two other voices had expressed dissatisfaction with the
Scheme: the one privately and the other publicly. In February an unsigned
Ministry of Transport internal memorandum expressed doubts about the
proposed form of administration. This was modelled on that of the National
Dock Labour Corporation, a body characterised, according to the memo, by an
unwillingness to take decisions 'unpalatable' to either side of the industry. The
new Scheme offered 'no improvement' on this matter. What was required was
'an independent element as strong numerically as either of the other
elements'.9^ Senior Transport Ministry civil servants took up this line in
opposition to the Ministry of Labour, as the latter department prepared
recommendations for the National Dock Labour Board's two independent
members, the Chair and Vice-Chair. Aubrey Clark, Assistant Secretary at the
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Transport Ministry's Docks and Canals Division, complained to his superior on
15 July that the Ministry of Labour had declined to supplement the NDLB with
two additional independent members to balance the four from each side of the
industry 6
Significantly, this would not be the last occasion on which the
Ministries of Transport and Labour would cross swords on the Dock Scheme.
Two years later, following large unofficial strikes in both 1948 and 1949,
Transport Ministry officials restated the opinion that their Ministry of Labour
colleagues had been mistaken in allowing the unions to share control of the
Scheme's administration. This position implied that the Ministry of Labour had
conceded too much ground to the TGWU.97 The young MP who became
Parliamentary Private Secretary at the MoT in 1947, James Callaghan, has
recorded in his memoirs that 'Shipowners had great influence with the
Ministry of Transport shortly after the war,'9 8 and Clark's frustration, just two
weeks after the NDLB had begun going about its business, certainly illustrates
the sympathies detected by the Parliamentary Secretary. 'I should have
thought', Clark wrote, 'that the employers, at least, would have taken the view
that a strong independent representation would help ensure that the dock
labour scheme was administered with due regard to economic and commercial
considerations ... .'99 This theme, that union representatives on the NDLB were,
unlike independents and employers, incapable of distinguishing what was in
the best interests of the port transport industry and the economic life of the
nation, would be restated in subsequent MoT observations on developments in
the docks. On these occasions Clark and his colleagues would not seek support
from employers in vain.
As well as tensions within Whitehall, the introduction of the Scheme
also revealed the divisions which organised labour was prone to, in the Port of
London at least. In the week preceding the Cameron Inquiry which began on
14 May, a pamphlet was circulated in the Port of London by an unofficial body
of dock workers, the National Portworkers' Defence Committee. Predicting that
the six-day Inquiry would be a 'farce in six acts', the Committee proclaimed its
willingness to strike in favour of a seven-point programme which included
the introduction of one daily call, the election of NDLB officials and the
96PRO: MT 63/408, Clark to Page, 15 July 1947.
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immediate nationalisation - without compensation - of the nation's docks,
ports, harbours and canals.'
The existence of this unofficial committee reflected the historical
problems of official organisation in the dock industry. Unofficial leadership,
which had first challenged the TGWU as early as 1923, re-emerged after the
war during the Dockers' Charter strike of October 1945. The committees then
established in various ports around Britain were never formally constituted,
and only remained active so long as a significant dispute in the docks existed,
but they reflected the historical impatience of port workers with procedures
and regulations and their consequent willingness to explore solutions to these
grievances through unofficial channels. The unofficial movement appeared
in various guises between 1945 and 1951. Despite styling itself in May 1947 as a
National Committee, its activities on this occasion appear to have been
confined to the Port of London. Within the vast docks of the capital, however,
the unofficial movement's base was fairly broad. During the unofficial strike
in 1948 - and there is little reason to suspect that the situation in 1947 would
have been appreciably different - its representatives were drawn from all of
the four main systems: London, Surrey, West and East India and Millwall, and
the Royals. Moreover, whilst predominantly composed of TGWU members, the
movement also included members of the Stevedores Union."" Given the
thorny relationship between the official leaders of the respective unions, this
was an interesting example of industrial organisation. As such it was a source
of tension within the Stevedores Union as well as the TGWU.
The National Amalgamated Stevedores and Dockers Union prized its
separate identity, which it had protected by refusing to join the TGWU in 1922.
The NASD's tiny membership - about 7,000 as compared to a Transport Workers'
Docks Group membership that exceeded 80,000 - was an indication of this
sectionalism. It was also a source of anxiety for the Stevedores' leadership,
which feared that it would be swallowed by its much larger rival. The
leadership was a jealous protector of its privileges and members. For the
General Secretary of the Union, Richard Barrett, this required tight discipline
from his members. Any contravention of the industry's constitutional
100mrc/MSS.15B/40, Frank Maitland deposit; National Portworkers' Defence
Committee, The Enquiry and YOU!, May 1947. Frank Maitland was an ILP
activist and journalist.
""PRO: LAB 10/783, 'Personnel of "No Name" Organisation', June 1948.
machinery would diminish the Stevedores' position as a credible force in the
docks.
Barrett expressed his respect for constitutional propriety during the
Cameron Inquiry hearings. On 13 May at a meeting of the Union's Stevedores
Sectional Committee, Barrett's attention was brought to the activities of one of
his Dock Branch secretaries, Bert Aylward. Aylward had circulated, on official
branch notepaper, a notice in the Surrey Dock which threatened to establish a
strike committee in opposition to the mooted Scheme. 102 This mirrored the
position of the National Portworkers' Defence Committee. Although Aylward's
precise role in this committee in 1947 is uncertain, at the very least he must
have liaised with its Surrey representatives. He was certainly also active on
the unofficial strike committee during the 'Zinc Oxide' dispute of June 1948.103
Clearly Aylward was determined to match the unofficial committee's opposition
to the 'farce' of the Cameron Inquiry by assuming an unheralded role during
its first act. When Barrett arrived at the Ministry of Labour on 14 May for the
hearing, he encountered Aylward on the steps outside. As the Inquiry began,
with Aylward in attendance, Barrett informed Cameron that only he and Hern,
his Dockers' Sectional Secretary, were entitled to represent the NASD. On the
advice of the chair Aylward agreed to withdraw, and the Inquiry was thus
prevented from officially recording the views of the unofficial opposition. It
would appear however, that Aylward lingered in Whitehall long enough to
confront Barrett and Hern with verbal abuse outside the Ministry during the
lunch-time recess, and at a subsequent meeting of the Stevedores' Executive
Aylward was officially cautioned as to his future behaviour. 104 The episode
indicated that even within the compact confines of the smaller union, tension
with regard to the immediate future of the industry was felt. 10 5
There were then two very different critiques of the 1947 Scheme. On the
one hand employers had expressed 'profound disagreement' with its
1 ^National Museum of Labour History (hereafter NMLH), NASD Stevedores
Sectional Committee Minutes, 13 May 1947.
103Below, pp. 108-09.
104jqMLH/NASD Joint Executive Council Minutes, 15 May and 11 June 1947.
105 According to Mr Andrew Flinn, who is sorting the NASD files at the
National Museum of Labour History in Manchester, it is very difficult to
obtain biographical information about either Barrett or Aylward. Barrett
remained General Secretary until the 1960s, whilst Aylward was briefly the
Dockers' Sectional Secretary in the 1950s. A letter from Aylward to Barrett
during the 1954 dock strike, which resulted in the NASD's expulsion from
the TUC under the Bridlington Agreement after it had recruited TGWU
members, suggests that the two men did at times work closely together.
administrative mechanisms, an observation shared by at least two very senior
figures in the Ministry of Transport. The shipowners' gazette, Fairplay Weekly
Shipping Journal, frankly stated the type of views which Macdonald and Clark
had been expressing, albeit more subtly, in private. 'Decasualisation', ran its
editorial, 'is a blessed word which, like Mesopotamia and democracy, can mean
different things to different people, and thus add to the confusion.' For
employers decasualisation implied continuity of employment for those
qualified, provided there was a sufficient supply of trade. Some employees,
however, interpreted the Scheme as guaranteeing continuity of payment with
actual employment a secondary consideration. This latter assumption was held
by the journal to exist 'largely because of a flood of sentimental twaddle about
the "rights" of Man, which rights are represented as the workers' due by noisy
folk whose jaws are their hardest working member and to whom unearned
income is only to be reprobated in the "idle rich"'.10"
On the other hand, there were the doubts and objections of the National
Portworkers' Defence Committee, and individuals such as Bert Aylward. Their
concerns indicated a degree of unofficial cross-union action that struck a
clear contrast with the frosty official relations between the TGWU and the
NASDU. It is important also to remember that after the extremely harsh winter
of 1947, many dockers needed little rousing from 'noisy' unofficial leaders:
they had been working all winter in formidably arduous conditions, with
cranes frozen in the docks and the thaw only recently completed by the middle
of May. 107 Many may well have had cause to sympathise with the unofficial
leaders who evidently believed that the Scheme did not go nearly far enough
in eliminating the power of private enterprise, and who voiced a willingness
to back this sentiment up with strike action.
These opposing views, and the bases of support from which they had
sprung, would reappear on more than one occasion during the Dock Labour
Scheme's difficult early years. However, the alliance of Government Ministers
and TGWU officials had few misgivings about the Scheme. They largely
accepted that the structure of the National Dock Labour Board was consonant
with Deakin's characterisation of its war-time predecessor, the National Dock
Labour Corporation, as 'a form of workers' control, expressed through the
trade union organisations acting jointly with representative employers'. Of
106Fairplay Weekly Shipping Journal, 15 May 1947, clipping in PRO: T
228/168.
107jack; Dash, Good Morning, Brothers! , p.60.
greater significance to the both sides of the alliance was the economic lever
which the Scheme bestowed them at a time of immense economic difficulty.
During the 1946 port transport industry's joint council negotiations, Jack
Donovan had emphasised decasualisation's role in obtaining the increase in
exports necessary to recovery. 108 Lord Ammon frequently confirmed Labour's
economic as well as social and political commitment to decasualisation.
Speaking at the sixth Annual General Meeting of the Corporation in June 1946,
for instance, Ammon stated of the ports that such 'an important fact of our
National Economy cannot be subject to the caprice of local enterprise.' 109 jn
1947, the year of the Scheme's introduction, as a result of intensified economic
pressure, the docks assumed an even greater strategic importance. On 5 June
the National Dock Labour Corporation held its final AGM, just four weeks
before its functions were to be assumed by the new National Dock Labour
Board. Two important speeches were made: the first by Lord Ammon who was to
chair the NDLB as he had the NDLC, and the second by Ernest Bevin. Ammon
observed, gratefully, that employers and employees had by now accepted the
importance of turning shipping around as rapidly as possible, stating that he
could not 'stress too heavily, how vitally urgent it is to see that our ships are at
sea and not lying idle in the ports; that is absolutely essential if the flow of raw
materials we so urgently need for our workshops is to be maintained, if
sufficient exports are to reach overseas markets, and indeed if the national
production programme is to be realised'. Bevin spoke of how the war-time
schemes had succeeded in maintaining the labour supply, and now called upon
the new Scheme, as Ammon had done, to speed the turn-round of North
Atlantic shipping. 'What I am putting to you', he said, 'is really our national
survival.' The audience of trade unionists and employers was also told: 'you dug
for victory in the war; now dig for dollars now.'110 The theme was taken up by
the Union in the wake of the autumn sterling crisis which precipitated the
appointment of the new Chancellor. With Cripps arguing in Cabinet that
recovery was dependent on increased exports along with a counter-
inflationary incomes policy,! 1 1 the Transport Workers urged their dock
108pRD: BK 1/57, NJC Decasualisation Sub-Committee, 20 March 1946.
109pRQ: BK 1/151, Chairman's speech to the NDLC's sixth AGM, 27 June 1946.
HOpRO: BK 1/153, Ammon and Bevin speeches to the NDLC's seventh AGM, 5
June 1947.
111 PRO: CAB 128/CM(47)87, 13 November 1947.
members to 'help the country out of its present difficulties' by doing
everything possible to eliminate delays in the turn-round of ships. 112
The following three chapters will separately discuss the unofficial dock
strikes of October 1945, June 1948 and April-July 1949. Each of the three
disputes can be understood in terms of the peculiar heritage which
decasualisation between 1940 and 1947 failed to uproot. Dock workers, whilst
historically given to spontaneous outbursts of militant strike action, had never
been fully immersed in the culture of the Trade Union movement. The central
pillars of labour movement culture, loyalty to trade union leaders and
solidarity with other groups of trade unionists and the Labour Party, did not
always command the attention of dock workers. Their loyalty and undoubted
occupational solidarity were instead expressed at a more immediate level, with
neighbours and work-mates in the dock communities. The TGWU, established
on shaky foundations in 1922, had not fully resolved the two outstanding
conflicts - local versus national and sectional versus industrial. The quest for a
solidly organised Union, commanding authority amongst dock workers
nationally and industrially, was as elusive to Arthur Deakin as it had been to
Ernest Bevin.
These chapters will also bring out the collision between this long
history and immediate post-war developments, with the strikes of 1948 and
1949 unfolding against an appreciably different background from that of 1945.
The year 1947 marked the coming-together of a number of factors that would
influence the Labour Government's response to strike action in the port
transport industry. In the ports a Scheme had been introduced to honour the
dignity of dock labour by guaranteeing its material maintenance, but which
simultaneously sought economic rationalisation through increased discipline
of the workforce, backed up by the pledge that a strike against the Scheme
would be taken as a challenge to the Government's authority. In maintaining
on a permanent footing the loss of freedoms which dockers had enjoyed under
casualism, decasualisation seemed in some respects to mark a deterioration in
the cultural quality of the dock workers' existence. Meanwhile, beyond the
docks, Attlee and his Ministers, supported by the TUC General Council, were
increasingly occupied by the central problems of domestic - and European -
economic recovery, and the international - and domestic - resistance to
communism. From 1948 onwards, these vital issues of the period increasingly
shaped the Government's reasoning on the port transport industry. These
112Transport and General Workers' Record, November 1947.
three chapters therefore illuminate the stresses which the labour alliance was
subject to as a result of the preoccupation - on the part of Government and
Trade Union leaders alike - with economic recovery and the seemingly
ubiquitous disruption of international communism.
CHAPTER THREE
THE DOCKERS' CHARTER STRIKE, OCTOBER 1945
THE STRIKE WHICH HISTORIANS FORGOT?
In July 1945 the Labour Government inherited a ten week old industrial
dispute in the docks over pay and conditions. Since May dockers had been on
strike at various times in Glasgow, in the Humber ports of Grimsby and
Immingham, in Swansea and in Cardiff. At each port Churchill's caretaker
administration had deployed troops to unload cargoes. In London throughout
July dockers had been operating a go-slow, and on 25 July 600 troops were
prepared for deployment in the Surrey Docks. On 31 July, only five days after
the election of the first ever majority Labour Government, Clement Attlee
ordered these troops to unload several of the ships affected by the go-slow, and
on 13 August the go-slow was called off.1 Given the remarkable persistence of
industrial unrest in the docks in the six years which followed - as a
contemporary observer noted, dockers struck work between six and seven
times more often than the traditionally more militant coal miners2 - this
initial episode was of immense significance, yet has largely been neglected by
historians.
The go-slow revealed considerable dissatisfaction in the docks with
existing pay and conditions. This dissatisfaction was the basis of far more
serious trouble which erupted in the docks less than two months later, when
the Government confronted the largest single industrial dispute of the 1945-51
period. The 'Dockers' Charter' strike lasted for forty-one days from 24
September to 4 November, involved approximately 50,000 dockers - a majority
of the national dock workforce - and cost the industry a total of 1,107,000
working days.3 Despite its obvious magnitude, even this strike has commanded
little attention in the general histories of the 1945 Government. Kenneth O.
Morgan offers a single sentence on the strike, which is one more than Henry
1 Steve Peak, Troops in Strikes, pp.83-8.
2Kenneth Knowles, 'The Post-War Dock Strikes', Political Quarterly Vol.
XXII, 266 (1951).
3PRO: LAB 34/60, Trade Disputes (All Industries), 1945. Henry Pelling, A
History of British Trade Unionism, notes that 14,260,000 days were lost to
strikes in the seven calender years 1945-51, pp.261-3.
Pelling, who neglects to mention it at all.4 Morgan's presentation of industrial
unrest in the docks is, nevertheless, extremely interesting. He concentrates in
slightly greater detail on the 1948 and 1949 strikes which are discussed in
chapters four and five of this thesis. The 1949 dispute, which involved
unofficial action in a limited number of British ports by workers who refused
to discharge ships that were subject to a Canadian industrial dispute, is
characterised by Morgan as the 'most serious crisis on the industrial relations
front' encountered by Attlee's ministers.5 Perhaps this judgement is based on
the tense economic and ideological atmosphere prevailing in 1949. It may also
reflect the weight of Whitehall's concern in 1949 which was the consequence
of this atmosphere: it is no mere curiosity that the Public Records Office holds
a more abundant official correspondence on the 1949 strike than the one in
1945. Yet in fact only 406,000 working days were lost during the 1949 strike,
rendering it quantitatively less than half the size of the 1945 strike.6
During a recent BBC Radio 4 series in which the political journalist and
historian, Anthony Howard, followed 'the chequered history of the Trade
Union Movement since the Second World War', the 1945 dock strike was
ignored altogether. Howard argued that the Labour Government initially
encountered little significant industrial unrest, with the establishment of full
employment and the welfare state guaranteeing that 'all was quiet on the
industrial front'. Once the euphoria of the 1945 victory and the initial
achievements had worn off, however, the Government's work was
increasingly disrupted by unofficial strike activity in a number of industries.
For Howard, this 'trouble started in the London docks where a strike broke out
in 1948.'7 This model of the 1945 Government's record is completely false.
During the 1948 strike around 200,000 working days were lost, less than one-
fifth of the October 1945 figure.^
These opening remarks are not intended to play down the importance -
economic, ideological or otherwise - of the 1948 and 1949 strikes. But it must be
emphasised that the most significant episode in the relationship between the
Labour Government and the docks did take place early in the 1945
Government's life. The vast dock strike, which took place in defiance of the
4Kenneth O. Morgan, Labour in Power 1945-1951, p.373; Henry Pelling, The
Labour Governments 1945-51.
5Morgan, op.cit., p.375.
6PRO: LAB 34/64, Trade Disputes (All Industries), 1949.
7Anthony Howard, 'Brothers', broadcast BBC Radio 4, 5 January 1993.
8pRO: LAB 34/63, Trade Disputes (All Industries), 1948.
Transport and General Workers' Union leadership, indicated the troubled
history of the Union's attempts to organise a national and industrial workforce
across local and sectional barriers. It also revealed the extreme pressures
bearing down upon Keir Hardie's 'Great Alliance' at the very moment of its
supreme triumph.
A LIST OF UNION FAILURES1 ? THE TGWU AND THE STRIKE
The national and unofficial strike of port workers in October 1945 ostensibly
began with a piece-rate dispute at Birkenhead on the Mersey on 24 September.
A group of sixty-one men was deployed to discharge a cargo of pit props. The
company involved was not, apparently, a member of the local Employers'
Association, and therefore there existed no agreed rate for the cargo. The
company refused negotiations with the local TGWU officials, preferring
instead to refer the matter to the Ministry of Supply. Owing to this delay, the
men involved requested that they be allowed to return to the labour pool. This
was rejected by the Port Labour Superintendent, and the rest of the
Birkenhead men struck work in support of the sixty-one. At this point the Port
Labour Superintendent refused a second request, this time from 360 Liverpool
men working temporarily in Birkenhead. These men asked for the return of
their work books, in order to leave the strike-bound west bank of the Mersey
to seek employment back in Liverpool.9 The Superintendent's second decision
caused the strike to spread throughout the Mersey system, with 13,000 of the
area's 18,000 workers on strike by 3 October.1® A local TGWU official noted that
the plight of the 360 bookless men had been crucial to the development of the
stoppage. As he stated, if 'these books had not been impounded and if the
Liverpool men had been able to obtain work on their return to Liverpool there
would have been no strike.'1 1
On 5 October the TGWU National Docks Trade Group Committee Secretary,
Jack Donovan, arrived in Liverpool to conduct the negotiations personally. On
the following day an agreement was struck with the Regional Port Director
that apparently resolved the difficulties raised in the initial dispute. The sixty-
one men could re-enter the reserve labour pool and be available for work,
9'The Facts About the Dock Strike', Transport and General Workers' Record,
November 1945.
^®The Times, 4 October 1945.
11Manchester Guardian, 4 October 1945.
negotiations to fix pit-prop rates at Birkenhead would proceed, and the 360
Liverpool men working at Birkenhead were to receive attendance money from
the date of the strike starting in Birkenhead until the date when Liverpool
became involved.12 Whilst these negotiations were nearing conclusion,
however, the unofficial committee which the strikers had established to co¬
ordinate their action, was making less conciliatory noises. Frank Campbell, the
committee's chairman, pledged the unofficial strike's continuation and
indicated that there was more to the stoppage than the disagreements which
Donovan was in town to resolve. On the day of the National Secretary's arrival,
Campbell said, 'We are not prepared to listen to the dictates of the Transport
and General Workers' Union. For twenty years we have been dictated to by
them. We know that the union has been arbitrating on our behalf, but I
challenge the union to state the dockers' case.'1 3
Within a week of these remarks unofficial strike committees had been
established at all the main dock groups in the country, including London and
Glasgow. Work was also disrupted at Dundee, Garston, Hull, Grimsby and
Immingham, Leith, Manchester, Preston, Sunderland and West Hartlepools.14
By 12 October, according to official Ministry of Labour and National Service
returns, over 40,000 dockers were on strike. Peaking at 45,720 on 24 October,
the daily strike total exceeded 40,000 on every day until the men returned on 4
November, excepting 18 October when it dipped only marginally, to 39,823.15
A strike of this scale and length was not, of course, attributable to the
actions of the Mersey management. Rather it drew upon the issue of pay and
conditions which had informed the sporadic unofficial action earlier in the
year, and the traditional ambivalence with which dock workers regarded their
trade union leaders. The unofficial strike committees established in the
various ports, starting with Liverpool, took the line that responsibility for the
stoppage rested largely with the TGWU. The Union leadership, as Campbell
implied, had failed to pursue improved pay and conditions with appropriate
vigour. For the men on strike the trouble had begun in earnest not at
Birkenhead on 24 September, but one month earlier in London at the Union's
National Docks Delegate Conference.
12'The Facts About the Dock Strike', Transport and General Workers' Record,
November 1945.
13Manchester Guardian, 5 October 1945.
1477ze Times, 9-12 October 1945.
15PRO: LAB 34/60, Trade Disputes (All Industries), 1945.
Held on 24 August, only eleven days after the termination of the London
go-slow, the Conference formulated a wide-ranging and ambitious set of
proposals as a basis for forthcoming negotiations with the National Association
of Port Employers. The package quickly earned the nick-name, the 'Dockers'
Charter', and as subsequent developments were to indicate, clearly captured
the imagination of the dock workforce. The Union's package comprised six
points:
[1] An increased daily minimum from 16s to 25s.
[2] Two weeks annual paid leave.
[3] Payment for statutory holidays.
[4] A reduced working week of 40 hours.
[5] Retirement allowances for the aged and infirm.
[6] The introduction of medical and other welfare services in all ports.
The Charter was duly approved on 31 August by the workpeople's side of the
National Joint Council for the Port Transport Industry,16 and communicated to
the Employers' Association on 3 September. A meeting of the NJC was scheduled
for the 27 September.17
Publicly the Transport Workers proclaimed the conference of 24 August
and the adoption of the Charter as a great success. The union journal described
it as 'one of the best docks conferences we have had in the Union.' A
significant point of caution was added, however: 'We have recently had a
number of serious disturbances in the industry and the delegate conference
called upon members in the ports to place themselves under strict Union
discipline, and that no independent action should be taken which may
embarrass those who are responsible for conducting negotiations.'1 8
In private those 'responsible for conducting negotiations' were less happy
with the package, particularly with regard to the 25 shillings figure, which
had been adopted against the advice of the Docks Group Committee. The Docks
Group Secretary, Jack Donovan, also believed that the Charter had been foisted
upon the Committee by the conference as a result of a successful Communist-
16This body included delegates of the National Amalgamated Stevedores and
Dockers' Union, the National Union of General and Municipal Workers, and
the Scottish Transport and General Workers' Union, as well as the TGWU.
17MRC/MSS. 126 T&G/4/1/25, TGWU General Executive Council Report, 1945-
46, Appendix IV, Docks Group Report 1945-6.
18Transport and General Workers' Record, September 1945.
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orchestrated campaign. On 30 October Donovan offered the Committee the sum
of his considerations:
This figure [25s] has become a slogan, and I am convinced that it had been
circulated around the branches of the Union for many months prior to the
Delegate Conference. It is significant that this figure of 25/- was contained in
resolutions from various parts of the country in almost identical terms. We do
know that in March this year, an outside body sent out a twelve-point
questionnaire to various members of our Union employed in the Dock
Industry, and asking that it be returned to the Unity Campaign Department at
16 King Street WC2.19
If Union leaders were impatient with their members' demands, the slow pace
with which negotiations on the basis of the Charter proceeded also ensured
that these members were impatient with their Union leaders. When the Docks'
National Joint Council gathered to discuss the claim on 27 September, the
employers argued that the 24 days since 3 September had been an insufficient
period in which to consider their response. On 28 September the NJC was
adjourned until 18 October, with the employers' executive privately asserting
its determination to resist any advance on the 16s daily minimum, given the
continuation of the wartime decasualisation schemes.20
The Union later defended itself from criticism that it had done little to keep
members informed on the progress of these negotiations, pointing out that a
circular to all dock branches had been issued, containing details of the
meeting held on 27 September.21 The national escalation of the strike which
had begun on the Mersey indicated that many TGWU dock members were
unhappy with the tolerance shown by their leaders, in allowing employers a
further three weeks to prepare their case.
The large-scale unofficial strike was also evidence that the workforce was
extremely unhappy with its material position. Dock workers had received no
formal increase in their daily rate of pay since the aftermath of the Shaw
Inquiry in 1921. The Shaw Inquiry had been held at the peak of the post-war
boom, and the position of relative advantage from which Bevin had negotiated
the daily minimum of 16s, had proved to be temporary. Guy Routh has
demonstrated that, in the economy as a whole, wages tumbled rapidly between
19TGWU Docks National Trade Group Committee Minutes and Reports
(hereafter DNTGC), 30 October 1945 (Transport House, London).
20LML/LWA 57, National Association of Port Employers' Executive
Committee Minutes, 4 October 1945.
21'The Facts About the Dock Strike', Transport and General Workers' Record,
November 1945.
1921 and 1922. There followed a long period of gradual wage deflation, ending
only with the inflationary upsurge - in wages and prices - of the Second World
War. In 1945, according to Routh's calculations, average wage rates and the
cost of living were almost identical to those of 1921.2 2
Writing to the Minister of Labour, George Isaacs, once the strike was over,
Ernest Bevin pointed out what the implications of these developments were for
the dockers he had formerly represented. He observed that dockers had ridden
the inflationary boom without having to rely on the daily minimum which he
had negotiated more than two decades previously: 'the real bone of contention
is of course the day worker and I think you should know how this becomes so
acute. In a war the main work you are doing is either piece-work or special
war work for which special rates are paid. But in peace-time when we get back
to ordinary shipping, day work again becomes more prominent, especially in
loading.3
However illusory the daily rate was in war-time, with this abundance of
piece-rate and special-rate war work lifting average daily earnings well above
the 16s minimum, it was apparent that circumstances might greatly alter as
the gradual transition to peace-time conditions took place. Certainly the
unofficial strike committees were keen to argue that the absence of a formal
advance in the daily guarantee was unacceptable. Strike leaders in London
gave pithy and colourful expression to their dissatisfaction over the related
questions of pay and arduous working conditions:
16/- in 1920 - 16/- in 1945 - 16/- a day for what [sic.]. Humping Beef in a Frig.
Ship 23 degrees freezing one day; sweating the next in a hold full of Sugar -
sweat and sugar, acting like sandpaper on your back - a back covered with
blood - coughing and spitting with cement and pepper. Working your fingers
to the bone on ingots of lead and copper - discharging wet hides and smelling
to high heaven - going home smothered with lamp black, red ochre and oil -
subject to Asthma, Bronchitis, Rheumatism, Lumbago - with a constant stream
of casualties to the hospitals.24
During the strike itself constant references were made to the need for the
immediate implementation of the Charter framed at the official August
Delegate Conference. The London Central Strike Committee's 'mandate' for a
return to work was almost identical to the Charter. In addition to the demand
22Guy Routh, Occupation and Pay in Britain 1906-79, pp. 134-5.
23PRO: FO 800/491, Bevin to Isaacs, 12 November 1945.
24MRC/MSS. 15B/M/3/D/1/31, Frank Maitland deposit, National Docks Strike
Committee, To You, the Public, We Present Our Case, November 1945.
that no striker be victimised, the London committee requested a 25s daily
minimum, a forty hour week, adequate pensions and improved medical
services.25 The espousal of similar programmes by the various other strike
committees may have struck the TGWU leadership as conspiratorial, but
whether communist-inspired or not the Charter was official Union policy. It
certainly appeared to many TGWU dock members that the unofficial
committees were more active champions of the Charter than the Union
leadership. Any apprehension that the Union was dragging its feet over the
policy would certainly not have been misplaced, given Donovan's noted lack of
enthusiasm for negotiating on the basis of the 25 shilling daily minimum.2 6
Indeed, the strike indicated that the relationship between the Union and its
dock members was not at all healthy, and revealed that for many workers
within the labour movement the euphoria of the July election was short-lived.
This was acknowledged by Union officials as well as independent observers.
Reporting from Liverpool during the first week of the strike, the Manchester
Guardian's labour correspondent found that very few workers were interested
in the arrival of Jack Donovan in the port, as the TGWU attempted to resolve
the initial piece-rate and impounded books disputes. In fact, the majority
appeared actively hostile to their national officer's presence:
This antagonism towards their union, it must be stressed, is no sudden
development. It is a growing development that has been brought to a head by
the strike and conversations with -the men at any of the control points at
which they assemble to discuss matters provide evidence of a very real
solidarity on this point. They state that time after time they have been
disappointed and 'let down' by the union's handling of complaints. Indeed a list
of union 'failures' has been compiled. One striker said, 'Because their hands
are tied is always the explanation for their own inaction. They have become
our masters instead of our servants.'27
The London strike committee also emphasised the men's frustration with the
inability or unwillingness of the TGWU to force the pace of the negotiations.
One of its pamphlets mocked the official leadership's insistence that due
attention to constitutional procedures would bear fruit: 'We have pleaded and
begged for the Union to fight for better conditions. The Unions have pledged
us that they are going forward, that the official machinery has been set in
25PRO: BK 1/105, London Central Strike Committee, Mandate, undated, but
clearly printed and distributed in October 1945.
26DNTGC, 30 October 1945.
27Manchester Guardian, 5 October 1945.
motion. It has been set in motion, round and round, getting nowhere, nothing
happening.'2 8
Contemporary press reports of unofficial meetings in support of the strike
provide further suggestions of hostility towards the Union leadership. At a
Merseyside rally attended by an estimated 10,000 dockers on 14 October, the
secretary of the Liverpool committee, Philip Callanan, provided details of the
salaries enjoyed by the Union's top officials. As General Secretary Bevin had
received £1,365, Deakin was receiving £1,114 and Jack Donovan £686. Callanan
claimed that these officials were out of touch with the members who paid their
salaries.29 In Manchester at the meeting which called for strike action no
Union representative had been present, 'and the feeling among the men
generally seemed to be that the union could be ignored'.3 0
With the majority of its members in open revolt, TGWU leaders met to
discuss their response to the strike on 12 October. With Acting General
Secretary Arthur Deakin in attendance, the National Docks Trade Group
Committee sat in special session and considered developments since the last
week of September. The meeting began with Deakin describing a vote of no
confidence in Jack Donovan, passed by the Manchester strikers, as 'a dastardly
attempt to discredit a man who had given of his best'. His own confidence in
the National Secretary was absolute. The Acting General-Secretary's opening
statement was immediately qualified by Cooper, the Manchester Area
representative. To Cooper's knowledge a vote of no confidence had not actually
been passed. However, 'it did appear in the minds of the members that the
Union did not mean to do anything except take their money'. This sentiment,
expressed by a senior Union official, anticipated Callanan's remarks at the
unofficial gathering in Liverpool, by two days.3 *
More direct criticisms of Donovan's handling of the situation were made by
the Scottish area representatives present. An unofficial meeting had taken
place at Leith, not with a view to taking strike action, but simply in order for
the men to get hold of 'the facts'. 'Nobody could give them the facts except for
the circular which Bro. Donovan had sent out.' Two representatives were duly
28PRO: BK 1/105, London Central Strike Committee, Why Strike? Also undated,
but again clearly printed and distributed in October 1945.
2 9 77re Times, 15 October. Callanan, described by the Daily Herald on 11
October as Merseyside strike secretary, was usually referred to as
'Callaghan' by The Times correspondent.
30Manchester Guardian, 9 October 1945.
31DNTGC, 12 October 1945.
sent from Leith to Liverpool, with a view to gathering more information about
the origins of the dispute. 'When Bro. Donovan had said the Union were behind
the 61 men, it was the first intimation they had and it was the with-holding of
the facts that was creating confusion.' Deakin expressed his gratitude for this
statement and noted that 'his thoughts were running with what had been said'.
However, rather than giving primary attention to the thoughts of his Scottish
brothers, Deakin appears to have been swayed by the explanation for the
strike which the Liverpool area representatives offered to the Committee. The
essence of their position was that the marginal Trotskyist organisation, the
Revolutionary Communist Party, had been 'a big factor in the trouble'.3 2
At a Transport House press conference held later that day by Deakin and
Donovan, the Union Secretariat issued a statement that characterised the
actions of 'self-chosen leaders' as damaging to the workforce in that it delayed
any settlement of the outstanding claim. The statement concluded by making
much of the information supplied by the Liverpool officials:
There is definite evidence that the present stoppage has been seized upon by
people connected with certain political organisations who had ready-prepared
machinery at their disposal for encouraging and maintaining strike action.
We think our members should know this and discard these people and make up
their minds to use the constitutional machinery already at their disposal.3 3
In a personal statement Deakin confirmed that the organisation referred to
was the RCP, which he accused of 'fomenting and spreading the strikes'. He
also implied that the Trotskyists had booked halls and obtained loud-speakers,
vans and cars before the strike began. Donovan also stressed the role of
political subversion, although he added that some shipowners and employers
in Liverpool and Hull had been keen 'to foment the difficulty'.3 4
This attempt to link the establishment of the Liverpool strike committee
with the Revolutionary Communist Party was somewhat disingenuous. A
historian of the far left in Britain, John Callaghan, has detailed the financial,
organisational and numerical weaknesses of the RCP in 1944-5. With only 500
or so national members it was hardly well placed to organise and sustain a
strike of 10,000 Mersey side dockers, especially when a large number of its
members and the bulk of its limited financial resources were concentrated in
32Ibid.
33Full text of statement in Ibid.
3477re Times, 13 October 1945.
London.35 The only apparent connection between the RCP and the strike was
its offer of a £40 grant-in-aid to the Liverpool strikers, which the Merseyside
committee had refused, as'^had a similar offer from Communist Party of Great
Britain activists in Liverpool. Frank Campbell, who chaired the Merseyside
committee, plausibly claimed that he knew nothing else about the RCP. The
Trotskyists were more forthcoming, insisting that the TGWU statement was a
'miserable falsification'. They added that if Deakin and Donovan were to oppose
the employers with the same energy with which they were undermining the
strike, the stoppage 'would be over tomorrow morning and the dockers would
have their 25s a day and a 40-hour week'.3 6
The Manchester Guardian correspondent lamented the fact that Deakin had
introduced the 'old and once fashionable distraction in the Communist
"bogy"'.37 The attention paid to the Trotskyists of the Revolutionary
Communist Party in this instance cannot pass without special emphasis.
During the 1948 and 1949 dock strikes Deakin would repeat the charge that
unrest in the docks was politically motivated. However, on these occasions he
was to place blame not on the Trotskyists, but on their sworn ideological
enemies, the Stalinists of the British Communist Party. As at all times, in
October 1945 the Stalinists and the Trotskyists in Britain presented entirely
different political analyses. The RCP was hostile to the Labour Government,
and duly welcomed the dock strike as a healthy expression of conscious
working-class struggle. The British Communist Party's attitude to the Labour
Government - and the wider labour movement - was completely different.
After the momentous election result of 26 July, the Party's Executive Committee
had pledged 'wholehearted support to the Labour Government in bringing the
war against Japan to early victory, and carrying out the great social changes
and the policy of international co-operation for which the people voted with
such decision and confidence'.38 This support was largely maintained in the
remaining months of 1945. It is telling, for instance, that unlike a number of
Labour back-benchers, both Communist MPs supported the Government over
3 5 John Callaghan, British Trotskyism. Theory and Practice, pp.27-39. The
Revolutionary Communist Party of the 1940s, which was affiliated to
Trotsky's Fourth International, should not be confused with the anti-
Trotskyist Revolutionary Communist Party of the 1990s, purveyor of the
hopelessly sectarian journal, Living Marxism.
36Respective responses from Campbell and the RCP leadership reported by
Manchester Guardian, 14 October 1945.
37ibid., 14 October 1945.
38Communist Party, World News and Views, 4 August 1945.
the US loan in December 1945, with Willie Gallacher arguing that it would
allow the beginnings of socialist reconstruction in Britain.39 This general
position required the British Communists to take a suitably cautious line on the
dock strike. Whilst sympathising with the material grievances of the men on
strike - the Daily Worker urged, 'These men have a case and it must be heard'4 0
- the CP broadly opposed the dockers' use of an unofficial strike to attain their
ends. The Stalinists were also concerned that the dock strike would delay the
emergence of a socialist Britain by damaging the unity of the movement and
consequently the effectiveness of the Labour Government. As early as 8
October the Merseyside area committee of the Party 'pointed out that the
dockers have achieved public recognition but that to continue attacking the
union would mean playing into the employers' hands and weakening their
own unity'. The Party's General Secretary, Harry Pollitt, warned that the dock
strike had been provoked by employers with the purpose of discrediting the
movement and the Government.41 As the dispute dragged on, communists
continued to emphasise that the strike had been useful in giving publicity to
the dockers' plight, but that its prolongation was unacceptable. On 26 October
the Daily Worker stated, 'all that can be achieved by an unofficial strike of this
character has been achieved. To continue beyond this point means purposeless
exhaustion and hardship.'42
With the Communist Party an increasingly unambiguous opponent of the
strike, the TGWU leadership was duly denied an established 'bogy' on which to
pin blame for the stoppage. This may explain the peculiar assertions about the
disruptive role of Trotskyism, which recalled Ernest Bevin's war-time
rumblings about the involvement in strikes of 'Trotskyites and other anti-war
people', at a time when the Communist Party's insistence on tight industrial
discipline had been absolute.43 During the 1948 and 1949 strikes a very
different situation would exist, for the CP's attitude towards the Labour
Government had by then been transformed by the Cominform's 'Two Camps'
thesis of 1947, and allegations about communist involvement were much more
freely bandied about, by Government Ministers and newspaper editors as well
as TGWU leaders.
39Morgan, op.cit., p.150.
40Daily Worker, 12 October 1945.
41 Ibid., 9 and 15 October 1945.
42Ibid„ 26 October 1945.
43Above, p. 12.
Neither the TGWU press conference and statement of 12 October nor the
Communist Party's numerous interventions weakened the strike. The
unofficial committees maintained, as has been noted, their attack on the
leadership of the Union, and the majority of the Union's dock members
remained on strike. The conjunction of this mass defiance and the fury of the
invective of Campbell, Callanan and other unofficial leaders, fuelled
speculation that a rival trade union organisation might emerge. Clearly there
was collaboration between the unofficial leaderships established in the
various ports. On 22 October the Bristol port authorities informed the National
Dock Labour Corporation that three days previously two unofficial leaders
from London, Constable and Campbell, had 'slipped' into the docks, 'where
presumably they indulged in their propaganda'.44 Three days earlier
Liverpool men had spoken at an unofficial meeting in London, and London
men had been given a hearing at a similar gathering in Liverpool.
Given the sectional nature of the industry's history, the London meeting
which the Liverpool men addressed on 16 October indicated a further
significant feature of the strike. One of the local speakers was Thomas Powell,
a member of the National Amalgamated Stevedores and Dockers Union from the
Royals Section, and chairman of the London strike committee. The composition
of this committee, which cut across sectional borders, was a reminder that the
TGWU itself had failed to organise the entire port on an industrial basis, and
Powell claimed that with 40,000 workers on strike in defiance of the TGWU, a
new union could be formed at a moment's notice. In Liverpool on the same day,
when an official Union meeting was ignored by all those on strike, Frank
Campbell agreed that such a move was possible: 'We certainly could form
another union. We are strong enough. But we don't intend to do so.'45
The reasoning behind this position was indicated on the following day,
with the London strike committee restating that the strike was in pursuit of
official Union policy. The immediate goals of the strike were those of the
TGWU, namely a 25s day and a 40 hour week. There was no question of
abandoning the Union, rather the object was to 'clean up the union from
44PRO: BK1/105, communication from Bristol port authorities to National
Dock Labour Corporation, 22 October 1945. Harry Constable (born 1914 or
1915), TGWU member in the Royals sector. Constable's subsequent activities
in the unofficial movement are discussed at various points in later
chapters.
45Manchester Guardian, 17 October 1945.
within', in order that it would campaign more vigorously for the Charter and
more accurately reflect the alleged militancy of the dock members.46
If there was little likelihood that an official rival would be established,
there still remained for Union leaders the potential long-term problem of a
nationally-co-ordinated unofficial movement. In reporting the exchange of
unofficial speakers between the two great ports, the Manchester Guardian's
labour correspondent had warned that such a phenomenon would be 'an even
more serious challenge to the official unions than the strikes themselves'.4 7
Nevertheless, Frank Campbell denied the possibility of such a development. On
22 October he said, 'We don't intend to tie ourselves up with London or with any
other port in the country.'4 8
This remark and also the pattern of subsequent developments suggested, in
fact, the prospect that divisions were present within the unofficial leadership.
The TGWU Docks Group Committee noted that on the last day of October, 'a body
calling itself the National Docks Strike Committee', gathered in Liverpool. The
meeting was attended by men from Dundee, Leith, Hull, Grimsby, Manchester,
Preston, Garston and Liverpool. Neither Campbell or Callanan was present; nor
was Powell, although the TGWU member from London who had 'slipped' into
the Bristol docks twelve days previously, Harry Constable, was. Frank
Campbell's absence suggests that his remarks of 22 October were made in
perfectly good faith.
In any event, it would appear that the meeting was called with the purpose
of co-ordinating the termination, rather than the extension, of the strike.
Significantly, when Campbell was talking down the possibility of the
unofficial movements' assuming a national cohesive basis, secret moves
involving Union officials and the strikers' unofficial representatives were
already afoot to bring the dispute to a closure.
The slow move towards a resolution perhaps began on 15 October, when a
group of London port employers had resolved that their National Association
should not negotiate with the unions on the September claim until the men
had resumed work. The employers felt that to do so would be disastrous, because
'if the men's demands were met on the 18th [at the scheduled National Joint
Council meeting] full credit for the award would be claimed by the unofficial
strike leaders to the discredit of the Unions. By refusing to negotiate during
4677ze Times, 18 October 1945.
47Manchester Guardian, 17 October 1945.
48Ibid„ 23 October 1945.
the strike the Employers would be supporting the Unions' efforts to get the
men back to work. Until the Unions had regained control of their members
they were not in a position to implement any agreement.'4 9
At the joint talks on 18 October the employers duly refused to resume
negotiations on pay and conditions. The talks carried an important coda,
however, namely that negotiations would re-open within 24 hours of a general
resumption of work.50 This was increasingly significant in the days that
followed. The strike's national scale had apparently stemmed from the
workforce's frustration with the lack of urgency in negotiations, but the
National Joint Council's straightforward statement implied that the only
impediment to the talks was now the strike itself.
With some of the unofficial leaders possibly realising that the initiative
was passing from their hands, but with Union officials perhaps also aware that
an unconditional termination of the strike was too great a humiliation for the
unofficial movements to contemplate, a most extraordinary meeting was held
in Liverpool over the weekend of 20-21 October. Hosted by the Mayor of Bootle,
the secret gathering was an obvious departure from the TGWU's usual position
of refusing to recognise 'self-chosen' leaders. The Union's Docks National
Trade Group Committee minutes record that Union officials and four
(unspecified) unofficial representatives of the Liverpool men discussed 'ways
and means of terminating the strike'. Attention was drawn to the National
Docks Delegate Conference that had been arranged for 23 October, and the
strike leaders 'were informed that it was possible that the National Committee
[ie the official Docks Group Committee] would issue a direction to the members
to resume and allow negotiations to proceed, and if this were endorsed by the
Delegate Conference they [ie the strike leaders] would be able to say that they
could not hold up negotiations any longer.' The Docks Group Committee also
resolved that Deakin himself would meet two of the Liverpool men at the
Delegate Conference, 'as members of the union'. Constitutional propriety would
be preserved with the official Committee's assertion that a resumption of work
had to be ordered by the Union rather than unofficial movement.5 1
4^LML/LWA 73, Executive Council of London Association of Public
Wharfingers Limited, Special Meeting, 15 October 1945.
50LML/LWA 57, National Association of Port Employers' Executive
Committee Minutes, 25 October 1945.
51DNTGC, 22 October 1945. The date of this meeting is unspecified:
presumably it took place over the weekend of 21-22 October.
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The National Docks Delegate Conference held in London on 23 October
indeed passed the type of resolution which union officials had hinted at
during the secret meeting in Liverpool:
this Delegate Conference ... recognises the deep sense of grievance and the
feeling existing in the minds of the men at this time and calls for an immediate
resumption of work as an organised body, so ending the existing deadlock. We
urge that work be resumed at once in accordance with the requirement
contained in Clause 18 of the Constitution of the National Joint Council in order
to enable the negotiating machinery to function without delay. We further
pledge that there will be no victimisation.5 2
This initiative clearly indicated a spirit of conciliation which the TGWU
leadership had lacked earlier in the dispute, and recognised the strikers'
obvious reluctance to be bullied into a return. It also provided the unofficial
movement with the opportunity to end the strike with its dignity intact. That
such an opportunity might be grasped was not immediately apparent, with the
London strike committee indicating that it was 'surprised and disgusted' by the
Conference decision.55 But in the wake of the previous week's confidential
rendez-vous, the official Union Conference elicited a more favourable
response from the Mersey leadership, with Philip Callanan speaking of the
men's 'duty to try to find a sensible way out of this deadlock. We do not wish to
create wholesale chaos throughout the country.'54
Liverpool was seen by the Union as the key area, with dockers in other
ports pledged to stay out until the Mersey men had agreed to resume work. The
hope that Liverpool would return was dashed in the short-term, when an
unofficial meeting on 26 October decided to stay out. However, the Union's
information was that this decision was contrary to the general mood of the
workers, which favoured resumption. This intelligence would appear to have
been correct. After the strike committee's meeting on 26 October, the Union
made arrangements for postal ballots to be taken of members at Liverpool,
Manchester and the two Humber ports. These ballots, counted on 2 November,
5 2MRC/MSS. 126/T&G/1/1/23, TGWU Finance and General Purposes
Committee, 25-26 October, report of National Docks Delegate Conference, 23
October 1945.
55Daily Worker, 24 October 1945.
54Daily Herald, 25 October 1945.
revealed substantial majorities in favour of a return: at Liverpool 7,177 were
for immediate resumption with 2,846 against.55
Anticipating the result of the ballot perhaps, the Liverpool strike
committee called a mass meeting for the morning of Friday 2 November, at
which the strikers resolved to return to work on the following Monday, 5
November. Meetings at various ports around the country, apparently co¬
ordinated by the unofficial 'national' committee established on 31 October,
reached identical decisions on 2 November. After forty-one days the 'national'
unofficial committee declared the strike over, although reserving for itself a
right to resume strike action if the National Joint Council failed to arrive at a
satisfactory settlement within thirty days of the talks restarting on 5
November.5 6
Work did indeed fully restart on 5 November, and although the question of
pay and conditions was not finally resolved until the middle of December, the
threat made by the national committee to revert to strike action was not
carried out. The aims of the Charter were not secured by the December
settlement, but the employers were forced into significant concessions. The
daily minimum rate was increased for time and piece workers to 19s, and the
workforce awarded an annual paid holiday of one week. In addition, men not
required to work on statutory or proclaimed holidays would be paid the
standard time rate for the holiday. Those required to work would receive the
standard daily time rate plus payment for the time actually worked at the
standard time or piece rate.5 7
SEPARATE SPHERES OR DESPERATE FOR DOLLARS? THE STRIKE AND
THE LABOUR GOVERNMENT
Throughout the dispute, the Labour Government sternly insisted that the
strike was entirely unjustified. Ministers asked the men on strike to return to
work as soon as possible, in order that negotiations on their claim could
proceed, and that the process of post-war economic recovery be also allowed to
continue. This behaviour might be interpreted as less vigorous than the
response made by the Government's trade union partners. Certainly Whitehall
55MRC/MSS.126/T&G/1/1/23, TGWU General Executive Council, 9 November
1945.
5()Manchester Guardian and Daily Worker, 3 November 1945.
57MRC/MSS.126 T&G/4/1/25, TGWU General Executive Council Report, 1945-
46, Appendix IV, Docks Group Report, terms of December 1945 Agreement.
issued no allegations about political subversion to compare with the Transport
Workers' attack on the Liverpool strike committee on 12 October. The relatively
relaxed public pronouncements of the Government on the strike would appear
to be consistent with Lewis Minkin's observations concerning the 'separate
spheres' of activity within the labour movement, with politicians ceding trade
unionists the 'freedom' over the regulation of industrial disputes.5 8
This apparent neutrality was, however, qualified by the use of state powers
which the Government made to diminish the effectiveness of the strike action.
Under the 1939 Emergency Powers (Defence) Act which was still in force, a
total of 21,000 troops were deployed, in the words of a Ministry of War
Transport press statement, 'to do the work the dockers should be doing'.5 9
The dual nature of the Government's response - what might be termed
strikebreaking without vilification of the strikers - is recorded in the banal
Cabinet minutes of 9 October, the first formal ministerial discussion of the
dispute. The Minister of Labour, George Isaacs, informed his colleagues that 'a
serious situation' was developing as a result of the strike. In Liverpool six
ships with perishable cargoes were waiting to be unloaded. Two of these
carried bacon, and if this was lost then an immediate cut in the bacon ration
would be necessary. The Minister sought approval for his department's
favoured course of action, which was to discharge all six of the food-carrying
vessels with military labour. This approval was given." 0
This was a decision of immense historical significance. Yet, as Keith Jeffery
and Peter Hennessy have indicated, the sense of collective ministerial
insouciance is overwhelming:
There it was. Less than three months after taking office for the first time with
an overall majority, a Labour Government contemplated the use of troops to
break a strike, apparently without any dissent from the ministers around the
Cabinet table.6 1
Of course, the Government did not simply 'contemplate' the deployment of
service labour, and troops had been used to unload ships in London during the
'go slow' in the first week of August, but the significance of the Jeffery and
Hennessy observation stands. Without reference to the ideological implications
58Above, pp.4-8.
^Ministry of War Transport statement, Daily Herald, 31 October 1945.
60PRO: CAB 128/CM(45)39, 9 October 1945.
61 Keith Jeffery and Peter Hennessy, States of Emergency, p.155.
of their action, the Government was to send troops into the docks in the same
casual manner during five further disputes in the ensuing six years.
The Government was clear on one thing, however, namely that the
deployment of troops was not entirely unconnected with the preservation of
the labour alliance 'rules' identified by Minkin. Jeffery and Hennessy note
that these steps were taken with the blessing, if not at the actual instigation, of
Ernest Bevin. According to them, George Isaacs worked under the 'huge
shadow' of the predecessor who had fixed his appointment. They also claim -
presumably on the basis of Bevin's character and Isaacs's deference rather
than secret evidence left to posterity by the security services - that 'in the
early days of the 1945 Parliament Bevin was constantly on the telephone from
the Foreign Office to St.James's Square [ie the Ministry of Labour] offering
Isaacs advice he was in no position to refuse. Bevin was not a man given to
self-doubt at the best of times. When dealing with dock disputes he had no
scepticism about the accuracy of his insights.'6 2
With Bevin closely tracking, if not actually determining the Minister of
Labour's strategy, the Government inevitably found itself using troops to
defend the TGWU and the industry against the unofficial strikers. On 10
October George Isaacs made his first House of Commons statement on the strike,
announcing the introduction of service labour. The Minister observed that
whatever grievances the men had, strike action was unjustified, for the
'constitutional machinery of the industry' had a long record of success, and it
was in the dockers' interests 'that its authority be maintained'. Adopting the
moral tone that would become an integral feature of his handling of industrial
unrest in the docks, Isaacs added that the strikers' responsibility to themselves,
their families and the country, was to return to work. When David Logan, a
Labour MP from Liverpool, asked Isaacs to meet some of his constituents who
were on strike, the Minister also established that it was not the Government's
intention to concern itself with the resolution of the dispute. Re-emphasising
the importance of observing established procedure, he replied: 'No, Sir, the
men should trust the machinery of the organisation. They would, I am sure,
resent a Government official stepping in between them and the Union. They
should trust the Union. I am sure the Union will see them through.'6 3
Cabinet considered the dock strike for a second time on Monday 15 October.
In the intervening period Parkin, a senior officer at the National Dock Labour
62Ibid., p.156.
63Parliamentary Debates, Vol.414, 229-30, 10 October 1945.
Corporation, had restated the case for the low-key approach implicit in the
previous Cabinet discussion. In a letter to his colleague Norris, Parkin
summarised the Corporation's belief that a restoration of the workers' faith in
due constitutional processes would require prudence on the part of Union
leaders as well as Ministers. Parkin suggested that if 'the Union is to re¬
establish itself, it must debunk these unofficial leaders and we must be careful
not to take any action which would, in effect, turn them into martyrs'.64 With
Deakin and Donovan spectacularly failing to live up to such a task, with the
'Trotskyist plot' press conference hosted within hours of this plea for caution,
Ministers had to be especially careful that the course of events did not further
undermine the Union's authority. On 15 October Cabinet therefore concurred
with Isaacs's request that no enquiry be made into the origins and nature of
the strike, lest this disrupt the Docks' National Joint Council negotiations
which were set to resume three days later.6 ^ In the wake of this joint
industrial meeting the Union was able to cast the unofficial leadership as the
body responsible for holding up the talks, and the Government used this to
reject any notion that it might more actively intervene.
Requests for positive action from the Government continued to be made by
MPs who sympathised with the material grievances of the dock workers. On 15
October Willie Gallacher spoke of the 'real grievances' of the dockers, and
asked Isaacs whether he would 'call a conference of employers, trade union
officials, and representatives of the dock areas, with a view to accelerating
negotiations and getting the strike ended?' Unsurprisingly, in the wake of that
morning's Cabinet discussion, Isaacs cautiously intoned that it would be 'most
unwise to let anything accrue to those who take unofficial action in this
matter.'66 A fortnight later the veteran of Red Clydeside, David Kirkwood, made
another vain attempt to force a change in the Government's position:
The workers are out on strike all over the place, they are striking all over the
country simultaneously. There is something seriously wrong, and I want to
appeal to the Minister of Labour ... if he himself goes and speaks to the strikers
in London the strike will be finished. (Interruption) Why should not Ministers
come off their pedestals when it is a question of dealing with the working
class? This has been the lot of workers right down the ages. Why cannot he do
this?6 7
64PRO: BK 1/105, Parkin to Norris, 12 October 1945.
65PRO: CAB 128/CM(45)41, 15 October 1945.
66Parliamentary Debates, Vol.414, 698, 15 October 1945.
67Ibid„ Vol.415, 246-7, 30 October 1945.
94
The separate interventions of such disparate figures as Logan, Gallacher and
Kirkwood, indicated that on the right and left of the labour movement, there
was considerable unease over the Government's handling of the dispute. The
Independent Labour Party suggested that dockers urgently needed pay
increases to keep pace with increased living costs, and stated, 'The Dockers
MUST Win'. Unlike the Communist Party, which had also sympathised with if
not actually supported the strikers, the ILP openly criticised the Government:
'The Government has handled the situation badly and have given the
impression of backing the employers against the workers. In addition it has
backed this attitude by introducing military force at the docks.'6 8
On the right-wing of the Labour party, the MP for Liverpool Exchange,
Bessie Braddock, threw her formidable weight - political as well as physical -
into the fray. On 31 October, prior to the convention of the 'national' strike
committee in Liverpool, Braddock had held talks with the local unofficial
leaders. This meeting was also attended by Logan and three other local Labour
MPs, Joseph Gibbins, James Haworth and James Keenan, who was a former
TGWU official.69 Braddock's political orthodoxy - as a long-serving member of
the party's NEC she was a renowned hammer of the left70 - suggests that her
decision to meet the strike leaders was a result of widespread support for the
men's position in Liverpool. Discussing this meeting in the House of Commons,
Braddock said that 'I have never, in all my industrial and political career,
found such perfect organisation as the dock strikers have at this moment.'
Urging the Government to pay close attention to ensuing negotiations,
Braddock added her certainty 'that men who have put in so much during the
war, who have worked under such tremendous difficulties in the ports during
the blitzes, would not remain on unofficial strike for five weeks unless there
was something fundamentally wrong with their conditions of labour and the
position as it exists in the ports today.'7 1
The notion that it was the duty of a Labour Government to intervene in an
industrial dispute on the side of the workers evidently aroused considerable
68MRC/MSS. 15B/M/3/D/1/30, ILP handbill, 'The Dockers MUST Win',
October 1945.
6 9 77ze Times, 1 November 1945.
70Ben Pimlott, Harold Wilson, p.245. Braddock was on the NEC 1947-8, 1958-
69.
71 Parliamentary Debates, Vol.415, 872-4, 2 November 1945. The memoirs of
Jack and Bessie Braddock, The Braddocks (1963), shed no light on her role
in the 1945 dispute.
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anxiety amongst Ministers and Union leaders. On 31 October the Daily Herald
patiently explained that the Government's approach, with intervention
restricted to the use of military labour in the ports, was in the interests of the
working class. A leader column entitled 'Your Government', ran:
An argument presented to dockers by some strike leaders is this:
'The Labour Government is your Government. You are entitled to use it as your
servant, and to insist that it shall remedy your grievances on demand. If the
Government does not act forthwith, then the Government is betraying you.'
We reply: Humbug! For while the Labour Government is undoubtedly the
servant of the dockers, it is also the servant of the whole nation, including all
the millions of workers who are organised in trade unions. This Government
won the votes of the people with a programme which included a solemn pledge
to uphold and advance the Trade Union Movement.
The Government will be faithful to trade unionists: but trade unionists must
be faithful to their unions.
Dockers who remain on strike in defiance of their democratically elected
leaders, must surely realise that they are weakening the authority of the
unions, damaging the repute and complicating the task of the Labour
Government, and undermining Democracy. If the constitutional machinery is
deemed to be inadequate it must be reformed from within.
What is happening now at the docks is that constitutional methods are
being repudiated and that an advantage is being conferred upon the enemies
of working-class organisation.'' 1
With no formal ministerial initiative to resolve the problems underwriting the
strike, the build-up of troops begun on 10 October continued. By 16 October
there were 16,000 troops at work in the docks, including the trained stevedores
of the Royal Engineers.73 The strikers held little animosity towards these men.
Said Philip Callanan, 'The Army are our friends, our brothers and our sons.
Liverpool dockers have provided for the Army, the Navy and Merchant Navy
throughout the war. We appreciate that, whatever they do, they have to do
their job as an order.'74 According to Jack Dash, who became a docker in
London in June 1945,7^ the London men regarded the largely conscripted
72Daily Herald, 31 October 1945.
73Jeffery and Hennessy, op.cit., p.156; Peak, op.cit., p.88.
74Da//y Herald, 11 October 1945.
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force without malice. 'There was no real anger against the troops themselves.
It was only one year after most of the dockers had been troops themselves. Our
only anger was against the Labour government; this was the last thing we
expected.'7 6
Whatever the dock workers expected of the Government, Ministers
remained insistent that they expected the men on strike to realise their
responsibilities and resume work. On 19 October Isaacs protested in the House
of Commons that: 'The action of the strikers cannot be defended and neither
the employers nor the trade unions can have confidence in negotiating a new
agreement while the obligations of the existing agreement are being
repudiated in this way.'77
On 26 October the Government did broaden its involvement in the dispute,
although not in the manner that Dash and his comrades would have wished.
With over 46,000 dockers on strike and 225 ships immobilised, the Government
extended the deployment of service labour in the docks. Given the differences
which emerged in 1947 between the Transport and Labour Ministries over the
introduction of the Dock Labour Scheme, it is significant that this development
took place at the request of the Transport Minister, Alfred Barnes. Cabinet
responded positively to his request that military labour now encompass vessels
loading export cargoes. Troops would also clear the ships which supplied
imports bought with sterling. This would save the precious dollars which were
being rapidly consumed by imports.78 Barnes's successful request indicated
the manner in which the government's priorities were ordered. With Keynes
in Washington negotiating a loan from the US Government, the primary
consideration was not simply that of maintaining people with a regular, if
meagre, supply of bacon, eggs, oranges and cheese. The perilous economic
position, with the need for dollars already desperate, persuaded ministers that
the strike could not be allowed to delay the turn-round of shipping any longer.
Jeffery and Hennessy record that the 'hard line' adopted by the
Government was a success. A forty-one day strike was terminated without a
firm pay offer 'on the table'.79 This conclusion ignores both the manner in
which the dispute had been terminated and the important material gains
which the dockers subsequently won. Evidently the Government had not
76jack Dash, speaking in 1982, quoted in Peak, op.cit., p.89.
77Parliamentary Debates, Vol.414, 1553, 19 October 1945.
78PRO: CAB 128/CM(45)46, 26 October 1945.
79Jeffery and Hennessy, op.cit., p. 160.
intervened to resolve the dispute, as the unofficial movement had requested,
and the commitment to the use of troops obviously served as a warning to the
men that the strike would not be allowed to interfere with supplies of food and
raw materials. There was, however, the additional and considerable factor of
the secret Liverpool meeting which had prepared the ground for the return to
work. What is more, within six weeks of the strike's termination, the dockers
received a formal advance in their guaranteed minimum daily rate for the
first time since 1922. In the face of the employers' sworn insistence that there
would be no scope for any advance upon the 16s daily minimum, it might be
suggested that the strike had illustrated the men's determination to force such
a raise upon the industry. Certainly Jack Dash recalled that his comrades in
the Royal Docks of London regarded the strike and the December settlement as
events to celebrate rather than mourn. In so doing he also indicated the
attitude of the unofficial leadership towards the TGWU and to subsequent
developments: 'We returned to work jubilant and victorious, determined to
maintain the inter-port unity that had been built up through the National
Portworkers' Unofficial Committee, not to usurp the power of our accredited
trade unions, but to make sure that the demands of the rank and file were acted
on.'8 0
There is also the question of the extent to which the Government had
adopted a 'hard line'. Clearly troops were used on a massive scale and this
military labour, while deployed ostensibly in the 'national interest' of
maintaining the economic life of the wider community, actively undermined
the unofficial strike's effectiveness. In this sense the Government did break
the strike. In so doing, however, the Government's actions were remarkably
free from the tactical smears which would characterise its response to the
significantly smaller 1948 and 1949 disputes. In contrast to Deakin's outburst
on 12 October, Ministers made no suggestion that political subversion was
underpinning the strike.
If the Government's public position on the strike was relatively relaxed,
there is evidence also to suggest that in private its attitude to the strikers was
more generous than the large-scale deployment of strike-breaking
servicemen might suggest. In the immediate aftermath of the strike but with
the wage issue still unresolved, Ernest Bevin himself partly conceded the
justice of the strikers' demands. Writing to Isaacs, Bevin reminded him that the
1921 Shaw Inquiry had fixed the daily minimum of 16s. Although most dockers
80Jack Dash, op. cit., p.59.
were earning much more than this from piece-rates and special war-work
rates, 16s remained the basic rate for daily engagement. This was an important
obstacle to peace in the docks: 'The output now is nearly double, the number of
men has fallen from 180,000 to 60,000, and if ever there was a case where the
men were entitled to improvement it seems to me to be in the dock industry.'
The Foreign Secretary had made some 'discreet inquiries', which suggested
that 'if the men could get £1 a day you would have a settlement, and quite
frankly I think it is worth it.'** 1
CONCLUSION: AN INTERNAL CRISIS OR BUNGLING AMATEURS?
Ernest Bevin's typical private candour strongly indicated that, whilst utterly
rejecting the legitimacy of the unofficial strike, the labour movement's
leaders did sympathise with the material position of the men on strike. The
Transport and General Workers' Record called attention to the fact that 'the
dockers have a deep sense of grievance'. However, the Union was more
concerned with another aspect of the dispute. Its salient feature had not been
the misfortune of their members' circumstances, but the 'certain elements
who have made up their minds that they will do everything possible to destroy
the constitutional machinery which has been built up over a long period of
years, and embarrass the Labour Government by trying to force it to act as a
substitute for trade unions'.82 The TGWU was evidently harassed by the
Liverpool 'national strike committee' meeting on 31 October, which gave the
unofficial movement an apparent 'national' footing. Jack Donovan was
particularly troubled by this, telling other officers on the Docks Group
Committee: 'I submit this is an impossible position for the Union, and so long as
these unofficial disruptive elements are allowed to retain their membership of
the Union and carry on their activities outside the constitution, it will be
absolutely impossible for me ... or the Dock officers ... to function.'8 2
This theme was pursued, perhaps not without satisfaction, by The Times' s
labour correspondent as the men returned to work and negotiations on the
National Joint Council looked set to resume. He made a further observation
81 PRO: FO 800/491, Bevin to Isaacs, 21 November 1945. The size of the
workforce in 1945 was nearer 80,000 than 60,000. Presumably the error was
typographical.
82'The Facts About the Dock Strike', Transport and General Workers' Record,
November 1945.
83DNTGC, 30 October 1945.
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which Donovan had also made in the privacy of the Docks Group Committee
rooms, about the manner in which the Charter had been arrived at:
The demands before the employers are to an important degree the result of the
steady activity in the union of those who have led the strike and who intend to
retain their hold and to change if they do not overthrow the official
leadership which they have for more than a month superseded in the
principal ports of the country. There is clearly a crisis in the internal affairs
of the dockers' section of the Transport and General Workers' Union.84
The emergence of an unofficial leadership in opposition to the official one,
continued to dominate public discussion of the strike in the months following
its termination. In January the Union claimed, contrary to the unofficial
movement's criticisms, that it had been pursuing the men's pay claim with the
utmost vigour. The delay in attaining the settlement 'was due solely to the
interference of bungling amateurs' who had never previously shown an
interest in improving the conditions of other dock workers.85 Speaking a few
months later at the National Docks Labour Corporation's AGM, as a veteran
trade unionist as well as the Corporation's chairman, Lord Ammon said that,
'the feature of the strike which disturbed me most profoundly was the
unofficial organisation which, for a brief period, sought to dominate
industrial negotiations.'8 6
These descriptions of an eruption in unofficial organisation and activity
neglected to add, however, that such organisation and activity had long been
features of the dock industry. The huge unofficial strike of October 1945
represented a continuation of the historical tradition which was discussed in
Chapter Two. As John Lovell has shown, from its origins in the latter decades
of the nineteenth century, dock labour organisation was characterised by
occasional outbursts of militant strike action, and a solid basis of unionisation
was never properly established.87 In other words, Bevin had built the TGWU
on foundations that were historically flimsy, and the 1945 strike was an
indication that the Transport Workers had yet to harness the workforce's
undoubted capacity for organisation and union activity.
In terms of the dilemmas facing Keir Hardie's 'Great Alliance' in the
immediate wake of 1945's huge triumph, the strike had been no less
8477ze Times, 2 November 1945.
85Transport and General Workers' Record, January, 1946.
86PRO: BK 1/151, NDLC Sixth AGM, 27 June 1946.
87John Lovell, Stevedores and Dockers.
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illuminating. The Government had shown its determination to break the
strikes with military labour for two purposes. The first objective was to
maintain the position of the TGWU and the joint negotiating machinery, thus
enabling the trade unions to continue with their traditional role of
determining the wages and conditions of workers. The second objective was to
maintain Britain's economic life in the extremely perilous conditions
prevailing in 1945. Only through economic recovery could the Government
fashion the type of Britain that Labour was pledged to realise: strike-breaking
was thus presented as a move to protect rather than penalise the working
class.
It is worth re-emphasising that the October 1945 strike lasted for forty-one
days, involved more than 40,000 workers, cost the port transport industry more
than one million working days, and was the largest single industrial dispute of
the 1945-51 period. Yet at the same time the Government's attitude towards the
strike was much more relaxed than during the later, and significantly smaller,
strikes. This is clearly a paradox, but one which historians of the 1945 Labour
Government have curiously failed to recognise.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE ZINC OXIDE' STRIKE, JUNE 1948.
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THE INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE AS A CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT
The second large-scale unofficial dock strike which the 1945 Government
encountered was the 'Zinc Oxide' dispute of June 1948. After a gang of
eleven London dockers had been disciplined for refusing to handle a cargo
of zinc oxide satisfactorily, work in the Port of London was severely
disrupted for two weeks. From 14-29 June more than half of the Port's
industrial workforce - including stevedores, lightermen, cold storage
workers and tally clerks as well as dockers - were on unofficial strike.
Approximately 19,000 of London's 27,000 men were involved, and
sympathetic action was taken by about 9,000 Mersey dockers on 28 and 29
June. The Ministry of Labour's official figures record that the stoppages on
the Mersey and the Thames cost the industry collectively more than 200,000
working days.1
The strike was the first of its kind since the introduction of the Dock
Labour Scheme in 1947. The Transport and General Workers' Union had, in
1947, been at pains to emphasise the new situation which the Scheme would
bring. Writing in the Union journal, Docks Group Secretary Jack Donovan
had encouraged dock workers to observe closely the Scheme's legal basis,
and offered his members this warning: 'We desire to make it clear to our
members that the decasualisation scheme will be based on an Act of
Parliament, and a strike on this issue would not be against the employers
but against the Government.'2
In the autumn of 1947 the Union also highlighted the economic
implications - for the labour movement, the Government and the nation -
of strike action. In the wake of the convertibility crisis which had
simultaneously highlighted and deepened the Labour Government's
economic problems, the TGWU drew attention to the severity of the
economic position, and members were informed that they could either
work, or starve, through the present difficulties. The following month
Docks Group members were urged to do 'EVERYTHING' that would alleviate
JpRO: LAB 34/63, Industrial Disputes (All Industries), 1948.
2Transport and General Workers' Record, February 1947.
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delays in the turn-round of shipping, 'in order that we make our
contribution to help the country out of its present difficulties'.3
These changed institutional, legal and economic implications of
unofficial industrial action ensured that the TGWU leadership - and its
labour movement colleagues in Government - would respond with the
utmost vigour to the stoppage in June 1948. In particular, the manner of
the Ministerial response differed greatly from October 1945, when the
Government had been much less critical of the strikers than had the TGWU
leadership. Paradoxically, a sterner line was taken on this occasion - by
Ministers and Union officials alike - than during the earlier and much
larger dispute. It would appear from the Ministerial response during the
June 1948 dispute that the Government broadly shared the assumption held
by Jack Donovan, that a strike against the Dock Labour Scheme was also a
strike against the Government.
For Ministers there was an important added consideration, however,
namely their determination to uphold the Government's authority as the
guarantor of essential supplies and services. Since July 1945, along with
senior Whitehall civil servants, Labour Ministers had been considering
how the Government could maintain essential supplies and services which
were disrupted as the result of unofficial strike action. On the basis of a
proposal made by the Permanent Under Secretary at the Home Office, Sir
Alexander Maxwell, in June 1945, the Government had revived the Supply
and Transport Organisation (STO). This was the Government committee,
comprising Ministers, civil servants and service chiefs, which had been
established in 1925. Responsible for directing military and voluntary
civilian labour during the 1926 General Strike, the STO had been allowed to
lapse under the 1939 Emergency regulations.4 The organisation's place in
labour movement demonology was in fact noted in January 1946, when
Ministers discussed the form of its reconstitution. With the imminent
repeal of the 1927 Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Act, which had outlawed
general strikes, Nye Bevan and Sir Stafford Cripps both emphasised the
potential embarrassment for the Government, if it became known that it
3Ibid., October and November 1947.
4Keith Jeffery and Peter Hennessy, States of Emergency, p. 148.
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was simultaneously preparing plans to defeat a general strike if one
occurred.5
In March 1946 Attlee successfully urged his Cabinet colleagues to set
such misgivings aside, and 'paper plans' for the establishment of the STO
were put in place.6 The STO was put into operation for the first time after
the war during the unofficial road transport workers strike of January
1947, when a total of 3,500 troops were deployed in London to maintain the
capital's meat rations.7 The 1947 road transport strike was also significant
in that it illustrated the Government's obvious determination to break
unofficial strikes which were disrupting food supplies. Moreover, it showed
that Ministers were not prepared to tolerate unofficial industrial action,
which threatened the bargaining position of trade unions and their
official leaders, and therefore also jeopardised the economic life of the
nation. The Government agreed that the Road Haulage Association and the
TGWU could not hold negotiations whilst men were on unofficial strike, and
Cabinet therefore decided that a declaration of a State of Emergency under
the 1920 Emergency Powers Act would be in order. By enabling the
Government to take over the entire industry, this would force the men back
to work, and duly allow negotiations to proceed.** However, before this
measure was implemented, the strike was called off, and the men went back
to work on 18 January. In provoking this tough Ministerial opposition, the
road transport strike set an important precedent for future industrial
dislocation, beginning with the London dock strike of June 1948.
ORIGINS: ZINC OXIDE AND COE'S GANG
The 1948 dock strike began with a piece-rate dispute on Friday 28 May in
Regent's Canal Dock. At issue was a 100 ton cargo of zinc oxide which a gang
of eleven daily workers, led by J.R. Coe, were loading on to a ship, the s.s.
Thi ems, from barges at a rate of 3s4d per ton.9 This rate had been fixed
5PRO: PREM 8/673, Supply and Transport Organisation meeting, 29 January
1946.
6PRO: CAB 128/CM(46)22, 8 March 1946.
7PRO: CAB 130/16, Supply and Transport Organisation, 10 January 1947.
8PRO: CAB 128/CM(47)7, 16 January 1947.
9PRO: LAB 10/783, the eleven men were J.R. Coe, G. Ashmore, J. Bloomberg,
A. Castle, C. Clancy, J. Hogan, W.J. Holland, J. Langley, J. Neill, A.E. Smith and
A. Upton.
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during a telephone conversation held on the previous afternoon between
the employer, the Grand Union (Stevedoring and Wharfage) Co. Ltd., and
the local TGWU negotiating official, S.Piatt. The fact that Piatt agreed the
rate from his office, without actually seeing the cargo, later assumed great
significance. Piatt and the Grand Union were guided by a document drawn
up by the Short Sea Traders' Association with the TGWU's agreement, which
provided a framework for setting 'dirty traffic' rates. Although zinc oxide
was not specifically mentioned in the agreed list, Piatt agreed with the
Grand Union manager that it be judged as equivalent to more common dirty
materials, such as antimony, plumbago and graphite. The piece-rate for
these items was 3s4d per ton.'®
Coe's gang began working the zinc oxide on the morning of 28 May,
unaware of the previous afternoon's negotiations. Upon learning that Piatt
had committed them to the rate of 3s4d, the men refused to continue loading
the cargo, arguing that it was unusually obnoxious and worthy of 5s per
ton. The Grand Union then telephoned Piatt, who affirmed that 3s4d was the
correct rate, but agreed to visit the ship immediately. Although Piatt might
at this stage have sided with Coe's men rather than the employer on the
piece-rate, it seems probable that he had already boxed himself in, by
committing himself to the lower rate on two occasions without having seen
the cargo. As a Union negotiatior Piatt would certainly have been keen to
avoid earning a reputation as a man who would not stick by mutual
agreements, however informally they had been reached. Upon seeing the
cargo himself, in fact he duly confirmed the original rate twice on the
afternoon of 28 May: the first time after watching the gang load the cargo
for one hour with Aldred, the Secretary of the Short Sea Traders'
Association which had compiled the list of 'dirty traffic'; and on the second
occasion with Tonge of the Grand Union's parent body, the Public
Wharfingers' Association. However, the gang persisted with their claim
that the rate was unfair and after Piatt had told them that the rate would be
3s4d, they refused to finish loading the zinc oxide, at which point they were
offered other work which gave them time to reconsider their position.' '
The situation was temporarily resolved over the weekend of 29-30 May, as
'"PRO: BK 2/72, NDLB press statement, 23 June 1948.
''PRO: LAB 10/783, W. Lessiter, Managing Director of Grand Union, to the
NDLB, 29 May 1948.
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the Thiems set sail for Antwerp with the rest of its cargo, minus the zinc
oxide.
On 4 June, as another Grand Union vessel, the ss Margworth, arrived
in the Port of London to receive the zinc oxide, the Joint Sector Committee,
the disciplinary section of the London Dock Labour Board on which both
employers' associations and unions were represented, met to discuss the
case. The Committee found that the men's actions of 28 May were in breach
of the Dock Labour Scheme which required men to discharge prescribed
duties according to locally-negotiated rules. In London these rules stated
that any gang disputing a piece rate had to continue work on a daily scale,
pending settlement of the contentious piece rate. On 29 May the gang had
indicated that they would only continue loading the zinc oxide at the daily
rate if offered an additional 2s6d per man per hour.1 2
The Joint Sector Committee's judgement was passed to the London
Board's executive. The Grand Union also asked the London Board to consider
the further refusal by Coe's gang, on 4-5 June, to load the new ship, the
Margworth, with the zinc oxide. It should be noted that under the Scheme's
continuity regulations, the original gang were obliged to stick with the
task until its completion.1 3
On 7 June the London Board executive appointed an expanded View
Committee to watch the work being done. On 8 June the committee, made up
of two men from each side of the industry, agreed that the original rate was
valid. Although insisting that this was iniquitous, and maintaining the
justice of their own position, the gang nevertheless completed loading the
cargo at 3s4d per ton on the afternoon of 8 June.14
On Wednesday 9 June the London Board disciplined the eleven men
for having previously abandoned their obligations under the Dock Labour
Scheme. They were suspended from the Scheme without pay for seven days,
and their rights to attendance money and guaranteed make-up withdrawn
for three months.15 In accordance with the Scheme's disciplinary
procedures, the eleven men were entitled to an appeal, but before this
could be lodged an unofficial strike committee was established at Wapping
in the London Docks section of the port on 10 June. Demanding solidarity
12Ibid.
1 ^ibid: Lessiter to the NDLB, 5 June 1948.
14 Unofficial Stoppages in the London Docks. Report of a Committee of
Inquiry (Cmd. 8236, 1951), para. 36.
15PRO: LAB 10/783, Lessiter to the NDLB, 5 June 1948.
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against the 'inhumanity' of the penalties, the strike committee called for
dockers to take sympathetic strike action, beginning on Monday 14 June.16
On 11 June a date for an appeal hearing was fixed for Tuesday 15
June. Before this hearing could be held, however, the threatened unofficial
strike began on 14 June with 1700 men stopping work.17 On 15 June the
Appeal Tribunal failed to reach agreement, and decided to reconvene two
days later. During this delay the stoppage continued to spread, and on the
morning of 17 June, when the Appeal Tribunal met again at the London
Board, approximately 12,000 dockers had ceased work. Over half of the
Port's 230 ships were affected, with work especially disrupted in the Royals
Group, where the unofficial committee appears to have been particularly
influential.1 8
UNOFFICIAL REASONING AND THE INITIAL OFFICIAL RESPONSE
The support which the unofficial strike gave the eleven disciplined men
was explained in a pamphlet issued by the 'Port Workers Strike Committee',
entitled The Men's Own Case. This emphasised the manner in which Piatt
had compromised both himself and the men by conducting the piece-rate
negotiations by telephone rather than in person, and characterised the
penalisation of the gang as a 'harsh and vicious punishment'. 1 9
On 17 June the Appeal Tribunal reduced from three months to two
weeks, the period during which the eleven were disentitled to attendance
money and guaranteed make-up, but the original seven days' unpaid
suspension was upheld. The following morning the strike committee
reaffirmed its commitment to the stoppage, prompting the TGWU to issue a
press notice which called attention to the unacceptable nature of the strike
and its damaging economic implications:
On behalf of the General Executive Council the men on strike at the London
Docks are requested to start work immediately. There is no justification at
all for the stoppage if constitutional machinery has been used. Any refusal
1 6Cmd.8236, para. 36. Wapping was approximately one mile downstream
from Regent's Canal Dock, where the Zinc Oxide piece-rate dispute had
taken place. Both were *' situated on the
North bank of the river.
17PRO: LAB 10/783, J.G. Whitlock, unpublished departmental account of the
June 1948 strike; Steve Peak, Troops in Strikes, p.93.
Manchester Guardian, 15-17 June 1948; The Times, 17 June 1948.
l^PRO: BK 2/72, Port Workers Strike Committee, The Men's Own Case.
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to carry out the decision of the properly established appeals machinery
will result in a permanent disadvantage to the men concerned. There is no
justification for continuing the present stoppage. Above all any
prolongation of the dispute will have the effect of seriously affecting vital
food supplies and cause great losses to the country and the people. The
members of the Union are expected loyally to carry out this request of their
own Executive Council.20
Later that day the Union called a meeting in Hackney's Victoria Park, to
secure the return to work demanded by its morning press release. When
Harvey and Condon from the local TGWU Docks Group arrived to address the
gathering, the 300 or so men who had assembled immediately walked off,
leaving the hapless officials to address a small group of reporters. 2 1
Having chosen to gather in the park, it is unclear exactly why these 300
men were unwilling to listen to the TGWU officials, although it is quite
possible that the walk-off was deliberately designed to humiliate Harvey
and Condon. Certainly a senior civil servant at the Ministry of Labour, J.G.
Whitlock, was moved to describe the event as 'a fiasco'.22
The Union officials thus humiliated were evidently much chastened
by developments. Harvey in particular appears to have been shaken by the
obvious lack of control which he had over his members. On 19 June, in the
company of Piatt, he visited the Assistant Port Manager, Saunders, at the
London Dock Labour Board. During the meeting Harvey 'stated that the
position generally had assumed serious proportions as the "unofficial
people" had now set up a "No name organisation'".2 3
From the information on the unofficial leaders which Harvey and
Piatt provided, Saunders duly compiled a list of men who belonged to this
'No Name Organisation', which he passed to the Ministry of Labour on 23
June, four days after the meeting at the London Board.24 The list was by no
means a complete record of the men who served on the strike committee,
for it contained twenty-one names, whilst it would appear from allegations
made by Arthur Deakin - also on 23 June - that the committee's membership
exceeded forty.25 It is significant, however, that in February 1949, when
20pRO: LAB 10/783, copy of TGWU Press Statement, 18 June 1948.
21The Times, 19 June 1948.
22PRO: LAB 10/783, Whitlock account of strike.
23PRO: BK 2/72, minutes of meeting at the LDLB between Saunders, Piatt and
Harvey on 19 June.
24PRO: LAB 10/783, London Regional Industrial Relations Officer to
Stillwell, 23 June 1948.
2 5 77ze Times, 24 June 1948.
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the TGWU held an inquiry into the activities of the unofficial group during
the 1948 strike, only seventeen men were called to give evidence.26 These
seventeen represented the entire TGWU complement which Saunders listed
as belonging to the 'No Name Organisation'. Of the other four, three were
members of the Stevedores' Union, with another individual - a man called
Dixon - somewhat mysteriously characterised as 'Not Yet Identified'.27 At
the TGWU investigation in 1949 each of the seventeen men confirmed that
he had belonged to the strike committee.28 This suggests that Harvey's
original characterisation of the unofficial committee - the 'No Name
Organisation' - as a covert body was false. Those who assumed unofficial
leadership did so unambiguously, making no apparent effort to conceal
their identities from journalists, police detectives or Ministry of Labour
industrial relations officers. They certainly did not operate in a mysterious
or secretive fashion.
Harvey's attitude towards the strike organisation was perhaps a
measure of his demoralisation, for the list which Saunders compiled
indicated the extent to which the unofficial movement challenged the
Union's authority. Its composition was drawn from all four upstream
sectors of the Port of London - the London, Surrey Commercial, West and
East India and Millwall, and the Royal Docks. There was the important
additional factor of the committee including members of the Stevedores'
Union as well as the TGWU. The three Stevedores' Union men listed were
Donovan, Aylward and Pullen. Like Aylward, Pullen was a senior figure in
the Stevedores' Union. Both in fact were members of its Joint Executive
Council in 1948.29
However, in leading the unofficial strike all three Stevedores' men
were, like their TGWU brothers, operating in defiance of their official
leaders. Unofficial activity was as roundly condemned in the small
Stevedores Union as it was within the mighty TGWU. The Stevedores'
General Secretary, Dickie Barrett, was anxious throughout the dispute to
26MRC/MSS. 126/T&G/1/1/27, TGWU General Executive Council, Appendix
III, 28 February 1949. This investigation is discussed in the following
chapter.
27PRO: LAB 10/783, London Regional Industrial Relations Officer to
Stillwell, 23 June 1948.
28MRC/MSS. 126/T&G/1/1/27, TGWU General Executive Council, Appendix
III, 28 February 1949.
29PRO: LAB 10/783, London Regional Industrial Relations Officer to
Stillwell, 23 June 1948.
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secure a general resumption of work. On 26 June he appeared at a meeting
in the Surrey Commercial Docks along with Deakin of the TGWU and Thomas
of the Lightermen's Union, and urged the men to call off the strike
immediately.^ ®
Moreover, though once the strike was over Barrett allowed Pullen's
actions to pass unchecked, he rounded on his other dissident colleague, Bert
Aylward. This was probably due to Aylward's persistent involvement in
unofficial activity. In 1947, it will be remembered, he had been
reprimanded by the Stevedore Union's Executive for his role in the
unofficial opposition to the manner of the Dock Labour Scheme's
introduction.31 There seems also to have been personal hostility between
Barrett and Aylward. At the Stevedore Union's Joint Executive meeting on
18 August 1948, Barrett baldly stated that he did not intend to call any
further Joint Executive meetings whilst Aylward remained a member. Faced
with this ultimatum the meeting voted marginally - three votes to two - to
remove Aylward from the Joint Executive Council and the Dockers Sectional
Committee of the Union. The minutes of the meeting, alas, do not record the
identity of the individual brave enough to side with Aylward against the
General Secretary.32
At the London Board on 19 June, in addition to providing information
on the membership of the strike leaders, Harvey also told Saunders that he
had met them, and spoke of his belief that 'drastic all-round face-saving
action' was necessary. He advocated the suspension of the penalties
'pending a discussion by the National Joint Council of amendments to the
Scheme'. This meeting with the unofficial leaders, and Harvey's plea for a
compromise solution, recalled the manner in which the Docker's Charter
strike had been resolved, without undue embarrassment to Union officials
or the unofficial movement. On this occasion, however, as Harvey evidently
anticipated in recognising that his position would not be popular at
Transport House,33 the Union leadership was in no mood to compromise.
Determined to defend the Scheme which it jointly administered, the TGWU
30Manchester Guardian, 28 June 1948.
31NMLH/NASDU Joint Executive Council Minutes, 11 June 1947.
32NMLH/NASDU Joint Executive Council Minutes, 18 August 1948. The
leadership of the Amalgamated Stevedores and Dockers' Union comprised
two Sectional Committees - the Stevedores and the Dockers - which were
subordinate to the Joint Executive Council.
33PRO: BK 2/72, minutes of meeting at the LDLB between Saunders, Piatt and
Harvey on 19 June.
fully endorsed the National Dock Labour Board's denial that the gang had,
as the unofficial movement claimed, been harshly treated. On 23 June the
NDLB stated its position:
It is said that the penalty of thirteen weeks disentitlement was severe.
Obviously in a port in which the likelihood of obtaining full employment is
slight, this might be so, but the eleven men concerned are members of a
preference gang. They work to a regular line of ships and are among the
first to be selected for work. Their average earnings during the preceding
twelve months were about £9 per week. On an average they are not
employed for one-half day a week, for which they get 5/-. The
disentitlement therefore, in effect, would be about 5/- per week, after the
seven days' suspension.3 4
This calculation of the financial penalties as they affected members of Coe's
gang may have been perfectly true. However, it rather lightly wrote off
the £9 which each man, on average, would forfeit during the week of
unpaid suspension. The Board's statement also failed to reassure other
workers who might be paid and employed less than Coe's gang, that they
would not be severely treated if they fell foul of the Scheme's disciplinary
measures. This much was recognised by the TGWU General Secretary
Arthur Deakin. Although in general publicly bullish in his attitude
throughout the dispute, at a National Dock Board meeting after the strike
had finished, Deakin asserted that the London Board's initial penal verdict
on 9 June had been foolish.3 3
Indeed on one occasion during the dispute Deakin indicated a limited
amount of sympathy with the strikers' position. At an official Union
meeting held in the Albert Hall on 22 June, the General Secretary gave an
undertaking that at the National Docks Delegate Conference scheduled for
August, the subject of the Dock Labour Scheme's disciplinary machinery
would be examined. In the meantime, however, he insisted that the men
had to accept the findings of the constitutional machinery on this occasion,
and return to work.3 6 The Albert Hall meeting, at which the Union claimed
there was an attendance of 4000 men, also closed with a resolution carried
in favour of an immediate resumption of work.
34PRO: BK 2/72, NDLB press release, 23 June 1948.
35PRO: BK 2/72, NDLB, 1 July 1948.
36'The Facts About the Unofficial Strike of London Dockers', Transport and
General Workers' Record, July 1948.
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The likelihood that this resolution would be effective was discounted
by a rival meeting which also took place on 22 June. Organised by the
unofficial committee and held at Victoria Park in Hackney on the other side
of London, it was addressed by a veteran of the 1945 strike, Harry Constable,
and attended by a crowd exceeding 5,000. This meeting voted to continue
with the stoppage.^ 7
On the same day, 22 June, the executive council of the employers'
association directly involved in the dispute was also holding a meeting. The
London Association of Public Wharfingers privately confirmed that,
throughout the dispute, the employers had been 'entirely in the right', the
Short Sea Traders' 3s4d per ton piece-rate on the zinc oxide had been ample,
and it had been fixed with due attention to agreed negotiating procedure.
The Chairman of the Public Wharfingers' labour committee, Parsons,
expressed regret that Deakin's efforts in the Albert Hall had been negated
by the 'rebel element' at Victoria Park. He suggested to his colleagues that
the rebels' only complaint could be that: 'the View Committee had not seen
the cargo actually working, but this could be discounted, as experienced
men were able to judge whether a cargo was bad or not, by seeing it in the
hold or craft. The Trade Union member had in fact seen it working ... ,'3 8
This was not quite the entire story, of course. The Trade Union member
concerned - Piatt - had agreed to the 3s4d rate by telephone, before he had
seen the cargo either being worked or idle in the barges from which it was
being loaded on to the Thiems.
Arthur Deakin had ignored a challenge from the unofficial
movement to address the men in Victoria Park,3^ and his somewhat curious
decision to hold an official meeting in South Kensington, several miles
away from the docks, was raised in Cabinet. The strike was evidently
straining relations between the Union and the Government. Ministers
noted 'evidence that the Union had not been sufficiently active in trying to
persuade the men to abandon the strike, and [that] it was reported that the
strikers had expressed resentment at being summoned to attend the Union
meeting at the Albert Hall'.4 0
37The Times, 23 June 1948. The Times suggested that as few as 2,000 may
have been in the Albert Hall.
38LML/LWA 73, London Association of Public Wharfingers Ltd, Executive
Council meeting, 22 June 1948.
39The Times, 23 June 1948.
40PRO: CAB 128/CM(48)42, 24 June 1948.
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The General Secretary did make two appearance in the docks later on
in the dispute, at Southwark Park on 25 June, and at the Surrey Commercial
Docks on the following day. On both occasions, as the Daily Worker, the
Manchester Guardian and The Times all concur, he received a generally
unfavourable response, and certainly despite his personal appeals the men
failed to go back to work.4 1
Private misgivings about Deakin's handling of the dispute did not
prevent the Government from rigorously condemning the strike, and
insisting that it was causing untold damage to collective bargaining
machinery and the economic and social life of the nation. This view was
also forcibly expressed in a Union press statement of 18 June, which was
summarised in a Daily Herald editorial of 19 June. Under the heading,
'DOCKERS AND DOLLARS,' the paper stated that the strike posed a double-
edged threat. With dollar exports essential for the purchase of rations, raw
materials and machinery, a hundred or so of the ships being held up were
dollar earners; and in maintaining an unofficial strike the men were
attacking rather than upholding trade union principles.4 2
On 21 June, the day before the official Albert Hall and unofficial
Victoria Park meetings, two important meetings had taken place in
Whitehall. Firstly, an inter-departmental gathering of senior civil servants
had discussed arrangements for dealing with the strike. According to
minutes taken by Frank Newsam of the Home Office, the officials were
primarily concerned with perishable food supplies, mainly eggs and
tomatoes, which were in danger of rotting. The meeting agreed that if
Arthur Deakin failed to secure a return to work at the Union meeting
scheduled for the next day, troops would have to be used to move these
supplies. The officials also decided that troops so deployed could not be
withdrawn after moving the food. With 136 ships immobilised, Newsam
further minuted, the strike was having a 'serious effect on our export
campaign and our shipping earnings', the loss of the latter running at
$170,000 daily. The troops were thus to continue working in the docks until
the strike was over.4 3 It should be noted that Newsam, promoted in 1948
from Deputy Under Secretary to replace Maxwell as Permanent Under
41 Daily Worker, the Manchester Guardian and The Times, 26 and 28 June
1948.
42Daily Herald, 19 June 1948.
43 PRO: CAB 21/2653, 'Dock Strike'. Report by the Chairman of the
Emergencies Co-ordinating Committee (Frank Newsam).
Secretary at the Home Office, had great experience in organised strike¬
breaking. In 1926 he had been private secretary to the then Permanent
Under Secretary, Sir John Anderson, and had regularly attended meetings
of the Supply and Transport Organisation, the Government committee
which directed military and voluntary civilian labour throughout the
General Strike.44
This official committee of 21 June evidently set the agenda for a
second important meeting that day of the Cabinet Emergencies Committee.
Its attention was initially drawn to the food supplies which the officials had
discussed earlier, and in line with the feelings expressed by Newsam and
his colleagues, the ministerial committee also believed that troops would
have to be introduced to rescue these supplies. However, the Ministers in
addition were concerned to bolster the position of the Union, and
recognised the difficulties of deploying service labour. The Food Minister,
John Strachey, suggested that the introduction of servicemen might
precipitate sympathetic strike action amongst the Smithfield meat porters.
Noting that the official Union meeting at the Albert Hall was to take place
on the following day, 'it was generally agreed that the Union must be given
an opportunity to seek a settlement and that to preserve their authority
action to move troops should not be taken until it was quite clear that the
Union could do nothing more.'45
Cabinet discussed the strike for the first time on the next morning.
With George Isaacs away, attending the International Labour Organisation
Conference in San Francisco, the Ministry of Labour was represented by
the Parliamentary Secretary, Ness Edwards. Edwards informed his senior
colleagues that Bevin, who was holidaying on the English Channel and not
present at that morning's Cabinet,46 had told him that a case existed for
reviewing the disciplinary machinery in the London area. This strongly
indicates the likelihood that Deakin had consulted Bevin before making his
Albert Hall announcement on the future working of the disciplinary
machinery. Edwards also reported that Deakin had conceded that if the
44Jeffery and Hennessy, op.cit., p.148.
45PRO: CAB 134/175 Cabinet Emergencies Committee (hereafter EC) of 21
June 1948; besides Ede, the Ministers present were the Minister of Defence,
A.V. Alexander, Strachey, the Scottish Secretary, Arthur Woodburn, the
Attorney General, Sir Hartley Shawcross, and Ness Edwards, Parliamentary
Secretary at the MoL, who was deputising for Isaacs.
46Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin. Foreign Secretary, p.575.
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strike did continue, then there would be no alternative to the introduction
of troops.47
Although Edwards spoke in place of Isaacs in Cabinet meetings for
the remainder of the dispute, Attlee himself deputised for his absent
Minister in the House of Commons. On the afternoon of 22 June the Prime
Minister related the apparently hopeful outcome of the Albert Hall meeting
which had ended earlier with the resolution to resume work having been
carried. He also pointed out that a continuation of the stoppage 'would have
serious effects on the national economy and it will be essential that the
goods accumulated at the docks should be handled with the utmost
expedition.'4^ Attlee insisted that Willie Gallacher's claim, that 6,000 men in
Victoria Park had taken an opposite decision to those gathered in South
Kensington, was 'quite wrong'. This drew an angry response from Bessie
Braddock, who had just returned from Victoria Park. According to her
account there had in fact been 7,000 bone fide trade unionists present, all
of whom had 'held up their union cards, stating that until the withdrawal
of the penalties that have been imposed, they would not be prepared to
return to work'.4 9
Despite Attlee's optimistic statement, the Government had more or
less immediately accepted that no general resumption of work was likely to
be imminent. In line with the Emergencies Committee decision of 21 June,
on 23 June 300 troops were sent to the West India Docks in Poplar, where
they loaded civilian lorries with the perishable food cargoes.50 On the same
afternoon the Ministry of Food issued a press statement which spelt out the
strike's implications for food supplies in London. Consumers would have to
accept half of their meat ration in canned form, as abundant supplies of
fresh meat were being held up in the refrigerated holds of blockaded
vessels. There was, however, no danger of these frozen carcasses being
lost.5 1
Speaking in the House of Commons on 23 June, Attlee explained that
the deployment of service labour was the only way to protect people's food
supplies. He then sought to defend the TGWU, re-emphasising the benefits
47PRO: CAB 128/CM(48)41, 22 June 1948.
4^Parliamentary Debates, Vol.452, 1138, 22 June 1948.
49Ibid.
50Manchester Guardian, 24 June 1948.
51 Ibid.
which the Dock Scheme - jointly administered by the unions - had brought
to the workforce. By remaining on strike the men endangered the Scheme
and therefore themselves: 'Unless the members of trade unions use the
machinery which has been set up with their agreement, the whole
Scheme, which is of immense value to the worker, may be jeopardised.
Further, the position won for the trade unions by so much sacrifice in the
past is endangered by action of this kind.'5 2
This statement summarised the impatient, yet generally cautious,
initial response of the labour movement's leaders to the strike. Appeals for
a resumption of work had been made largely in terms of the damage being
caused to the economy and to the Union itself, through the abandonment of
agreements which it was party to. The Government supported the Union in
its attempts to defend its position in the docks. When Willie Gallacher asked
the Prime Minister on 24 June to meet the representatives of the men on
strike, he was dismissed with a characteristically curt response: 'The short
answer is that there is no question of meeting the men's representatives.
The union representatives have been met by the Ministry of Labour.'53
As the strike entered its second week, however, political and
industrial leaders stepped up the offensive, and attacks on the strike
leaders were broadened to include charges of political subversion. These
charges were to carry a particular resonance owing to the political storm
which was gathering over another European capital, several hundred
miles to the east.
A TALE OF TWO CITIES: 'THE GRAVEST DAYS SINCE THE WAR'
On 24 June, with the number of men on strike still exceeding 19,000, from
Transport House Arthur Deakin asserted that the unofficial committee
established ten days previously was politically motivated. Of its forty-eight
members, thirty-seven were said to be communists or 'fellow-travellers'.5 4
The General Secretary's implication was that the dispute had been hijacked
by conspiratorial forces intent on maximising trade disruption and
political instability. The next day, 25 June, in Southwark Park Deakin spoke
near the docks for the first time during the strike, and was more open with
52Parliamentary Debates, Vol.452, 1364, 23 June 1948.
53Parliamentary Debates, Vol.452, 1566, 24 June 1948.
5 4 77ie Times, 25 June 1948.
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these charges, telling the unofficial committee, 'You cannot challenge the
State and you cannot challenge the Government.' The strike committee
responded by claiming that twenty-seven of its members held no party
affiliation, with ten of them being Labour men and five Communist.55
It is possible to extract information on the political character of the
strike leadership from the 'No Name Organisation' list put together on 19
June by Saunders of the London dock board with the assistance of the TGWU
officials Harvey and Piatt. This list contained no note about political
allegiance, but during the 1949 strike the London Dock Labour Board
produced a list of prominent figures in the unofficial movement which did
include the political orientation of its participants.56 Obviously many of
those involved in the latter dispute were also involved in 1948, and by
juxtaposing the two lists it is possible to note that amongst the twenty-one
stated as belonging to the 1948 'No Name Organisation', only a handful were
actually communists. These included Bert Aylward of the Stevedores Union,
Harry Constable and two TGWU shop stewards, Ted Dickens and C.H.
Saunders. However, the alleged 'Organiser' of the committee, H.J. Vanloo,
who was also a TGWU shop steward, was a Labour Councillor in Stepney. In
fact, the Regional Industrial Relations Officer who was responsible for
passing the 'No Name Organisation' information on to the Ministry of
Labour, was moved to concede that the 'organisation is a very mixed bag
indeed and includes, I am told, people who are not extremists'.5 ^
Scepticism about the alleged role of communism in the dispute had
also been expressed in the Cabinet Emergencies Committee on 21 June.
Ministers present noted that, although Arthur Deakin 'was of opinion that
the strike was of a political nature, no evidence was available to support
this view'. The minutes continued: 'Scotland Yard was of opinion that the
strike was not being fomented by Communists, but there was some
55The Times, 26 June 1948. The strike committee's figures on political
affiliation total 42. The missing six are partially explained in a subsequent
paragraph.
56PRO: BK 2/76, London Dock Labour Board list of 4 August 1949.
5^PRO: LAB 10/783, London Regional Industrial Relations Officer, whose
name is illegible, to Stillwell at the Industrial Relations Department of
MLNS on 23 June. Ted Dickens (born 1907) and C.H. Saunders were, along
with Harry Constable, active in the 1949 strike. This activity, and its
consequences, are discussed in the following chapters.
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indication that the Communist Party was beginning to take an interest in it
for political purposes.'5 8
Moreover, the employers, it should also be emphasised, appear to
have made no reference - in public or private - to the involvement of
communists in the dispute. They were only of the opinion that the 'rebel
element' had to be tamed. On 24 June - the day of Deakin's red smear - the
Port Employers in London met to discuss developments. The question of
political involvement was not directly discussed. All the Chairman, R.H.
Senior, said was that employers 'were gravely concerned with the
continued hold up of shipping and the repercussions which were bound to
ensue for many months to come,' and that the Government was being
pressed to clear the ships blockaded and guarantee the Port's normal
operation.5 9
The possibility of communist intrigue was further raised on 24 June,
when Anthony Eden sent the Prime Minister a note which he had received
from the Conservative member for Melton, Anthony Nutting. This note
detailed a mysterious telephone call which had reached Nutting at the
House on the previous day from an anonymous individual, one 'Mr. X', who
claimed to be a disillusioned communist unable to tolerate the Party's 'anti-
British' activities any longer. 'Mr. X' claimed that the dock strike had been
organised by the British Communist Party on the advice of Monsieur Zarov,
a prominent Cominform official from Yugoslavia. Zarov had apparently
addressed a number of communist-orientated dockers' representatives at
the headquarters of the British Soviet Society, informing his audience that
the Cominform had chosen the British Party to spearhead the campaign
against Marshall Aid, with unspecified agitation to be mounted on all
fronts. The dock strike had immediately followed this meeting. 'Mr. X' went
on to describe a meeting held on the night of 22 June of communist trade
unionists, including TGWU members, at which it had been agreed that all
possible measures would be taken to prolong the stoppage in the docks and
maximise tension within other unions besides the TGWU.^O
It is unlikely that the Government's thinking was significantly
influenced by the case of 'Mr.X'. The substance of his claims - which would
probably be impossible definitively to prove or disprove - was certainly
58PRO: CAB 134/175, EC, 21 June 1948.
59LML/LWA 73, Port Employers in London, 24 June 1948.
60PRO: PREM 8/1086, Nutting to Eden, 23 June 1948.
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never given a public airing by Ministers. It seems probable that Attlee
concurred with the sentiment expressed in Eden's letter of enclosure,
which advised that although the matter was worthy of investigation, there
was possibly 'nothing in all of this'.61 However, the approximate scenario
presented by Nutting's mysterious contact was partially endorsed by six
well-publicised resignations from the unofficial committee, which took
place on 25 June.62 Two of those who abandoned the strike, Bernard Duhig
and Frank Palmer, explained their reasons for doing so in terms of what
they saw as the political direction which the strike was now taking. In a
press statement bearing the imprint of the TGWU, the pair spoke of 'sinister
events behind the scenes', and raised the spectre of the strike unseating
the Government which had achieved so much on behalf of the labour
movement:
We are fully aware of the grave effects of the strike on the nation's
economy and we fear that the situation is being exploited for irrelevant
political ends. Our experience as members of the original strike committee -
now almost entirely dominated by Communists and their fellow travellers -
makes it clear to us that their intention is to extend the strike to other ports
and industries and so disrupt the country's economic life as to bring about
the downfall of the Government. We therefore urge the Government in its
own and in the community's interest to take swift steps to end the
deadlock.6 3
There is no evidence that Government ministers now considered the link
between the London dock strike and wider ideological pressures to be hard
and fast. However, an emergency gathering of ministers, which convened
late in the evening of 24 June, did implicitly recognise that the strike was
indirectly associated with the deepening ideological crisis in Europe. The
main item on the agenda was the situation in Berlin, which the Soviet
forces in Germany had blockaded that morning in response to the
introduction by Britain, France and the United States of a reformed
currency in the Berlin areas under their control. Due to the crisis in Berlin
Bevin had cut short his holiday, and with the aid of a Royal Navy torpedo
boat was back in London in time for this 10 p.m. meeting.64 With the return
61 PRO: PREM 8/1086, Eden to Attlee, 24 June 1948.
62Thus Deakin could speak of a forty-eight member unofficial committee,
and the unofficial committee could number themselves as forty-two.
63Manchester Guardian, 26 June 1948. Neither Duhig and Palmer were on
the London Board's 'No Name Organisation'.
64Bullock, op.cit., p.575.
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of Bevin, the Government's position on the dock strike immediately
hardened, for the meeting gave consideration to both the London and
Berlin situations. In each city, according to Bevin, the Government's
political authority was at stake, and both problems required an extremely
tough response. In addition to the few hundred troops already unloading
food supplies in the West India Docks, that afternoon Cabinet had ordered a
further total of 6,000 servicemen to prepare themselves for deployment in
the docks on the following Monday, 28 June.^5 This had raised the fear
expressed in the Emergencies Committee on 21 June about the possibility of
the strike escalating as a result of service labour being introduced. Bevin
dismissed these misgivings unequivocally:
there must be no sign of weakness on the part of the Government: they
must show their determination to maintain the distribution of essential
foodstuffs. They should not be deterred by threats that, if further troops
were employed, the strike would spread to the meat markets. If the strikers
got their way, the Government would be at the mercy of unofficial strikers
for many years to come. Whether the strike continued for one week or five,
no concessions should be made by the Government until the men had
returned to work.
For Bevin it was essential that events in Berlin were met with equal
pugnacity. To abandon Berlin now would ultimately involve abandoning
the whole of Germany, placing Western Europe and Britain in mortal
danger: 'If we now showed signs of weakness, we were in danger of being
forced out of Europe. If we took a strong line ... the Russians would in the
end come to terms.'6 6
Did Clement Attlee really only ever read the births, marriages,
deaths and cricket scores in The TimesIf so, then the Prime Minister
would have been unaware of a remarkable leader column which the paper
carried five days after the meeting at which Bevin had implicitly compared
the London and Berlin crises. More graphically than Bevin, on 29 June The
Times solemnly expressed the view that the strike was endangering
Britain's survival at a pivotal moment in international history:
These may turn out to be the gravest days since the war. Strikers in the
docks are seeking to blockade Britain as surely as the Russians on the other
side of Europe are already besieging Berlin: and the margin of safety in
65Peak, op.cit., p.93.
66PRO: CAB 130/38, meeting of Ministers, 24 June 1948.
67Peter Hennessy, Never Again, p. 199.
120
essential supplies is not greatly wider here than in the unhappy German
capital. ... The dock strike does not only aim a mortal blow at the country's
food; it cuts off merchants from their markets and factories from their raw
materials, and threatens to undo all the work of months in building up
exports to ward off insolvency. It is a challenge to be resisted as resolutely
as the threat of an attack by a foreign power.08
The Government did not take its lead on industrial disputes and
international strategy from the editorial staff at The Times. The editorial
does reinforce the point, however, that the 1948 dock strike was unfolding
against an economic, international and ideological background that was
very different from that of October 1945.
A STATE OF EMERGENCY
On Saturday 19 June, five days after the unofficial strike had begun in the
London docks, Clement Attlee had addressed a gathering of Labour and Co¬
operative Movement workers in the capital. He warned his audience of
'subversive elements' within the labour movement, more explicitly
referring to the spread of communism in Europe being brought about by
people 'with a certain creed [who] enforce that creed on others.' He
continued, 'There is a danger in this and a great danger in all our
organisations because, unless you are vigilant, you may find your
organisation has been captured by a small and active minority. And the
bigger your organisation the greater the danger.'0^ Attlee returned to this
theme in a national radio broadcast on the evening of Monday 28 June, in
which he explained a dramatic decision which the Government had taken
earlier in the day.
Early that Monday morning, approximately 1600 soldiers, who had
been brought to London over the weekend in anticipation of the strike's
continuation, were sent to discharge food cargoes in Poplar.70 Later on in
the morning, the Cabinet discussed the dispute's other weekend
developments. On Saturday a crowd of approximately 4,500 in Victoria Park
had passed a vote of confidence in the unofficial committee.71 On Sunday
afternoon the situation had deteriorated seriously, with the strike
08The Times, 29 June 1948.
°°Attlee speech of 19 June, Manchester Guardian, 21 June 1948.
70Peak, op.cit., p.93.
71 PRO: LAB 10/783, Whitlock to Gould, 26 June 1948.
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spreading to Merseyside. A meeting of 2,000 Liverpool dockers had listened
to speeches from Harry Constable and C.H. Saunders, and duly voted in
favour of a sympathetic strike. Although Deakin insisted that this decision
was unrepresentative of the mood locally,7^ 9,000 dockers - approximately
half of the Merseyside workforce - were supporting this action on the
Monday morning. Ministers also heard reports that the strike was possibly
about to spread to Glasgow and Southampton.
In these circumstances Cabinet managed to convince itself that
conspiratorial forces were at work. It concluded that there was 'a powerful
organisation behind the strike and some reason to regard it as part of a
general attempt to create industrial unrest. It seemed to be the object of the
organisers to make the Dock Labour Scheme unworkable and thus to create
a state of affairs in which the movement of goods would be liable to
constant interruption through dock strikes.'7 3
Whether by this it was meant that a formal organisation - the British
Communist Party, for instance - was behind the strike, or simply that the
unofficial strike committee was evidently well-organised, is not clear from
the minutes. What is beyond dispute is that the Government was now
determined to bring the strike to a rapid conclusion. Consideration was
given to a paper prepared by Ness Edwards. The Labour Ministry's
Parliamentary Secretary proposed that the Dock Labour Scheme be
temporarily suspended in the Port of London. This, he felt, would make
dockers realise that if they ignored the Scheme's obligations, then they
would also have to forego its benefits. Suspension would have the additional
benefit of allowing employers to recruit volunteers for the clearance of
the congested ships.74 A brief discussion of this paper prefaced its
rejection. As Keith Jeffery and Peter Hennessy have pointed out, no Cabinet
which Ernest Bevin belonged to would countenance the suspension of the
Scheme which he regarded as his own personal triumph.75 However,
Bevin's inextricable association with the Scheme did ensure that the
Government would take stern steps to defend it, as he himself had demanded
four days previously.
I^The Times, 28 June 1948.
73PRO: CAB 128/CM(48)44, 28 June 1948.
74PRO: CAB 129/CP(48)168, 28 June 1948.
75Jeffery and Hennessy, op.cit., p. 192.
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This took the form of a remarkable decision to declare a State of
Emergency under the 1920 Emergency Powers Act. Thus did a Labour
Government bring into operation powers which had not been used since
helping to inflict the terrible defeat upon the labour movement in 1926.
The minutes recording this initiative stated the 'desirable' nature of powers
which would 'give a firm legal basis for the use [and accommodation] of
troops'.76 This was, of course, entirely disingenuous. In August 1945 the
Cabinet had agreed to retain selected war-time Emergency Powers for five
more years, with the Supplies and Services Act,77 and under these
provisions some 23,000 troops had been mobilised during the October 1945
strike.
The Cabinet Emergencies Committee met on the afternoon of 28 June
to consider which provisions of the 1920 Act were to be utilised. Ministers
present were informed that the Commissioner of Police considered the
temper of the strikers to be good, and that there was no need for
regulations relating to public safety and order. The situation was akin to
the one in October 1945, when there had been no animosity between
dockers and servicemen. Leaving this advice aside, however, Aneurin
Bevan urged toughness, suggesting that it would be prudent to wield more
wide-ranging powers, lest relations between the strikers and the military
deteriorate.78 Sedition and the disaffection of servicemen were duly
covered by the widely drawn regulations, which were signed by George VI
that evening at Holyrood Palace in Edinburgh, and which were to become
law on Thursday 1 July.7 9
In the House of Commons on 28 June, Clement Attlee explained why
the Government had decided to use Lloyd George's strike-breaking
legislation against the dockers. He stressed that the Government held a
responsibility to protect the wider community from the effects of a strike
which had been mounted by dockers without regard to their own social
76PRO: CAB 128/CM(48)44, 28 June 1948.
77Jeffery and Hennessy, op.cit., p. 150.
78Bevan had been a regular on the Emergencies Committee since its
inception in 1947, although this was his only attendance during the 1948
strike. Jeffery and Hennessy, op.cit, pp. 148-180, trace the evolution of the
Emergencies Committee from its pre-war antecedent, the Supply and
Transport Organisation.
79pRO: CAB 134/176, EC, 28 June 1948. The Lord President of the Council,
Herbert Morrison, was represented at the Holyrood Palace Privy Council
meeting by Arthur Woodburn, The Times, 29 June 1948.
123
obligations: 'The irresponsible action of a section of the workers is
endangering the regular supply of food to the people and is inflicting
grave injuries on the nation.'8 0
In a wireless broadcast to the nation that same evening, Attlee
expanded on the reasons behind the introduction of the Emergency Powers.
One recent historian of industrial unrest in the post-1945 period has
suggested that this broadcast was written by Ernest Bevin,81 and whilst this
remains a matter of conjecture, its broad outlines were certainly drafted
with Cabinet approval. Attlee was specifically set the task of emphasising
the value of the British system of collective bargaining, where agreements
had to be honoured on both sides of industry,82 and he duly offered a
vigorous defence of the Dock Labour Scheme and the Union. In so doing he
appealed to the class solidarity of the dockers, and to their duty to support
the Labour Government by going back to work:
This Government has decided on full employment. Full employment is the
greatest benefit to all our people. Everybody in the country - whether
docker or any other worker - must continue to give us the output. We
depend on transport, shipping and the movement of goods to keep up this
output. Therefore, this strike is not a strike against capitalists or employers.
It is a strike against your mates, a strike against the housewife, a strike
against the ordinary common people who have difficulties enough now to
manage on their shilling's worth of meat and the other rationed
commodities. ... The Government owes a duty to the public, and where the
food of the people and the economic life of the country are endangered, it
must use all the means at its disposal to safeguard them ... The ships which
bring our food from overseas are held up and the exports on which we
depend to pay for our food and raw materials are not sent abroad. The
Government cannot allow this to continue. They have therefore proclaimed
a state of emergency in order that they may have the necessary powers to
safeguard the life of the country.
Having restated the hazardous economic perspective facing Britain, and
illustrated how this was being exacerbated by the strike, Attlee then
described the strike as a threat to Britain's worthy and unparalleled
collective bargaining system, which was dependent on each side of
industry honouring existing agreements. These agreements would be
undermined if the Government in any way seemed to bargain with or
80Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 452, 1840, 28 June 1948.
8'Justin Davis-Smith, The Attlee and Churchill Administrations and
Industrial Unrest 1944-55, p.75.
82PRO: PREM 8/1086, note entitled 'Points Agreed Upon by Cabinet for the
PM's Broadcast', 28 June 1948.
recognise the unofficial strike leaders. He spoke of the Dock Labour
Scheme's immeasurable benefits to the workforce, contrasting the situation
prevailing in 1948 with the misery of the interwar years, when economic
depression had combined with the casual system of labour relations to
cause so much unemployment and poverty in dock communities. Attlee
insisted that in accepting the new benefits of the Scheme, dockers had also
to accept new obligations in the workplace and in the community: 'You
must work the cargoes available. You must carry out reasonable orders. You
must turn up at the proper times. This nation, which is trying to maintain
full employment, must not only undertake obligations to the people, but it
must demand from the people discipline and duty and responsibility.'
Attlee also emphasised the conspiratorial nature of the strike. The
unofficial leaders were people without genuine influence:
just a small nucleus who had been instructed for political reasons to take
advantage of every little disturbance that takes place to cause the
disruption of British economy, British trade, to undermine the Government
and to destroy Britain's position ... agitators ... interested not in improving
their conditions but in destroying the only agencies by which their
conditions have been improved and can be further improved - the trade
unions and the Labour Government.
The ten minute broadcast, recently described by Anthony Howard as
Attlee's 'straight talk to the lads',83 concluded with the Prime Minister
making a final, direct appeal to the men on strike: 'Your clear duty to
yourselves, to your fellow citizens and to your country is to return to
work.'8 4
On the following morning, 29 June, the strike committee convened a
meeting of around 6,000 dock workers in Victoria Park. Charles Riddell, a
TGWU shop steward in the London Docks, read out a resolution calling for
an end to the strike. Blessed by Coe's gang, the resolution was accepted
almost unanimously on a show of union cards. It was a strong statement of
future intent, however, as well as present sentiment:
In view of the complete line up of the reactionary forces against us and
considering the complacent attitude of the responsible parties - that is, the
employers, the higher trade union officials, and the Government - we, the
strike committee, are recommending all our men to work tomorrow,
83'Brothers', BBC Radio 4, 5 January 1993.
84FulI text of.Attlee's speech, which was broadcast at 9 p.m. on 28 June 1948
and again at 7 a.m and 8 a.m. on 29 June 1948, in Daily Herald, 29 June 1948.
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Wednesday at 8 a.m. We do not expect the authorities concerned to deal out
the punishment which we and they agree is harsh and vicious, and we
demand a public enquiry into the scheme with special reference to clause
16 [the clause containing penal sanctions for maintaining discipline]. We
view the orderly return as the first step in the reorganisation of our
respective trade unions and the realisation of our aims by the National
Joint Council. We expect that there will be no victimisation in any shape or
form.^ 5
THE CHARACTER OF THE STRIKE
Cabinet regarded the resumption of work with the utmost satisfaction,
viewing the reversal of the situation as a result of the introduction of
Emergency Powers and Attlee's broadcast. The decision was also taken to
forego any formal inquiry into the strike, Bevin preferring to keep any
discussion on the future of the Scheme strictly on an informal basis.8 6 To
do otherwise would have been to undermine the Scheme and the Union
which the Government had steadily been defending throughout the
previous fortnight.
Contemporary observers generally shared the belief that the impact
of Attlee's broadcast had been decisive. The Manchester Guardian described
the men's vote for a return to work on 29 June as a personal triumph for
the Prime Minister, and The Telegraph recorded that Attlee's prestige was
high as a result of the dispute's sudden resolution. Only the Daily Mail was
critical from a right-wing perspective, rejecting as nonsense the notion
that Attlee's force of personality had been crucial: 'What mainly broke the
strike was the Emergency Powers Act - and the dockers' fear of empty
bellies.' Meanwhile the Daily Worker, which described the 1920 Emergency
Powers Act as a 'handy weapon against the working class', spoke of the
'Unholy Alliance' of Labour Ministers, Tory Opposition and Trade Union
leaders who had 'transformed the strike into a political issue and created a
nationwide crisis'.8 7
The Daily Worker was not all that far off the mark in its suggestion
that the strike had been transformed into a political issue. In November
1945 the Transport and General Workers' Record discussed the 'Facts About
85Manchester Guardian, 30 June 1948. No-one, it should be noted, in official
authority had suggested that the penalties were 'harsh and vicious'.
86PRO: CAB 128/CM(48)45, 29 June 1948.
^^The Manchester Guardian and The Telegraph, 30 June 1948; the Daily
Mail, 2 July 1948, Daily Worker, 29-30 June 1948.
the Dock Strike' in the Docks Group section, tucked away near the back of
the journal. In July 1948 the Record relayed 'The Facts About the Unofficial
Strike of London Dockers' much more prominently, in the General
Secretary's monthly personal column, which adorned the middle pages of
the paper. Deakin wrote much as Attlee had broadcast, commending the
supreme industrial achievements won in building the Union and in
creating the Dock Labour Scheme. He overtly stressed that these
achievements faced a critical, political challenge:
We know well there are those who desire to break our strength, to discredit
the representatives we ourselves have chosen, and to hamper and frustrate
the Labour Government. We must expect them to adopt every form of
provocation, to exploit and magnify every grievance, and to obscure and
distort every issue. We must expect this, but we do not need to fear it. We
have within our own Union the means of settling every difficulty, if the
constitutional machinery is understood and used - as it has not been on this
occasion.
The strike, Deakin concluded, had been a tragedy, bringing great suffering
down on 'our people' and damaging 'our Government'.8 8 This final
reference to the Government of Attlee, MP for the London docklands
constituency of Limehouse, and Bevin as the dockers' 'own' Government,
was at least partly vindicated by the resumption of work. Attlee's appeal to
the men's class loyalty and solidarity had met with a response which
indicated a significant amount of goodwill towards the Labour Government
amongst the London dockers. This much is indicated in an interesting note
made by J.G. Whitlock of the Ministry of Labour on the unofficial meeting
which voted for a resumption of work. According to Whitlock, when one of
the speakers, Stan Smith, 'apparently dodged his brief and risked an attack
on the Prime Minister, there developed a murmur of disapproval which
quickly spread through the whole assembly. Unwisely continuing [and
generally denigrating the Government] Smith was finally howled down
and disappeared, none too gracefully, from the platform.'89
The strike also demonstrated, however, the survival amongst the
dock workforce of peculiar patterns of class loyalty and solidarity. As John
88'The Facts About the Unofficial Strike of London Dockers', Transport and
General Workers' Record, July 1948. Original emphasis.
89PRO: LAB 10/783, Whitlock account of strike. Smith was described in the
Saunders/Harvey/Piatt list as the 'Secretary' of the 'No Name Organisation'.
A TGWU shop steward, according to Whitlock, Smith was also a communist.
Lovell points out, dock workers have primarily expressed these values
within their own communities, rather than within the wider labour
movement;90 and the workforce's commitment to the local men who
comprised the unofficial committee was incontestable. The Times noted
with a hint of irritation, 'An unsatisfactory feature of the way the strike
has ended is that the unofficial leaders, while they have not secured any
kind of recognition outside, have kept their hold on the leadership to the
end. They have succeeded in maintaining their control of the men
throughout the strike, and it is they who have ordered the men back to
work.'9! This fact, that the unofficial leaders retained the confidence of the
men as they returned to work, was recognised at the Ministry of Labour,
with Whitlock observing that the unofficial committee's influence was
particularly strong in the Royal Docks area.9 2
The existence of this lively and active unofficial movement reflected
the traditional difficulties encountered by the TGWU in solidly organising
dock workers. The Union leadership was, of course, aware that the Scheme
had placed its relationship with the dockers on a more fragile basis. In the
aftermath of the stoppage Deakin fulfilled his promise of 22 June to review
the disciplinary procedures of the Scheme. In August a National Docks
Delegate Conference decided that any period of suspension from the
benefits of the Scheme should not exceed 14 days, as opposed to the three
months originally given to the 'zinc oxide' gang on 9 June.92 The
employers' representatives on the National Dock Labour Board accepted the
need for limited revision, and on 9 November the maximum period of
disentitlement to the Scheme's benefits was fixed at four weeks.94
The Union's Docks Group seems to have been less willing to accept
that the strike revealed genuine tensions within the workplace or
particular faults in the Scheme. Holding its first meeting to discuss the
strike on the afternoon of its conclusion, the National Committee lamely
concluded that, 'the Union should endeavour to acquire its own Loud¬
speaker apparatus in order that in future meetings in the open air could be
conducted reasonably and properly.'92
90John Lovell, Stevedores and Dockers, pp. 214-18.
^^The Times leader column, 30 June 1948.
92PRO: LAB 10/783, Whitlock to Tennant, 29 June 1948.
93MRC/MSS.126/1/1/26, TGWU General Executive Council, 24 August 1948.
94PRO: BK 2/255, NDLB, 9 November 1948.
95DNTGC, 29 June 1948.
Not surprisingly perhaps, the port employers who had entered the
Dock Scheme with such reluctance in 1947, were much more willing than
the TGWU Docks Group to draw wider lessons from the strike. There is
definite evidence that their position was hardened by the experience,
unwilling as they were to leave their commercial activities vulnerable to
future disruption at the hands of the 'rebel element'. On 29 June, the day on
which the strike was ended, the Port Employers in London established a
special sub-committee to consider three things: how to avoid a repetition of
the strike; future arrangements for presenting the employers' opinions to
the press; and, perhaps most significantly, to consider modifications to the
Dock Labour Scheme, 'should it come under review'.9(> This committee's
favoured 'modifications' to the Scheme were to emerge in the wake of the
1949 dock strike, as part of the employers' contribution to an informal yet
serious debate about the future of the Dock Labour Scheme, which involved
various Government departments as well as the Unions. This debate
(discussed in chapter six of this thesis) was to subject the labour alliance to
an increasingly significant amount of internal tension.
9(>LML/LWA 73, Port Employers in London, 29 June 1948.
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THE CANADIAN SEAMEN STRIKES, MAY-JULY 1949
A COLD WAR EPISODE WHICH HISTORIANS HAVE ONLY HALF-
REMEMBERED?
The third large-scale docks dispute of the 1945-51 period was more
widespread than the 'Zinc Oxide' strike of June 1948. But although it
involved a number of ports, it cost the industry less than half the days
which had been lost during the 'Dockers' Charter' strike of 1945. The 1949
trouble centred on several Canadian vessels docked in Britain, which were
apparently the subject of an industrial dispute between the Canadian
Seamen's Union and their Canadian employers. Contrary to instructions
from the Labour Government, British port employers and Trade Union
officials, dockers in five port areas refused to work these ships. At Leith
and Southampton, no working days were actually lost as a result of this
action, but there were general stoppages in three important dock systems.
Between 16 May and 14 June approximately 12,000 workers were involved
in a cessation of work in Liverpool and the Bristol Channel ports of
Newport, Avonmouth, Portishead and Bristol. This cost the industry 142,000
working days. In a strike on 23 June and from 27 June to 22 July in London,
which at its peak involved over 15,000 of the port's 28,000 men, the industry
lost a further 264,000 working days.1
These were the most controversial strikes which the 1945
Government encountered. Ministers and Trade Union leaders cited them as
evidence of a communist conspiracy to weaken the Trade Union movement
and destabilise the economy at a time of increasing international tension.
The Government produced a lengthy White Paper which appeared in the
aftermath of the affair. This purported to demonstrate that the communist-
led Canadian Seamen's Union had conspired with communist supporters in
Britain to persuade British dockers, against their better judgement, to
withdraw their labour. This 'cold and deliberate plan' had caused delays 'in
the turn round of ships which meant that valuable exports were lost that
can never be made up, and the setback to our economic recovery
JpRO: LAB 34/64, Trade Disputes (All Industries), 1949.
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programme was severe'.2 In placing the dispute within this Cold War
context, the White Paper implied that the 1949 strikes were the most serious
since the war, more important even than the 1945 stoppage, which had cost
the industry more than one million working days.2
Historians have tended to follow, rather than rebut, this misleading
presentation of the 1949 strikes. Keith Jeffery's and Peter Hennessy's work
on Government intervention in strikes, States of Emergency, devotes twice
as much attention to the Canadian seamen's dispute as it does to the Dockers'
Charter strike.4 Kenneth O. Morgan, whose work scarcely mentions the
huge 1945 strike, is more forthcoming about the 1949 affair. Whilst
expressing scepticism about the charges of communist involvement, he is
convinced about the dispute's 'ideological origins', and that it was the 'most
serious crisis on the industrial relations front' which the Government
encountered.5 Peter Weiler, an American historian who presses the
hackneyed argument that Labour in power dampened and frustrated a
supposedly militant working class, has shared Morgan's misunderstanding
of the dock strikes. He characterises the 'most politically important strike
of the postwar period' as an ideological issue, arguing that the Government
deliberately constructed the dispute as a Cold War episode in order to
discredit the Communist Party of Great Britain and to impose 'traditional
measures to overcome the economic crisis' upon the working class.
The attraction of the 1949 strike for historians and the comparative
neglect of the 1945 strike, can easily be explained. The Labour
Government's response to industrial unrest was clearly entangled with
wider economic, ideological and international problems. These problems
were more pressing in 1949 than in 1945: in short, as a perceived Cold War
episode - with helpings of Transatlantic conspiracy and ideological conflict
- the latter dispute invokes spicier historical associations. There is also far
more documentary evidence on the 1949 strike. It may be that an easing of
the paper shortage in 1949 allowed Whitehall officials more physical space
in which to record their concerns. Alternatively, it is more likely that the
2Review of the British Docks Strikes, (Cmd. 7851, December 1949), p.3.
3PRO: LAB 34/60, Trade Disputes (All Industries), 1945.
4Keith Jeffery and Peter Hennessy, States of Emergency, pp.154-60 and 198-
208.
5Kenneth O. Morgan, Labour in Power 1945-1951, pp. 375-8.
6Peter Weiler, British Labour and the Cold War, p.230.
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larger amount of paperwork which accumulated in 1949 is a sign that these
concerns were more keenly felt than in 1945.
The literature on the 1949 strike is also weakened by its inadequate
discussion of events outside London. Jeffery and Hennessy do at least attach
significance to the Government's response to developments in
Avonmouth.7 However, although noting that 'parallel strikes' took place in
Liverpool, Morgan's account largely confines the action to London.
Weiler's judgements on the Dock Labour Scheme, the Labour Government
and the British Communist Party, are extrapolated from the London strike
alone. In fact, as the 1949 White Paper and the unpublished official records
indicate, the London strike cannot possibly be understood fully without
examining 'provincial' developments. Certainly fewer days were lost on the
Avon and Mersey, but this was largely because fewer men were employed
in these ports than in London. Size is not everything, and during the Avon
and Mersey strikes, attitudes towards the dispute were formed that would
largely determine the pattern of events in London.
This chapter will rescue the 'provincial' strikes from the darker
recesses of historical memory, and so place the better known London strike
in its proper context. But London is still the starting point, for the Canadian
dispute was prefaced by further evidence of industrial tension and
unofficial activity in the nation's largest port system.
TENSION IN LONDON
On 28 February 1949 the TGWU held an Inquiry into the activities of the
unofficial movement during the strike of June 1948. A five-man Special
Committee, which included Arthur Deakin as an ex-officio member, heard
evidence from the seventeen union members who had been named as
belonging to the 'No Name organisation' by Dock Board and Union officials
on 19 June 1948.8 Amongst the seventeen were some familiar names: C.E.
Aylward (not Bert Aylward of the Stevedores' Union), Coleman, Constable,
Cowley, Dickens, Donovan, Doyle, Fenn, Palmer, Riddell, Saunders, Smith,
Upton, Vanloo, Webster, Weeks and White. Not one of these men denied
membership of the unofficial committee, but each gave an assurance that
the committee was no longer in existence. The Inquiry accepted this in
7Jeffery and Hennessy, op.cit., pp. 199-202.
8See above, p.98.
good faith, and dismissed any idea of penalising the men. However, the
seventeen were warned that repeated unofficial activity would be viewed
seriously, and those who had been to Liverpool during the strike were told
to expect 'severe disciplinary measures' if they made similar visits in the
future.^
This conclusion suggested that the unofficial movement had
voluntarily disbanded, and that tension in the Port would consequently be
abated. Within six weeks several thousand TGWU dock members were,
however, once more on unofficial strike in London. The new dispute arose
after the National Dock Labour Board decided to remove thirty-three
'ineffective' workers from the London register on 6 March. Eight of these
workers were unfit men below the age of sixty-five, two were between the
ages of sixty-five and seventy, and the remaining twenty-three were more
than seventy years old. The dismissals took effect on 9 April.10
Four of the 'ineffective' men belonged to the Stevedores Union. In
response to the dismissals, on 11 April this Union declared what was the
first official strike since the emergency regulation Order 1305 - which
prohibited strikes and was still in force - had been passed in 1940.11 On the
same afternoon this official protest was supported by an unofficial strike of
TGWU members, with Ted Dickens addressing a strike meeting at Customs
House fields. On the morning of 13 April a total of 15,021 dockers and
stevedores, and 1550 lightermen, were on strike.12
Government Ministers were convinced that the 'communist
dominated' Stevedores' Union had mounted the strike to disrupt essential
services and Marshall Aid,13 and also concerned that the official strike
might set a damaging precedent.14 The Attorney General, Sir Hartley
Shawcross, duly began collecting evidence of a conspiracy to mount the
stoppage, with a view to prosecuting its leaders under Order 1305.13 At the
same time, Ministry of Labour officials held a meeting on 13 April with the
°MRC/MSS. 126/T&G/1/1/27, TGWU General Executive Council, 28 February
1949, Appendix III, 'Report of a Special Committee on 1948 London Dock
Strike'.
10PRO: LAB 10/831, notes by Ministry Conciliation Officer, W.E. Thomas, 4
and 11 April 1949.
^NMLH/NASDU Joint Executive Committee minutes, 11 April 1949.
12PRO: LAB 10/831, notes by W.E. Thomas, 12 and 13 April 1949.
13PRO: CAB 134/176, EC, 12 April 1949; PRO: CAB 128/CM(49)27, 13 April 1949.
14PRO: CAB 129/CP(49)88 and CP(49)89, 12 April 1949.
15PRO: LAB 10/831, Shawcross to Attlee, 13 April 1949.
133
Stevedores' General Secretary, Dickie Barrett, and formally warned him
that Order 1305 would be invoked. On 14 April Barrett informed members of
this position at a mass meeting in Victoria Park, and requested an
immediate return to work. The Stevedores, together with the TGWU men,
resumed work on Saturday 16 April.1 6
While the Government regarded the strike as a politically-motivated
conspiracy, the men involved saw things differently. As the Manchester
Guardian correspondent pointed out, the 'combing out' of the thirty-three
appeared to set a dangerous precedent. If the principle of altering the
registers was conceded, then no-one could regard their own position with
any certainty.^ These fears were indeed justified, for the National Dock
Labour Board privately conceded to the Ministry of Labour that the
dismissal of the 'ineffective' men was actually part of a longer-term
strategy to 'reduce the load they were carrying'.1 8
The suspicions that the 'ineffectives' episode aroused - within the
Government and amongst the workforce - were of immense importance,
contributing to the slow build up of tension that would erupt over the
disputed Canadian ships, a number of which were already in British ports
at the start of April.
THE CANADIAN DISPUTE
The strikes of May-July involved eight Canadian ships which were subject
to a complex industrial dispute that involved Canadian shipowners and two
rival unions, the Canadian Seamen's Union and the Seafarers'
International Union. The contentious vessels are listed below:19
Ship Port Arrival Date Union Crew
Seaboard Ranger Liverpool 27 March CSU
Gulfside Avonmouth 28 March CSU
Ivor Rita London (Royals) 2 April British articles
Beaverbrae London (Royals) 4 April CSU
Argomont London (Surrey) 9 April CSU
Seaboard Trader Southampton 29 April CSU
Montreal City Newport 5 May SIU
Seaboard Queen Leith 17 May SIU
1(Tbid., note by W.E. Thomas, 19 April 1949.
^Manchester Guardian, 16 April 1949.
18PRO: LAB 10/831, W.E. Thomas note of conversation with Hogger of the
NDLB, 12 April 1949.
19Cmd. 7851, Appendix VI.
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The Canadian dispute began in October 1948, when an agreement between
the CSU and Canadian East Coast (Deep-Sea) Shipowners on pay and
conditions expired. With union and employers deadlocked on a replacement
agreement, the Canadian Minister of Labour, Humphrey Mitchell,
appointed a three-member Conciliation Board which reported to him in
February 1949. The Board's general suggestion was that both sides accept
for one year the terms which had expired the previous October. Although
the shipowners agreed to this on 28 February, the union rejected it on 28
March,2® and in search of better terms organised a sit-in strike on East
Coast vessels in Halifax on 21 March. At this point the dispute took a bitter
twist, with the shipowners obtaining a Court Order which required the CSU
crews to leave their ships. The vessels were crewed instead by members of
the Seafarers' International Union, which signed an agreement in
accordance with the Conciliation Board's recommendations: in other words,
undercutting the CSU.21
The SIU was an affiliate of the American Federation of Labour,
unlike the CSU which was affiliated to the Trades and Labour Congress of
Canada. In 1947 the aggressively anti-communist AFL had covertly
established the break-away French labour organisation, Fource Ouvriere,
in order to undermine the communist dominated CGT.22 In Canada in 1948-
49 the AFL appears to have been involved in a similar operation, albeit on a
much smaller scale. With the CSU led by communists, the AFL seemingly
exploited the deadlock between the CSU and the East Coast owners to pitch
an anti-communist affiliate - hitherto without Canadian membership - into
the Canadian shipping labour market at the expense of the communist-led
union.
After the deal had been struck between the SIU and the East Coast
Shipowners, on 31 March the CSU declared a strike on the East Coast
Shipowners' ships. These Canadian events had almost immediate
repercussions in Britain. Four days before the CSU strike began, on 27
March, the Seaboard Ranger arrived in Liverpool, where dockers began
unloading. On 1 April the CSU's British representative, Jack Pope, arrived
in Liverpool and instructed his members to go on strike, whereupon the
20PRO: LAB 10/833, Statement issued by Humphrey Mitchell of 16 May 1949,
copy sent to Isaacs by Canadian High Commissioner, 23 May 1949.
21Cmd. 7851, p.6.
22Henry Pelling, Britain and the Marshall Plan, pp.62-3.
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Liverpool men on board also stopped work. Liverpool employers agreed that
fresh labour for the Canadian ship would not be requisitioned.23 At
Avonmouth on 28 March the crew of the Gulfside went on strike upon
arrival, but made no attempt to dissuade dockers from discharging their
cargo. This task was completed on 2 April, when the crew was paid off and
ordered to leave the ship. In London three East Coast ships docked between
2 and 9 April, two of which, the Beaverbrae and the Argomont, were crewed
by CSU members. The CSU men dissuaded dockers from unloading their
cargoes, and that of the third Canadian ship, the British-crewed Ivor Rita.
As in Liverpool, London employers made no attempt to requisition labour
for the disputed ships. Over the next few weeks, other than on the Canadian
ships which were left idle, work carried on as normal in Liverpool and
Bristol. In London work was disrupted from 11-16 April by the official
Stevedores' strike, but this was entirely unrelated to the Canadian issue.
About two weeks later, on 29 April, the CSU-crewed Seaboard Trader arrived
in Southampton. Local dockers indicated that they would not accept
direction to the vessel, and employers left it in suspense. The work of the
port was not otherwise disrupted.24
During the opening weeks of the CSU strike in Britain, the TGWU
made no comment on a dispute in which it was uncomfortably placed. As
joint administrator of the Dock Labour Scheme, it was obliged to oversee
work on all ships that were not subject to a domestic dispute. At the same
time, however, like the CSU, the TGWU was affiliated to the International
Transport Workers' Federation. If it insisted that members did work on the
disputed vessels, the TGWU would clearly risk undermining the position of
its Canadian brothers. This difficulty was apparently removed on 23 April,
when the ITWF released the following unambiguous statement:
It is apparent that the strike is not over an industrial issue, but the result of
an inter-union conflict. After careful consideration of the matter it was
unanimously decided that there was no occasion for unions abroad to
interfere in the dispute. This means, on the one hand, that the seafarers'
unions affiliated to the International Transport Workers' Federation in
Europe will not supply crews for the strike bound ships, but on the other
hand, that dockers' unions will not be asked to refuse to handle the cargoes
of the ships.25
23Cmd. 7851, p.8.
24Ibid., p.9.
25Ibid., p.7.
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Whilst unambiguously sanctioning work on the Canadian ships in Britain,
the ITWF statement also legitimised the presence on these ships of
Seafarers' International Union men. The ITWF also provided the SIU with
considerable organisational assistance, allowing W.D. Henderson, the SIU's
British representative, to work from its London office.2f> The TGWU also co¬
operated closely with the SIU, the two unions holding a joint press
conference on 6 May, after trouble had broken out on the Avon. Arthur
Bird, who had replaced Jack Donovan as the National Docks Trade Group
Secretary at the start of 1948, said on this occasion: 'Here is a row between
two unions. We in the British Labour Movement are carrying out the policy
of the International Transport Workers' Federation - that is, we are loading
and discharging the ships.'27
TROUBLE ON THE AVON
Bird's statement was an unsuccessful attempt to resolve trouble which had
begun in the Bristol Channel several days earlier, and which persisted
until the middle of June. The ports involved, Avonmouth, Bristol and
Portishead, employed only around 2,000 workers. The Ministerial
Emergencies Committee monitoring the strike duly observed that the Avon
ports were 'not of great importance to the export trade'.28 Of the 400,000 or
so days lost between May and July, it should be noted that only about 35,000
were lost in the month-long stoppage on the Avon.29 Nevertheless, the
Avon strike was extremely significant, for it prefaced the larger and more
damaging stoppages in Liverpool and London.
On 1 May a crew of SIU men arrived in Avonmouth to sail the
Gulfside, idle since its CSU crew had been sacked on 2 April, back to Canada.
To reach the Bristol Channel from Avonmouth, ships had to be manoeuvred
by tugboatmen and lockgatemen, but with SIU members aboard the
Gulfside, these men refused to co-operate, and the Canadian ship remained
tied up. On 2 May a general one day stoppage at Avonmouth followed, in
protest at the Gulfside's attempted departure.30 This preceded more
26pRO: LAB 10/833, Henderson to Arthur Bird, 5 May 1949.
27Ibid., clipping from Western Daily Press, 7 May 1949.
28PRO: CAB 134/176, EC, 25 May 1949.
29PRO: BK 2/71, Industrial Disputes, 1949.
30Ibid.
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extensive unofficial action on both sides of the Bristol Channel, which
stemmed from the arrival in Newport on 5 May of another Canadian East
Coast ship, the SlU-crewed Montreal City, which had left Canada on 19
April. The Gulfside's sacked crew were in Newport on 5 May, and dissuaded
dockers from working the Montreal City. A two day general stoppage
ensued, before local union officials persuaded the Newport men to resume
all duties on 8 May, including work on the Canadian ship.3 1
The Montreal City made scheduled calls at Barry and Swansea without
apparent incident, and sailed to Avonmouth, where it arrived on 14 May.
The secretary of the Port of Bristol Employers' Authority, Cross, had
anticipated that this arrival would cause trouble, and on 9 May wrote to
Macdonald of the National Association of Port Employers, warning that the
repercussions of the Canadian dispute would soon be felt throughout the
nation. Prompted thus, Macdonald wrote to Gould, the Chief Industrial
Commissioner at the Ministry of Labour, requesting Government guidance
on the matter, suggesting that 'an appropriate and impartial authority,
possibly in this case the Canadian High Commissioner', might be persuaded
to issue a public statement on the full facts of the dispute.3 2
This anxiety that the dispute was dragging on, was expressed by the
employers' representatives when the National Dock Labour Board discussed
the situation on 10 May. Its line was that in failing to direct labour to the
Canadian ships, Labour Boards in a number of ports were not fulfilling a
central obligation of the Dock Labour Scheme. The cost of enforcing the
Scheme would be high, however, and the meeting concluded that: 'although
the consequences of the Board's present policy, in seeking to limit the
numbers of men involved in refusing to work the ships concerned, were
serious, the alternative of directing men to employment was likely to create
a widespread stoppage which would be damaging to the country.'3 3
This exactly anticipated events in Avonmouth, after the local Board
directed fifty-five men to the Montreal City on 16 May. On 13 May, at an
unofficial meeting, the men had pledged not to handle the Montreal City.
The allocated men only worked the Canadian vessel for two or three hours,
before responding to appeals from other dockers to respect the unofficial
31Cmd. 7851, p. 10.
32LML/BPA 152, Cross to Macdonald, 9 May 1949; Macdonald to Gould, 11 May
1949.
33PRO: BK 2/255, NDLB, 10 May 1949.
decision which had been taken three days earlier. The entire port stopped
work for the remainder of the day in protest at the Canadian ship having
been worked.34
The next day, 17 May, a second unofficial meeting confirmed the
workforce's position. The men voted to isolate the Montreal City and to
continue all other work as normal. The Bristol port employers refused to
allow this, however, responding with this resolution: 'No fresh requisitions
shall be made from the Dock Labour Board for labour at Avonmouth until
the Montreal City is manned and working.' This position was conveyed in
writing to the local TGWU officials, who convened a mass meeting for 8 a.m.
on 18 May. The majority of the 1000 or so workers who attended the meeting
rejected the employers' ultimatum, which was regarded as unreasonable.
The fifty-five men who were re-allocated to the Montreal City refused the
work and before the day was out a general stoppage at Avonmouth
prevailed.3 5
Developments at Avonmouth can usefully be contrasted with those at
Leith, a port of comparable size with a registered workforce of about
2,000.3^ On 17 May an SlU-crewed Canadian ship, the Seaboard Queen,
arrived in Leith. CSU representatives who had been sent to Edinburgh
spoke to the Leith men, who refused to discharge the vessel on 18 May.3 7
Thereafter the Leith dockers affirmed that whilst they had no wish to go on
strike, they were adamant that their boycott of the Canadian ship would not
be lifted. The Leith employers, unlike those at Avonmouth, made no attempt
to direct labour to the disputed boat, and this more relaxed attitude ensured
that the only cargo lost in Scotland was the 1,000 tons of wheat and 3,000
tons of timber carried by the Seaboard Queen. The Canadian ship eventually
sailed - without unloading - for Bremen on 3 June.38 A similar situation
arose at Southampton, after the CSU President, Harry Davis, had spoken
outside the dock gates on 16 May. At this impromptu meeting the
Southampton men reaffirmed their refusal to work the Canadian ship, the
34Cmd. 7851, pp.10-11.
35PRO: LAB 10/833, report from Bristol Regional Industrial Relations
Officer, 18 May.
36PRO: MT 81/15, NDLB Stats 1948-1963.
37Cmd. 7851, p.12.
38PRO: LAB 10/832, Scottish Industrial Relations Officer's memoranda, 21
May and 3 June 1949.
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Seaboard Trader, which had been idle since docking on 29 April. The local
Dock Board made no attempt to direct labour to this ship.3 9
In accordance with its usual practice, the Government moved
cautiously during the dispute's initial stages. On Thursday 19 May, two days
after the Avon stoppage had become general, Attlee discussed the situation
with Ernest Bevin. His view was that 'we should hold our hand over the
weekend.'40 The position was reviewed by a ministerial meeting on Monday
23 May, which Attlee himself chaired. Also present were the Minister of
Labour, George Isaacs, the Minister of Transport, Alfred Barnes, the Home
Secretary, Chuter Ede, and Philip Noel-Baker, who as Secretary of State for
Commonwealth Relations was held to be informed about the dispute's
Canadian aspects. Isaacs pointed out that the actions of the Avon employers
had been unhelpful. He criticised the Canadian shipowners, who had flown
across the substitute Seafarers' Union, and the Canadian Seamen's Union.
In so doing he emphasised that Harry Davis, whom he described as 'a
known communist', had arrived at Avonmouth on 13 May,41 the day on
which the unofficial meeting had voted to isolate the Montreal City.
Concluding that the involvement of British dockers in this essentially
Canadian dispute was not a matter of direct Government concern, the
Ministers decided to make no official intervention at this stage. Such
action, it was felt, might cause the strike to spread, and would also deny the
TGWU an opportunity to reassert its authority amongst its dock members. In
the meantime the Ministerial Emergencies Committee was instructed to
keep an eye on developments.4 2
The Cabinet Committee discussed the Government's strategy on the
Canadian vessels two days later, on 25 May, and made two highly significant
observations. Firstly, in noting the relative economic insignificance of the
Avon ports, Ministers also recognised that military resources were
extremely limited. This was of central importance, for in the event of a
general stoppage in more than one port, troops would simply be unable to
maintain supplies of essential services. Secondly, the committee observed
that the isolation of the Canadian ships on the Avon was no longer
acceptable, since its prolongation would jeopardise the authority of the
39Cmd. 7851, p.14.
40PRO: LAB 43/150, Attlee to Isaacs, 19 May 1949.
41Cmd. 7851, p.10.
42PRO: PREM 8/1081, Ministerial meeting to discuss strike over Canadian
ships, 23 May 1949.
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employers and the men's official leaders. The conclusion reached was that,
'if at the Government's request, the employers retreated from the attitude
they had taken up, the dockers would be able to claim to have won a
victory, and they and their Communist instigators would have just what
they were after - they would have established de facto the right to refuse to
work certain ships.' The Government could not tolerate the establishment
of such a precedent, for it would threaten the basis of the existing Dock
Labour Scheme.43
On 26 May the Emergencies Committee decided that service labour
would be used to unload the fifteen ships which were idle at Avonmouth
and Bristol.44 The work began on 27 May, with troops unloading cargoes in
order of priority determined by the Ministries of Food and Transport, the
Montreal City being ranked eleventh on this list.45 These troops were
specifically deployed to defend the authority of the Scheme. After
servicemen began work on 27 May, a mass meeting of strikers requested
that troops immediately discharge the Montreal City, so that it could be
cleared from the port.4^ However, the Cabinet Emergencies Committee of 30
May refused to bring forward the Montreal City's scheduled clearance. This
would be 'impolitic', as the men could resume work without handling the
Montreal City, having by-passed their obligations under the Scheme and
claiming this dereliction of duty as a victory.4 7
A total of 1,200 men from the three services were duly deployed on
the Avon, a number approximately half of the usual Avonmouth/Bristol
workforce.48 On 31 May the SlU-crewed Gulfside finally left Avonmouth, its
passage cleared not by lightermen and tugmen but by staff of the local Port
Authority. In accordance with the original Ministries of Food and
Transport schedule, on 7 June troops began work on the Montreal Cityf 9
43PRO: CAB 134/176, EC, 25 May 1949.
44Ibid„ 26 May 1949.
45Cmd. 7851, p.11-12.
46pRO: LAB 10/833, note from Bristol Regional Industrial Relations Officer,
28 May 1949.
47PRO: CAB 134/176, EC, 30 May 1949.
48Steve Peak, Troops in Strikes, p.94.
49Cmd. 7851, p.12; PRO: CAB 134/176, EC, 1 June 1949.
ESCALATION: THE STRIKE ON THE MERSEY
On 26 May the Canadian dispute spread to Liverpool. The Mersey docks
system employed more than 17,000 registered men, and was of immense
economic significance.5(3 Moreover, with the Emergencies Committee
committing the limited overall supply of service labour to the Avon ports
on the same day, this development was doubly serious.
A Canadian ship, the Seaboard Ranger, had been in Liverpool since
27 March, but the immediate cause of trouble in Liverpool was a British
ship, the Dromore, which had been unloading at Avonmouth when the
stoppage began on 17 May. The Dromore arrived in Liverpool on 26 May,
and about fifty Liverpool dockers began removing its cargo. Having spoken
to the Seaboard Ranger's CSU crew in their dinner hour, however, these
men refused to go back to the Dromore. Since the ship had come from a
strike-bound port, they felt that by working it they would be abandoning a
basic trade union principle of solidarity with their Avonmouth brothers.5 1
The local Dock Labour Board informed the men, via their Union
officials, that they would receive no other work until the Dromore was
cleared. As with the actions of the Avonmouth employers on 16 May, the
Liverpool Board's position on 27 May appears to have inflamed the
situation. By noon on 27 May about 1000 men were on strike in support of
the original fifty, and an unofficial strike committee had been formed.
Over the next few days support for the stoppage steadily grew, and by 8
June about 10,000 men had ceased work.52 At a special meeting of the
Liverpool Dock Labour Board on 31 May, the Union nominees pressed for
the Dromore to be left idle, and that the men allocated to the Dromore be
allowed to seek alternative work. However, the Board's chairman, an
employer called Hodges, informed the NDLB secretary Parkin, that the
employers could not accept this position: 'They [ie the employers] took this
attitude quite deliberately in face of the strong possibility that a
resumption would have been achieved by leaving the Dromore idle until
presumably the strike was settled in Avonmouth.'5 3
50PRO: MT 81/15, NDLB Stats 1948-1963.
51 PRO: BK 2/75, Hodges (Secretary, Liverpool board) to Parkin (NDLB), 3
June 1949.
52Cmd. 7851, p.13; PRO: LAB 10/832, Whitlock note on Liverpool situation, 26
May 1949.
53PRO: BK 2/75, Hodges to Parkin, 31 May 1949.
The Government was also aware that the Dromore was the only
obstacle to a resumption in Liverpool, and aware that the services could do
nothing to relieve the strike, the Cabinet initially rejected the inflexible
position which it had supported on the Avon. On 2 June George Isaacs was
instructed to press the Liverpool employers into isolating-the Dromore.54
The employers, predictably perhaps, rebutted this approach. Furthermore,
on 7 June Lord Ammon wrote spikily to Attlee, indicating that the National
Board was no longer ambivalent - as it had been on 10 May - about
directing dockers to disputed ships. On the question of isolating the
Dromore, Ammon said:
My opinion and that of my advisers is that this would be a very serious
mistake. It would not affect the general problem, which is the unloading of
the Canadian ships, but would tend to make matters much worse by
discrimination, which would be a very bad precedent ... and confirm the
recalcitrant and sabotaging elements in their position.
He continued by urging a tough defence of the Board's obligations under
the Scheme:
The Board is being pressed by the owners to supply staffs to unload and in
accordance with the terms of the Scheme, we should comply. With the
consent of the Government we have ignored the scheme and have agreed
that the Canadian ships should be isolated; but this cannot go on
indefinitely and the owners are now pressing that they are not willing for
this sort of thing to continue unless there are signs that the Government
are acting in the matter. My own inclination is to call the bluff or have the
showdown, whichever it may turn out to be, and apply the Scheme. It may
mean that the men will be glad that at least some definite step is being
taken and a workable understanding is arrived at.5 5
This appeal for firmer Government action prevailed, particularly once it
had been endorsed by Ernest Bevin. On 9 June he informed Attlee that ships
could not be isolated from the Scheme. Attlee told Cabinet colleagues that
Bevin 'had most strongly expressed the view that it would be disastrous to
let the Unions gain the power of deciding which ships should be unloaded
and which not'.56 The Government's position was finally determined by an
important economic casualty at Liverpool. A substantial cargo of cars was to
have been exported to South Africa, but the scheduled vessel for the cars'
54PRO: CAB 128/CM(49)40, 2 June 1949.
55PRO: BK 2/75, Ammon to Attlee, 7 June 1949.
56PRO: CAB 130/46, Ministerial meeting on strike, 10 June 1949.
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transportation was blockaded at Avonmouth. In the meantime, the South
African Government had introduced new restrictions on car imports, and
the sale of the Liverpool cars was lost.5 7
Without the military resources to break the Mersey blockade,
Ministers decided to try and bring the strike to an end by repeating the
trick which had worked successfully in June 1948, namely a national
Ministerial broadcast. On 10 June Attlee suggested to colleagues that if the
men on strike were given the facts about the Canadian dispute, and
encouraged to consider the damage which their action was causing to the
economy and to their Union, the strike would collapse immediately.5 8
Responsibility for the 11 June broadcast on this occasion was given
to Isaacs. Telling his audience that he spoke as 'a fellow trade unionist' as
well as a member of the Government, he asked the strikers to consider the
consequences of their 'ill-advised and irresponsible action', with food for
'our wives and children being lost'. He alleged that a political conspiracy
was afoot: 'The plain fact is that the Canadian dispute is being used - and
you are being used - by the Communists in this country to dislocate our
trade and thus retard our economic recovery.' Isaacs concluded by claiming
that the past struggles of dock workers, in building the Union, were being
discredited by the present stoppage.5 9
The impact of Isaacs's statement appears to have been almost
immediate. According to Jeffery and Hennessy, 'Once again the magic of
the wireless worked.On 13 June the unofficial leaders on the Avon
recommended that the men resume work as normal, including on the
Montreal City. This they did on 15 June, ending a strike which had lasted
twenty-seven days. In Liverpool a full resumption, which included the
Dromore, was effected even more quickly, on 13 June. At Southampton,
after concerted efforts by local TGWU officials, work on the Seaboard
Trader eventually began on 18 June. This task was completed on 12 July,
when the CSU crew agreed to take the vessel back to Canada.6 1
57PRO: CAB 134/176, EC, 30 May and 1 June 1949.
58PRO: CAB 130/46, Ministerial meeting on strike, 10 June 1949.
59pRO: LAB 43/150, text of Ministerial broadcast, 11 June 1949.
6°Jeffery and Hennessy, op.cit., p.202.
61Cmd. 7851, pp.12-14.
LONDON: ANOTHER EMERGENCY?
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The National Dock Labour Board considered the resolution of the Avon and
Mersey strikes on 13 June. The Board also discussed the two Canadian ships
which had been idle in London since 4 April. On 13-14 May about 200
stevedores and dockers had refused allocation to the Beaverbrae in the
Royal Docks. London employers, unlike those in Bristol, had not forced the
issue, with work otherwise continuing as normal, and nor had any attempt
been made to direct labour to the Argomont in the Surrey Docks. (On 18
May, the Ivor Rita, which had arrived in the Royals with a crew under
British articles on 2 April, was allowed to leave for Bremen without
discharging its cargo.)6 2
However, following the men's refusal to accept allocation to the
Beaverbrae, Canadian shipowners had begun pressing the National Board
to abandon its cautious position, and have the Scheme fully worked. On 16
May the Board had been contacted by the Goulandris Brothers, the UK
representatives of the owners of a number of the Canadian ships, who had
stated: 'We are very pleased, but by no means relieved, to note that your
Board shares our concern at the delay to these Canadian vessels. We should
have been happier if, apart from their sharing our concern, the NDLB also
shared the loss to which the owners are being condemned.'6 3
The extent to which this pressure, containing the implied threat of
suing for damages, persuaded the Board to take a tougher stance is unclear.
However, the Board had not condemned the Avon employers' ultimatum,
and Amnion's letter to Attlee on 7 June which raised the idea of forcing 'a
showdown', had certainly indicated that the Board no longer countenanced
prudence.
On 13 June Ammon told the rest of the Board that in London, 'the time
has now arrived for us to work this Scheme, realising the dangers inherent
in any moves we might make.' In other words, labour would be directed to
the disputed Canadian ships. With Arthur Bird absent, Dickie Barrett of the
Stevedores' Union was the sole dissentient from this position, a fact that
would assume greater significance as events developed.64 Ammon informed
Isaacs of the Board's decision, noting that labour would be directed to the
62Ibid„ p. 15.
63PRO: BK 2/75, Goulandris Brothers to NDLB, 16 May 1949.
64Ibid., NDLB, 13 June 1949.
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Canadian ships on the following Monday, 20 June.65 On 15 June the MoL's
Chief Industrial Commissioner, Sir Robert Gould, tacitly supported
confrontation. Replying on Isaacs's behalf, he stated that the Government
had no wish to influence the Board's actions over the Canadian ships.66
On 20 June the Board invoked the decision to direct labour to the
Argomont and the B eav erbrae. This again stirred the opposition of the
Stevedores' leader, Dickie Barrett. In accordance with established
procedure, members of the Stevedores' Union, as opposed to TGWU members,
were bound to perform the initial work on the Canadian ships. This
prompted Barrett to remark: 'he knew his position as a Member of the
National Board, but said he made his position as a Union Official quite clear.
No one would get him to send men to what he said were "black" ships.' But
his request that the isolation of the ships be continued was dismissed by the
rest of the Board.67
As it happened, the free call at the Royal Docks on the morning of 20
June yielded no surplus stevedores, and there was no question of directing
labour to the Beaverbrae. However, in the Surrey Docks there was a surplus
of 300 stevedores, and these men were directed to the Argomont.68 Barrett
duly realised his threat to the Dock Board, telling members in the Surrey
Docks that, although as a member of the National Board he was obliged to
tell them to work the Argomont, as their General Secretary he was obliged
to advise them not to. The men refused the allocation.6 9
This official defiance proved to be merely transitory, with Barrett's
position changing completely after an interview that afternoon with Sir
Robert Gould at the Ministry of Labour. What was said at this meeting is
unclear, but given that it ended with Barrett committed to seeking a
resumption of work, it might reasonably be assumed that Gould - as he had
done two months previously - reminded Barrett of the potential illegality of
official strike action under Order 1305.7® On 21 June the Stevedores'
65Ibid., Ammon to Isaacs, 13 June 1949.
66PRO: BK 2/76, Gould to Parkin, 15 June 1949.
67Ibid„ NDLB, 20 June 1949.
68Cmd.7851, p.16.
69PRO: LAB 10/904, Thomas (RIRO) report to Andrew, 20 June 1949.
70PRO: CAB 134/176, EC, Edwards' report of Gould/Barrett meeting, 21 June
1949.
146
Executive recommended that its members resume normal work, including
both Canadian ships, on the following morning.7 1
Contrary to this advice, on 22 June Stevedores in the Surrey Docks
refused to work the Argomont. In the Royal Docks twenty-six TGWU
members accepted allocation to the Beaverbrae, handed their books to the
employer and set off for the ship. En route - according to Whitlock of the
MoL - they were 'intercepted by Dickens and Powell (two well known
trouble makers) and persuaded to defer going'.72 There was some merit in
this testy characterisation of the two men. Ted Dickens, a TGWU shop
steward in the Royal Docks, had been active in the recent 'Ineffectives'
strike and the 1948 'Zinc Oxide' strike. Thomas Powell, who also worked in
the Royals but was a member of the Stevedores Union, had chaired the
London strike committee in October 1945.
The London employers' organisation reacted to these developments
by resolving to make no fresh engagements of stevedore labour until the
Canadian vessels were manned.73 This seemed likely to provoke a general
unofficial stoppage throughout the Port of London, but on 23 June an
apparent resolution of the Canadian dispute suddenly emerged. Through
the Canadian High Commissioner in London, the CSU put a list of proposals
to Captain R.W. McMurray, Managing Director of the Beaverbrae owners,
Canadian Pacific Steamships. The CSU submitted that upon returning to
work the strikers would not be victimised, required to join the SIU or
prosecuted by the shipowners. Pre-strike pay levels would also be restored.
McMurray accepted these conditions on behalf of Messrs. A. Lusti Ltd.,
agents for the Argomont', as well as his own company. The CSU called off
the strike on Friday morning, 24 June.74
This proved, however, to be another fleeting development. Over the
weekend it emerged that the Argomont had actually been sold some months
previously, was no longer under Canadian ownership and would not be
returning to Canada.75 The Canadian strike committee in London duly
alleged that McMurray had double-crossed them, and at a lunch-time
meeting in the Royal Docks on Monday 27 June, CSU representatives asked
71NMLH/NASDU Joint Executive Council minutes, 21 June 1949.
72PRO: LAB 10/904, Whitlock to Diack, 22 June 1949.
73LML/LWA 73, Port Employers in London, 22 June 1949.
74Cmd.7851, pp. 16-17.
75Ibid., p. 18.
dockers not to handle the contested vessels. The employers, meanwhile, had
been preparing for a confrontation. On 24 June J.R. Hobhouse, who as a
prominent Liverpool shipowner and NDLB member wielded considerable
influence, had written to Macdonald of the National Employers' Association.
Hobhouse felt that it was time to confront the strikers; it was opportune to
'bring them to battle' he wrote.7 6 With the CSU strike resuming on 27 June,
the Port Employers in London decided: 'Should the position revert to a
refusal to work only the Beaverbrae and the Argomont (or either) then the
Employers' arrangements to refrain from calling stevedore labour for
fresh engagements in the affected docks should be re-introduced as soon as
possible.'77 When allocations to the two ships were refused in answer to the
CSU's appeal, the employers acted as planned, leading to widespread
disruption in the Port. By the end of the day, over 2,500 men - stevedores
and dockers - were idle in the Surrey and Royal docks.7 8
On 29 June the London Board sanctioned the employers' decision of
27 June, with the further proviso that in the Royal Docks, where work on
the Beaverbrae required TGWU as well as NASDU labour, no engagements
for any labour would be made until the Canadian vessel was being
worked.7^ By this time work had completely stopped in the Surrey and
Royal docks, and was considerably disrupted in the West India and Millwall
areas.8 0
Between these developments, on the morning of 28 June an
unofficial leadership committee was established. According to information
compiled by the London Dock Labour Board, the character and composition
of the committee broadly replicated that of its 1948 predecessor. Drawn
from the various sections of the port, it was chaired by a Stevedore, Albert
Timothy, and included many who had previously been involved in the
unofficial movement: Thomas Powell of the Stevedores, and Blomberg,
Constable, Cronin, Dickens, Stan Smith and Vanloo of the TGWU.81 One
established unofficial stalwart, Bert Aylward, was absent from this London
76LML/BPA 243, Hobhouse to Macdonald, 24 June 1949.
77LML/LWA 73, Port Employers in London, 27 June 1949.
I^Manchester Guardian, 28 June 1949.
79PRO: BK 2/76, London Dock Labour Board minutes, 30 June 1949.
80PRO: LAB 10/904, Whitlock to Diack, 29 June 1949.
81 PRO: BK 2/76, 'Brief particulars of Dock Workers known to have been
more or less prominent during the Strike', sent from London to National
Dock Labour Board, 4 August 1949.
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Board list, but his contacts with the unofficial movement were maintained.
On 7 August, two weeks after the stoppage had been called off, he addressed
an unofficial meeting at Canning Town Hall along with Timothy, Blomberg
and Dickens.82
Whilst the CSU had evidently encouraged the London stoppage, the
employers' actions had also been of clear importance. This was certainly
the line taken by the unofficial 'Lock-out Committee', which printed a
pamphlet entitled We Want Work on 30 June. This made three claims.
Firstly, the stoppage was not an extension of the CSU's campaign, but an
expression of the dockers' determination to avoid taking sides in the
Canadian dispute. Secondly, it was not a strike: in attempting to force the
men to blackleg, the shipowners and the NDLB had locked them out. Finally,
the men were 'prepared to demand the right to work all ships outside of
those in dispute in accordance with our known custom, practice and
tradition, as Trade Unionists'.8 3
The stoppage continued to escalate, despite the condemnation of both
union leaderships. At the TGWU Finance and General Purposes Committee
on 30 June, Arthur Deakin informed colleagues that very serious views had
been expressed in the port industry's National Joint Council on 22 June. The
joint body had emphasised that unofficial strikes 'gravely imperilled' the
industry's conciliation machinery and the Dock Labour Scheme.84 Deakin
put the same point to his dock members in the Transport and General
Workers' Record on 1 July, warning that the great benefits won by the
Union over the years 'must not be imperilled by ill-considered action'.8 5
The Stevedores' Union also took little satisfaction from developments.
Further belying his initial belligerence, Barrett invited Captain McMurray,
who had been accused by the CSU of double-dealing, to address the
Stevedores' Executive on 28 June. Having listened to McMurray, the
Executive reaffirmed that its members should resume normal work
immediately.8
^2Ibid., report of Canning Town Hall meeting, 7 August 1949.
83Ibid., Lock-out Committee, We Want Work, 30 June 1949.
84MRC/MSS.126/T&G/l/l/27, TGWU Finance and General Purposes
Committee, 30 June 1949.
83'Trade Unionism versus Communism: The Gloves are Off!', Transport and
General Worker's Record, July 1949.
86NMLH/NASDU Joint Executive Council minutes, 28 June 1949.
Despite these entreaties, the number of men on strike continued to
grow steadily: 8,209 on 2 July, more than 10,000 on 8 July, 13,000 on 12 July,
and over 15,000 on 18 July. Support for the strike remained above 15,000
until it was called off on 23 July.8 7
The Government regarded the London stoppage as a serious threat to
the British economy and the Trade Union movement's authority. Ministers
also argued that it was a political issue, forced by communists in the CSU
and the London docks. On 28 June, the second day of the strike, George
Isaacs told the House of Commons:
It is intolerable that our trade and our recovery should be interfered with
in this way. It is abundantly clear that the Communists, in their support of
the Canadian Seamen's Union, are completely indifferent to the loss and
hardship that may be occasioned to our dockers and their families and the
rest of the community. These disruptive elements represent only a small
minority of the men and the men must realise that unless they assert
themselves in loyalty to their Union, they are betraying the interests of
the vast majority of their fellow trade unionists.8 8
Isaacs reiterated this statement when challenged by the Communist MP
Willie Gallacher, who said that the London strikers were merely expressing
loyalty A to their Canadian comrades. The Minister asserted that the
C
dockers owed loyalty to their Union and not to 'a lot of imported agitators',
whose aim was not to win the Canadian strike but 'to disturb the flow of
merchandise in our ports'.8 9
The strike was monitored by the Cabinet Emergencies Committee,
which met six times in July. On 4 July it withheld the immediate
introduction of troops, feeling that this would cause the strike to spread.9 0
Prior to the committee's next meeting, on 5 July an important exchange of
correspondence took place between Ammon and Attlee. Having advocated
tough action during the Liverpool strike, Ammon again expressed the need
for confrontation: 'It does seem to me that while we are in this difficulty
the matter should be fought to a finish.' He recommended a declaration of a
State of Emergency, deportation of the 'imported agitators', and the arrest
and trial of the strike leaders. Attlee replied by pointing out that there was
no evidence to support such prosecutions, nor could the Canadian activists
87cmd.7851, Appendix XIII.
88Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 466, 982, 28 June 1949.
89Ibid„ 983.
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be deported, as they were British subjects. Attlee did admit, however, that
Ammon's first suggestion - a declaration of an emergency - was being
considered.9 1
The 1920 Emergency Powers legislation was indeed discussed by the
Emergencies Committee on 6 July. The committee agreed that the threat to
food supplies and the increasing loss of export trade revenue were
sufficiently serious to justify a State of Emergency. It was decided that Ede
would recommend to Cabinet that such a proclamation be made on 8 July,
with the powers to take effect on 11 July. In the meantime troops would be
immediately introduced to move foodstuffs from the docks.92
That afternoon in Parliament, Isaacs said that the introduction of
troops to safeguard food was 'necessary without delay'.9 3 This
announcement had been prefaced by a dramatic statement by Sir Stafford
Cripps on the growing dollar deficit, which had erupted seriously from £93
million in the first quarter of the year to £157 million in the second
quarter of the year.94 Having made this statement, Cripps gave a press
conference where he spelt out a direct relationship between the London
strike and the grim economic news: the country could ill-afford 'the
ridiculous luxury of politically-inspired strikes the sole object of which is
to destroy our earning powers and bring hardship and misery on our
people. We need maximum efficiency and the highest productivity
throughout industry. There is no greater inefficiency than unnecessary
strikes.'9 5
On 7 July 300 troops at the docks began unloading food cargoes. On
the same morning Cabinet accepted Ede's recommendation that a
proclamation would have to be made under the 1920 Emergency Powers Act.
A dissenting view was expressed, namely that this would be an excessive
weapon to utilise for the discharge of two ships. Yet, on the whole, Cabinet's
judgement was apparently swayed by the 'grave economic crisis', which
made breaking the blockade on Britain's exports essential. The legitimacy
of the Dock Labour Scheme was also at issue: 'There could be no compromise
on the issue that the dockers must unload ships without discrimination. If
91 PRO: BK 2/76, Ammon/Attlee correspondence, 5 July 1949.
92PRO: CAB 134/176, EC, 6 July 1949.
92Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 466, 2163, 6 July 1949.
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the Government once admitted the claim that dockers could decline to
unload particular ships, there would be endless difficulties in the future.'9 6
The Emergency Committee met again that evening, and affirmed that
if normal work was not resumed on the following day, an immediate
announcement on Emergency Powers would be made.97 With 1,000 troops
moving food cargoes on 8 July, the dockers on strike showed no sign of
going back. Having consulted Attlee, Isaacs, Bevin and the Emergencies
Committee,98 Ede announced in Parliament that unless the men went back
to work, a State of Emergency under the 1920 Act would take effect on
Monday, 11 July.99
On 11 July an early morning mass meeting of strikers in Victoria
Park elected to ignore the Government and maintain the stoppage.
According to the Manchester Guardian's labour correspondent, the lock-out
committee's handling of the meeting was 'scrupulously fair'. He quoted a
lighterman thus: 'I don't mind going home tired after a day's work, but I do
demand to go home with a good conscience,' and concluded that the 5,000-
strong crowd generally agreed that to unload the Canadian ships would be
'against the collective conscience of the waterfront'.100
With no sign that the men were preparing to return, on 11 July
Cabinet agreed to invoke Emergency Powers for the second time in less
than thirteen months and decided to establish a small executive body to
direct military and civilian labour in the docks for the duration of the
Emergency.191 Known as the Port Emergencies Committee, its composition
was settled that afternoon by Alfred Barnes, who had discussed the matter
with Attlee, Isaacs and Ede. To chair the committee, Barnes chose Sir
Alexander Maxwell, who had been Permanent Under Secretary at the Home
Office from 1923 to 1948. As such, he had played a prominent part in
directing strike-breaking troops during the General Strike, which suggests
to one recent historian that his July 1949 appointment symbolised the
traditional nature of the Labour Government's response to industrial
96PRO: CAB 128/CM(49)44, 7 July 1949.
97PRO: CAB 134/176, EC, 7 July 1949.
98Ibid„ 8 July 1949.
99Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 466, 2593, 8 July 1949.
199Manchester Guardian, 12 July 1949.
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action.1®2 The most senior of the committee's three other members was
another retired civil servant, Sir Frederick Leggett, who had occupied a
number of senior posts in a distinguished career at the Ministry of Labour
between 1917 and 1945.103
This new Committee's task was in one respect eased by a Cabinet
Emergencies Committee decision on the afternoon of 11 July which had
widened the potential responsibilities of service labour. Previously this had
been confined to food cargoes: additional troops would now be drafted in to
work all cargoes.104 This allowed for a steady escalation of military
involvement in the docks: from around 2,500 on Tuesday 12 July to 5,500 on
Friday 15 July. During the fourth and final week of the dispute, the
numbers rose from 7,082 on Monday 18 July, to 10,821 on Thursday 21 July.
When the strike ended on Saturday 23 July, there were 12,792 troops
working on a total of 130 ships throughout the docks.105
The declaration of an Emergency evidently failed to repeat the trick
which had worked in 1948. In fact, the only immediate consequence of the
proclamation was to complicate an already confused situation. The
existence of the Port Emergencies Committee suggested to many workers
that the Dock Labour Scheme had actually been temporarily suspended, and
on 12 July the numbers failing to report for work increased from under
11,000, to well over 13,000. The NDLB hastily issued a denial that the Scheme
no longer applied, adding:'dock workers should continue therefore to make
themselves available for work at the normal times and places in accordance
with the Scheme.'100
On 13 July Parliament considered the Emergency Powers which had
been drawn up. As agreed by Cabinet on 11 July, Attlee opened the debate in
order to emphasise the Government's serious intentions.107 He observed:
'The situation is such as gravely to injure the economy of this country at a
critical period in its history.' Continuing his statement with a discussion of
the Canadian dispute's origins, Attlee invoked the authority of the Canadian
102Justin Davis-Smith, The Attlee and Churchill Administrations and
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Trades and Labour Congress, the International Transport Workers'
Federation, the TGWU and the NASDU, to indicate that the Canadian ships
were not, as the lock-out committee insisted, 'black'. He raised four other
points, all of which had been made during the broadcast which had helped
to end the 1948 strike. Firstly, the dockers were being manipulated by an
irresponsible 'clique' of Communists and 'fellow travellers'. Secondly, the
Dock Labour Scheme had 'brought untold benefit to the dock workers', and
in return they had 'to take the call and accept the work offered'. Thirdly,
'the great position attained by the trade unions in this country has been
due not a little to the fact that they keep agreements entered into, and the
whole position of the unions is jeopardised by breaches of agreements such
as this.' Finally, the strike was exposing the country to immense economic
damage through the loss of the 'external trade on which our people depend
for their means of life.' Attlee reasoned that in the circumstances he had
described, the Government had no option other than to declare a State of
Emergency.108 This final point was as untrue in 1949 as it had been in 1948,
for the 1945 Supplies and Services Act gave the Government enough power
to introduce large numbers of troops without invoking the 1920
regulations.109 Certainly Anthony Eden could legitimately point out, when
replying for the Opposition, that Attlee had not specifically indicated what
the Government intended to do to bring the dispute to an end.1 10
Presumably the Government simply hoped that the men on strike would be
cowed into submission - as they had been in 1948 - by the proclamation of
an Emergency, and the accompanying appeals in terms of the danger
which the stoppage posed to the Scheme, the unions and the nation's
economic security.
These supposed dangers were put to the strikers by George Isaacs in
a BBC broadcast that evening, 13 July. He observed sympathetically that the
majority of the men were on strike due to their admirable sense of loyalty,
but repeated Attlee's point that the CTLC, the ITWF, the TGWU and the NASDU
had all said the ships were not 'black'. Thus, if the men went back to work,
they would not be scabs or blacklegs, but defenders of the Scheme, their
unions, their families and the country at a time of great economic danger.
He asked the men to consider the strike's political character: 'who is to have
108Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 467, 441-4, 13 July 1949.
109Jeffery and Hennessy, op.cit., p. 150.
110Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 467, 445, 13 July 1949.
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your support? The Nation in its present needs, or the Communists in their
opportunity to cause damage and mischief?'1 1 1
The strikers were also under increased pressure from the TGWU. In
the Union journal of 1 July, Deakin had described recent and present
unofficial dock strikes as 'merely another facet of the attempt that is being
made on the part of international communism to prevent our economic
recovery, and especially the flow of American aid to Europe.' He gave
notice that Union members involved in these strikes were to be 'given
their marching orders'.112
This end was pursued at the Union's Biennial Delegate Conference,
which coincidentally opened at Scarborough on the day that Emergency
Powers came into effect, 11 July. On its first day the conference adopted an
important change to the Union's constitution: 'No member of the
Communist Party shall be eligible to hold any office within the Union,
either as a lay member or as a permanent or full-time officer, this rule to
take effect as and from the beginning of the 1950/51 electoral period.'1 1 3
This was Deakin's own contribution to the TUC anti-communist campaign
which he had helped launch in 1948. In stating the incompatibility of
Union activity with Communist membership, it was also an indirect attack
on the unofficial movement in the London docks, which contained a
number of men who were both TGWU shop stewards and Communist Party
members. The rule change represented at least a minor contribution to the
attempt to discredit the strike as a communist conspiracy. The strikers were
also directly confronted at Scarborough on 14 July, when Deakin tabled an
emergency resolution which set out the customary trade union
condemnation of unofficial action:
This Biennial Delegate Conference deeply deplores the continuation of the
unofficial strike in the London Docks and calls upon the Members involved
to resume normal work, declaring that it is their bounden duty to honour
the obligations entered into by the Union on their behalf.
Conference places on record the fact that there is no dispute
involving wages and conditions, or any other question arising which can
be settled by any action on the part of our Members or which justifies any
prolongation of the stoppage.
^PRO: LAB 10/904, text of Ministerial broadcast, 13 July 1949.
112'Trade Unionism versus Communism: The Gloves are Off!', Transport and
General Worker's Record, July 1949.
1 13MRC/MSS.126/T&G/l/4/13, Report of TGWU Biennial Delegate
Conference, 11-15 July 1949, para. 10.
Conference further declares that it is imperative that the Union
should carry out its obligations. Our Members should realise this and also
the fact that a continuance of the unofficial strike imposes a hardship and
burden upon the community at a time when the country is struggling for
its very existence.114
Neither this resolution - which was carried by an overwhelming majority -
nor the banning of communists from official positions within the Union,
weakened the strikers' resolve. With these men resisting pressure from
both Government and Union leaders to work the Canadian ships, the dispute
had seemingly reached an impasse, for the Government position was
equally inflexible. From the Cabinet Emergencies Committee of 15 July it is
clear that Ministers knew the dispute would last only as long as the
Beaverbrae and Argomont were in London. Yet they were prepared to
discuss the prospect of sending 20,000 troops to the docks rather than
concede the strikers' demand. Indeed, it was stated as a 'matter of principle'
that troops would not discharge the Canadian ships until all other vessels
had been cleared.115
This inflexibility rested uneasily with the Government's insistence
that a national emergency was afoot. On 8 July, after Ede had announced
that an Emergency would be proclaimed on the following Monday, Ronald
Chamberlain, a Labour back-bencher, said that the immediate unloading of
the Canadian ships by troops would 'be a matter of ordinary woolly
wisdom'.116 The Manchester Guardian also advocated this strategy, which
would terminate the stoppage and immediately halt the losses of vital export
trade. The paper condemned the Government's refusal to do this as
irrational obstinacy.117
Whilst the Government was unanimous in its refusal to move the
disputed ships first, the stoppage temporarily re-opened the inter¬
departmental conflict which had been evident during the introduction of
the Dock Labour Scheme. In 1947 senior Ministry of Transport officials had
expressed misgivings about unions enjoying an equal share in the
Scheme's administration. On 18 July Cabinet considered a paper from
Transport Minister Alfred Barnes, suggesting that the strike indicated
possible faults in the Scheme's administration which had to be investigated.
114Ibid., para. 54.
115PRO: CAB 134/176, EC, 15 July 1949.
116Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 466, 2594, 8 July 1949.
117Manchester Guardian, 14 and 16 July 1949.
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The rival Ministry of Labour argument, that such an inquiry was
unnecessary, was put by George Isaacs. He said that industrial disputes in
the docks were the responsibility of the industry's National Joint Council,
rather than the National Dock Labour Board.118
Discussion on the competing papers was pre-empted in the short-
term by Ernest Bevin, who said that if the Government announced the type
of inquiry which the MoT requested, 'Grave disquiet was bound to be
aroused among dock workers throughout the country.'119 As ever, Bevin
was motivated by the desire to protect the Scheme which had built upon his
personal achievements as TGWU General Secretary and Minister of Labour.
Bevin was also prepared to be tough, as he had been during the 1948 strike,
and when informing Attlee in June 1949 that it would be disastrous if the
workforce could determine which ships they would and would not work.120
The toughness with which Bevin and the Government regarded unofficial
action reflected the concern that it threatened the economy and therefore
full employment; but it also rested on the conceived damage being done to
the Scheme's credibility, and therefore to the TGWU. In the longer-term,
however, Ministry of Transport pressure for a review of the Scheme was
not permanently lifted by Bevin's intervention. This pressure, and the
strains which it imposed on the Government's relationship with the TGWU,
will further be discussed in the final chapters of this thesis.
TROUBLE WITH THE NDLB
With the Government being tough only in order to protect the Scheme, the
TGWU and, if perhaps indirectly, the workforce itself, a furious public row
developed between Cabinet Ministers and the National Dock Labour Board
during the fourth week of the London stoppage.
The week began on Sunday 17 July, when the lock-out committee
held a march from Canning Town in the East End to a rally in Trafalgar
Square where the refusal to work the Canadian ships was reaffirmed. An
interesting insight into the demonstrators' loyalties was provided by the
Manchester Guardian's labour correspondent. He observed that, 'The
marchers had sung "The Red Flag" with gusto, but they carried a Union
118PRO: CAB 129/CP(49)145 and CP(49)151, 18 July 1949.
119PRO: CAB 128/CM(49)46, 18 July 1949.
120pRO; CAB 130/46, Ministerial meeting, 10 June 1949.
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Jack at the head of all their banners.' In Trafalgar Square the crowd was
addressed by the leftist MP, John Platts-Mills, and Albert Timothy, the
unofficial committee's chairman. The correspondent also stated that the
event, held in very heavy rain, was an 'impressive demonstration of the
London dockers' solidarity in their strike'.121
The men's continued refusal to resume work exacerbated the deep
sense of frustration already felt by the National Dock Labour Board over
the Government's inability to end the strike. Tension between the Board
and the Government had already been evident with Ammon advocating a
tougher line than Attlee on 5 July, and it had been the Board which forced
the issue of directing labour to the Canadian ships. On 12 July at a meeting
with Ministry of Labour and TGWU officials, the Board sought agreement on
a new strategy of confrontation. The Ministry's Chief Industrial
Commissioner, Sir Robert Gould, asked what could be done to kill the 'virus'
that caused unofficial action in the docks. Parkin of the Board suggested
that each striker could be sent a notice, specifying that if he failed to
resume work by a particular date, he would be dismissed from the
Scheme.1 22
This course of action was agreed by the Board on Friday 15 July,123
with Ammon making this intention clear to the Port Emergency Committee
at a morning meeting on Monday 19 July. Maxwell felt that issuing
dismissal notices would simply make matters worse, transforming the strike
into an emotive defence of victimised dockers. Leggett also opposed the
Board's idea, saying that in his professional experience, employers who
sacked men en masse generally had to re-engage them en masse.124
Ammon ignored this advice, and dispatched an angry note to the
Prime Minister about the meeting. 'Might I say in passing,' he wrote, 'that
"Emergency" as the name of the Committee seems a joke.' Reiterating his
determination to issue a statement that would secure a resumption, he
protested 'that there seems to be no powers whereby those who foment and
encourage the continuance of the strike can be brought to book'.125
121Manchester Guardian, 18 July 1949.
122PRO: BK 2/76, meeting at Ministry of Labour, 12 July 1949.
123PRO: BK 2/255 NDLB, 15 July 1949.
124PRO: BK 2/76, Port Emergency Committee meeting with Lord Ammon, 19
July 1949.
125PRO: PREM 8/1081, Ammon to Attlee, 19 July 1949.
When the NDLB met that afternoon, Arthur Bird suggested that the
issue of dismissal notices would be ineffective so long as the fifty or so
'trouble-makers' held the confidence of the workforce. The rest of the
Board brushed this aside, however, and decided to issue - in the form of a
press release - an ultimatum to the strikers. A long statement was produced,
which expressed dissatisfaction that 15,000 men in London were refusing to
honour existing national and local agreements. The argument that men
who worked on the Canadian vessels would be black-legs was strongly
rejected:
The board, being responsible for the allocation of dock workers to
employment, (a) does not and will not allocate men to any job unless the
terms and conditions are in accord with national and local dock
agreements; (b) does not and will not allocate men to any job which is in
dispute so long as the proper machinery of negotiation as laid down in
national and local dock agreements is being followed. ...
... Any dispute between the shipowners and the unions on the east
coast of Canada cannot be settled by the National Joint Council for the port
transport industry.
Adding - disingenuously, given Bird's minuted misgivings - that the notice
had been fully agreed by all the Board's members, the statement concluded
with an ultimatum:
In view of the foregoing statement the National Board hereby orders all
dock workers now on strike to resume work at 7.45 am on Thursday, July 21.
Failure to return to work will jeopardize the very existence of the scheme
which former dock workers have struggled to achieve. The board urges
them to respect this loyalty to workers of the past and thus help to
safeguard the benefits of the scheme for their sons.126
The statement was broadcast on the 9 p.m. news. Alarmed by what
was implied about the Dock Labour Scheme's future, Attlee, Isaacs and Ede
held urgent talks, which three hours later produced a rival Government
statement:
The attention of the Government has been called to the notice issued by the
National Dock Labour Board. This notice, which was issued without the
authority of the Emergency Committee, implies that the continuance of the
dock labour scheme may be in jeopardy. The Government are entirely in
agreement with the board that all men should return to work at the earliest
possible moment and they are aware that many men are desirous of doing
so, but the Government think it right to state that they are not
12 6 77ze Times, 20 July 1949.
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contemplating taking any steps to bring to an end the national dock labour
scheme.1 27
On 20 July the NDLB noted 'with grave concern the hasty action
taken by the Government amounting to a repudiation of the Board's
reasonable statement of policy and instructions for a resumption of
work'.12® Ammon was personally bewildered by the turn of events.
Interviewed by journalists, he attacked Ministers who had 'crabbed a real
chance of getting a resumption of work'. This opportunity had been 'kicked
to bits' by the 'panicky' Downing Street statement: 'Why the Government
have gone crazy and done what they have done I don't know'.129 The
Manchester Guardian regarded Ammon's confusion as justifiable, pointing
out that the Government had condemned the Board for simply repeating
Ministerial warnings about the future of the Scheme.130
For their part Ministers were furious that Ammon had been disloyal
to the Government which he served as Chief Whip in the Lords. In
September 1945, when Ammon had been appointed to the Government,
Bevin told him that the two roles were ultimately irreconcilable.131 It had
taken almost four years, but on 21 July Cabinet reflected on Ammon's
recent behaviour and agreed that Bevin had been right. After meetings
with Attlee, Isaacs and Ede on 20 July, he had apparently adopted a 'more
accommodating attitude', yet on the morning of 21 July, his fresh attacks
had appeared in the press. 'There was general agreement that it was wholly
improper that Lord Ammon, while still a member of the Government,
should make public statements which were critical of the Government's
handling of this matter; and that this situation should be remedied without
delay.'132 That afternoon Attlee asked Ammon to leave the Government.
There being no question of his leaving the NDLB, Ammon dutifully
resigned his Government post on the evening of 21 July.133
127 lbid.
128PRO: BK 2/255, NDLB, 20 July 1949.
12 9 77ze Times, 21 July 1949.
130Manchester Guardian, 21 July 1949.
13 ^RO: FO 800/491, Bevin to Ammon, 3 September 1945.
132PRO: CAB 128/CM(49)47, 21 July 1949.
13377ie Times, 22 July 1949.
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TERMINATION OF THE STRIKE: AGITATORS, FOMENTERS AND MUSIC
FACERS
A first sign that the strike might be coming to an end had actually arrived
before the NDLB's ultimatum. On 19 July the lock-out committee had stated
its intention to hold a public meeting in Victoria Park on Friday morning,
22 July. All interested parties - Ministry of Labour and trade union
officials, the CSU and the Canadian crews - were challenged to attend.134 a
portent of what this meeting might hold arrived on 21 July, the day after
the row between the NDLB and the Government, when the TGWU secured
the attendance of around 1,000 strikers at an official meeting at the West
India Dock. These men voted overwhelmingly to resume work on Monday 25
July.1 35
The Victoria Park meeting began at 7.45 am on 22 July, and attracted
the attendance of several thousand strikers. It began with a sudden
announcement from the CSU president, Harry Davis, that his Union was
calling off its strike in Great Britain. He stated, misleadingly as it turned
out, that the Canadian Deputy Minister of Labour had offered fresh
conciliation on the original dispute. This offer had in fact been made on 27
June, and was no longer valid,136 which suggests that the CSU was
tactically withdrawing whilst the support of the London men remained
intact. The lock-out committee duly recommended a resumption of work in
victorious terms. With the Canadian Union no longer on strike, the
B e ave rb rae and the Argomont were no longer 'black', and men could
resume work on these ships without violating 'trade union principles'. This
was unanimously accepted by the meeting, and the men resolved to resume
all work on Monday morning, 25 July.137
Normal work was indeed resumed as the unofficial meeting had
pledged, but this was not accepted with complete satisfaction by the Board
or port employers, who were unhappy that the dispute had ended with the
men's faith in the unofficial leaders unshaken. In a statement to his fellow
peers on 27 July, Lord Ammon claimed that full credit for the resumption of
work was owed to the NDLB, for the ultimatum which it had issued. He also
134Ibid., 20 July 1949.
135Cmd.7851, p.25.
136Ibid„ p.26.
13777ze Times, 23 July 1949.
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criticised the Government for failing to act against the 'fomenters' of the
strike, which he had urged Attlee to do as early as 5 July. In allowing these
men to go unpunished Ministers had merely stored up problems for the
future.13 8
The Port Employers in London held similarly pessimistic views about
both the manner in which the strike had ended, and the prospects for a
peaceful future in the docks. Less than three hours after the men had voted
to return, the local employers' organisation expressed a determination to
confront the dockworkers' unofficial leaders. It was 'agreed that early
representations should be made to the London Dock Labour Board for the
removal of known agitators from the Port Register'.13 9
Neither was the institution which had most to fear from the
unofficial movement, the TGWU, particularly pleased with the strike's
outcome. With the Union's authority having again been usurped in the
docks, Arthur Deakin was even angrier than Lord Ammon and the
employers. On 21 July he told the Union's Docks Group that the presence of
unofficial leaders would no longer be tolerated:
there were certain people who would be dealt with and they would not be
dealt with sympathetically, they must face the music. He had been taunted
with being too easy when dealing with certain people who had been
attempting to destroy the good will in the Industry. Be that as it may,
whatever the consequence he would be no party to any lenient treatment
so far as certain people were concerned, they had set out to bring this
Union into discredit, they had sought to dishonour and disrupt. These
people would be put out of the Scheme, he would go this far if people would
not act decently. We could not afford to throw away the hardwon gains that
the Dock Employees enjoy at the moment.140
The London strike had again illustrated that there was in existence a core
of vigorous and determined unofficial leaders, who commanded a level of
trust and support amongst sections of the workforce which the TGWU
palpably did not. The stoppages at Avonmouth and Liverpool had also
signalled the continuing inability of the TGWU to organise coherently a
diverse national and industrial workforce. At the Biennial Delegate
Conference Deakin had fulfilled his promise to give communist shop
stewards their 'marching orders', and banished them from Union office.
138House of Lords, Vol. 164, 557-65, 27 July 1949.
139LML/LWA 73, Port Employers in London, 22 July 1949.
140DNTGC, 21 July 1949.
Now he was to turn the Union's organisational wrath against the unofficial
core of 'certain people' who were to be 'dealt with' in London. This
important sequel to the 1949 dispute is discussed in the final chapter, which
examines the strains which the unofficial strikes exerted on the labour
alliance. This is preceded, however, by an analysis of the character of these
strikes.
CHAPTER SIX
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COMMUNIST CONSPIRACIES? THE ALLEGATIONS AND THE
REALITY
STRIKES AS POLITICAL SUBVERSION
The association between unofficial strike action and political subversion
was initially made by Arthur Deakin, the TGWU General Secretary, during
the huge Dockers' Charter strike of October 1945. He accused the Trotskyist
Revolutionary Communist Party of 'encouraging and maintaining the
strike action'.1 During the London strike of June 1948, Deakin perceived an
altogether different political conspiracy. Claiming that the vast majority of
the unofficial committee were communists, he hinted that the stoppage - in
disrupting trade in Britain's busiest port - was part of international
communism's attempt to undermine Britain's economic and international
standing.2 On this occasion, in contrast to 1945, his charges of subversion
were publicly supported by the Government. In his national broadcast on
the State of Emergency, Clement Attlee described the strike leaders as 'a
small nucleus' of 'agitators', who were intent on pulling the TGWU apart
and disrupting Britain's recovery.3
Allegations of communist involvement were made even more
explicitly during the 1949 strikes. When the Ministerial Emergencies
Committee discussed the Stevedores' official strike in April, George Isaacs
stated that the 'Communist-dominated' union was seeking to embarrass the
Government,4 and the Cabinet believed that communists on the union's
executive were deliberately attempting to disrupt essential services and
impede the delivery of Marshall Aid.^ The communist conspiracy theme
enjoyed particular lustre during the strikes in support of the Canadian
Seamen's Union, which began a few weeks later at Avonmouth on 16 May.
On 23 May Isaacs informed fellow Ministers that the CSU's President, Harry
Davis, who had arrived at Avonmouth on 13 May, was 'a known Communist',
1 The Times, 13 October 1945.
2The Times, 25 June 1948.
3Daily Herald, 29 June 1948.
4PRO: CAB 134/176, EC, 12 April 1949.
5PRO: CAB 128/CM(49)27, 13 April 1949.
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who 'had been extremely active in stirring up trouble among British
dockers'.6 On 26 May Chuter Ede told Cabinet colleagues that the seamen's
strike was designed to interfere with 'the shipment of supplies under the
European Recovery Campaign'; they agreed that the affair 'illustrated the
need for a more general campaign to put the dockers and other workers in
this country on their guard against this sort of Communist exploitation'.7
Ministry of Labour officials believed that the general stoppage in
Liverpool, which followed the arrival of a ship from strike-bound
Avonmouth, was further evidence of communist intervention. On 9 June a
departmental memo recorded: 'It seems definite that the difficulties which
are being created is a Communist Party affair planned at the highest level.
(This is from TGWU and Dock Labour Board officials). Stated that Communist
Party made plans and were on the job as soon as the Dromore difficulty
arose [sic].'8
The TGWU also insisted that the London strike, which began in the
last week of June, was political in character. Bob Mellish, TGWU-sponsored
MP for the docklands constituency of Rotherhithe, told journalists that the
strike was 'riddled with Communist activity of so serious a nature that the
facts should be investigated by MI5'.9 John Platts-Mills, who had recently
been expelled from the Labour Party amidst unsubstantiated allegations
that he was a secret Communist Party member, responded to this statement
by refering to Mellish in the House of Commons as the 'special agent for
Rotherhithe'.1 0
Allegations of communist involvement on the basis of these
incidents were taken seriously by the Government. On 4 July the
Ministerial Emergencies Committee observed:
the effect and timing of these and other industrial troubles clearly
demonstrated the existence of a Communist attempt to cause industrial and
financial damage, as part of a campaign to defeat the European Recovery
Programme. The dockers were being deluded and exploited by the
Communists, and to make this clear would be one step towards bringing the
strike to an end.1 1
^PRO: PREM 8/1081, Ministerial Meeting, 23 May 1949.
7PRO: CAB 128/CM(49)39, 26 May 1949.
8PRO: LAB 10/832, memo by Andrews, 9 June 1949.
9Manchester Guardian, 4 July 1949.
111Daily Worker, 5 July 1949.
nPRO: CAB 134/176, EC, 4 July 1949.
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Chuter Ede spelt out this characterisation of the strike when announcing
the introduction of Emergency Powers on 8 July, and also emphasised that
the communist attempt to disrupt British trade and European recovery was
an unacceptable challenge to the State's authority.12 The strikers were
more roundly condemned by Sir Hartley Shawcross, the Attorney General,
who said at Liverpool on 9 July: 'These unofficial strikes are an act of
economic and political treason to our trade unions, our Socialist movement,
and indeed to our country.' When the Opposition pressed Shawcross to
clarify this statement in the Commons on 13 July, he argued that he had not
meant to imply that the strike was an act of legal treason. In challenging
the authority of elected Parliamentary and trade union representatives it
was, however, a concerted attack on political democracy.1 2
This belief in communist conspiracies culminated with the
publication in December 1949 of a White Paper on the Canadian strikes.14
The Paper included a foreword from George Isaacs, which stated that
evidence existed of 'a cold and deliberate plan' executed by unofficial dock
leaders and the communist-dominated Canadian Seamen's Union. Intended
to alert the public to the dangers of communist disruption, the timing of
the paper's release actually ensured that it received the minimum of
publicity. On 16 December, the date of its appearance, Parliament rose until
24 January 1950, and did not in fact reconvene until after the General
Election of 23 February. Thus Parliament was denied the opportunity to
debate the White Paper, which received only slightly more attention in the
press. The Times simply provided an uncritical summary of its contents.1 3
These were also extensively relayed, in some fourteen or so paragraphs, by
the Manchester Guardian's labour correspondent. However, this
correspondent also pointed out that the Paper had failed to comment on the
important row between Lord Ammon and the Government, and the
Government's tacit acceptance for two months that the Canadian ships were
'black'. He also criticised its lack of 'official understanding of the genuine
loyalties of the dockers which were exploited during the strike'.1 6
12Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 466, 2596, 8 July 1949.
13Ibid., 467, 474-484, 8 July 1949.
14Review of the British Dock Strikes, 1949, (Cmd. 7851, December 1949).
1377ze Times, 16 December 1949.
16Manchester Guardian, 16 December 1949.
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Despite - or perhaps because of - this somewhat unheralded
publication, in March 1950 Herbert Morrison attempted to promote public
interest in the White Paper, using it to publicise the Communist Party's
probable strategy after its disastrous showing in the February General
Election. Speaking to the Labour League of Youth at Lewisham, Morrison
argued that communists would now switch their efforts from 'the political
field to the industrial field'. This would involve an emulation of 'the true
and detailed story published as a White Paper just before Christmas, of the
international conspiracy which led to last summer's dock strikes here and
in other countries'. Incidentally, he added a further, and rather
unedifying, sales pitch: 'This amazing record is published by the Stationery
Office. It only costs 9d. and anyone who wants to see how the Communist
game is played could not do better than order it from a newsagent and read
it.'l 7
This chapter seeks to reappraise the notion that unofficial dock
strikes were a component of the 'Communist game'. Firstly, the three major
strikes are re-examined in order to deal more directly with the question of
political subversion in the docks. Recapitulating and bringing together
points made in the previous three chapters will illuminate the essentially
industrial - as opposed to political - characteristics of the three disputes.
Secondly, extensive attention is paid to a number of general problems in
the industry. These specifically industrial problems were the real causes of
the unofficial strikes.
OCTOBER 1945
Arthur Deakin argued that the Revolutionary Communist Party had been
instrumental in maintaining the Liverpool strike which sparked the huge
Docker's Charter Strike in October 1945. In fact, the RCP was a miniscule
force, with a national membership in 1945 of less than 500, many of whom
lived in London. More than 20,000 dockers were employed on the Mersey:
quite simply, the Trotskyists lacked the members or financial support that
were needed to maintain a general stoppage in the Liverpool docks for a
number of weeks. Indeed, this largest single industrial dispute of the 1945-
51 period had nothing to do with political subversion, but arose from the
17Full text of Morrison's speech in Lewisham, 24 March 1950, in PRO: CAB
124/4, extended extracts in The Times, 25 March 1950.
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workforce's dissatisfaction over wages and conditions of work. Dockers had
not received a formal increase in their guaranteed minimum daily pay
since 1921, and Ernest Bevin was himself aware that this was the cause of
the strike.1 8
It should also be noted that the TGWU publicly admitted the
unsatisfactory nature of the workforce's financial position. On 23 October
the TGWU National Docks Delegate Conference observed 'the deep sense of
grievance' which members held.19 Deakin and his colleagues privately
recognised the other main characteristic of the huge unofficial strike.
Impatient with the leadership's conduct of pay negotiations, large numbers
of dockers had temporarily transferred their allegiance to unofficial
representatives. Realising that a return would only be secured if
sanctioned by these men, the Union leadership reached a highly unusual
decision to permit secret - and ultimately successful - negotiations between
Liverpool Docks Group officials and unofficial leaders on 'ways and means
of terminating the strike'.2 0
Given Deakin's evident awareness of these problems, some
explanation must be offered for his remarks about political subversion. The
only actual suggestion of Trotskyist involvement came from Liverpool
officers reporting to the Union's Docks Group on 12 October,21 but there
was never any solid indication of how this involvement had determined the
strike's development. In the absence of such evidence, it might reasonably
be speculated that the Liverpool officers were offering an explanation for
the dispute which did not directly leave themselves open to criticism. There
is, after all, no doubt that their response to the original piece-rate and
work-books disputes which began on 24 September, had been extremely
slow, for negotiations with employers were not opened until 5 October.
There is also the possibility that rumours about Trotskyist involvement in
the docks might have been started by communists. The British Communist
Party, it should be remembered, had greatly embarrassed itself in the early
part of 1945 by arguing for a continuation of the war-time Coalition
Government, and had attempted to ingratiate itself with the labour
18PRO: FO 800/491, Bevin to Isaacs, 21 November 1945.
19MRC/MSS. 126/T&G/1/1/23, TGWU Finance and General Purposes'
Committee, 25-6 October 1945, report of National Docks Delegate Conference,
23 October 1945.
20DNTGC, 22 October 1945.
21DNTGC, 12 October 1945.
movement in August 1945 by pledging its 'whole-hearted support' for the
new Government.22 Without access to sources on Communist Party tactics, it
is impossible to express any certainties on these matters. However, it is
highly likely that the Communist Party's initial support for the
Government influenced its strong opposition to the dock strike. It is equally
likely that some communist activists in the docks might have seen the
situation as representing a dual opportunity: they could undermine support
for the strike and attack their hated Trotskyist rivals, the Revolutionary
Communists, by linking the two together. This is speculation, but unless the
non-communist Liverpool TGWU officers merely invented the story to
protect themselves from criticism, and with the Government and the Union
already greatly embarrassed by the strike, only the Communist Party really
stood to gain from rumours of political subversion. Did Arthur Deakin
himself unconsciously participate in a communist conspiracy on this
occasion, by branding the strike as a Trotskyist ramp?
JUNE 1948
Just as the 1945 strike was essentially a traditional industrial struggle for
improved pay and conditions, so the 'political' nature of the 1948 'Zinc
Oxide' strike in London was similarly overblown. In private the
Government was perfectly aware of the fact that, whatever Deakin said,
Scotland Yard believed there to be no evidence linking the strike with
political subversion.23 Nevertheless, in his broadcast of 28 June, Attlee
studiously ignored the specifically industrial causes of the strike, and
asserted that it had been organised by a small core of agitators. To recap
briefly, the strike began with a disputed piece-rate for an unusual cargo -
100 tons of zinc oxide - in Regent's Canal Dock. The employer offered 3s4d
per ton, but the gang of eleven men wanted 5s per ton. The TGWU
negotiating official, S. Piatt, drew the wrath of his members for
sanctioning the employer's rate by telephone without actually seeing the
cargo himself. In refusing to discharge the cargo at this lower rate, the
men failed to fulfil their obligations under the Dock Labour Scheme, and
were duly suspended by the London Dock Labour Board without pay for
seven days, and their rights to attendance money and guaranteed make-up
22Communist Party, World News and Views, 4 August 1945.
23Above, pp.116-17.
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withdrawn for thirteen weeks. This second penalty was reduced to two
weeks after an appeal.
An unofficial pamphlet on the piece-rate dispute and the consequent
penalties, stated that Piatt, by having 'agreed to a rate before seeing the job
and without consulting the men', had committed an 'outrage'.24 This
criticism of Piatt suggested that the Union had yet to regain the confidence
of its members which had so obviously been lost in October 1945. The
difficulty facing the TGWU was also evident on 18 June, when it attempted
to restore order with an official meeting in Victoria Park. This ended in
farce as the small crowd of 300 walked off as a body when the London Docks
Group officials arrived.25
Whilst maintaining that the strike was a political conspiracy, Deakin
sensibly acknowledged that his members had been greatly antagonised by
the length of the men's original thirteen week punishment. He threw the
Union's weight behind a demand that the maximum period of
disentitlement to the benefits of the Scheme be drastically cut, and in
November 1948 the employers' representatives on the National Dock Labour
Board agreed to reduce this to four weeks.2^ This admission is further
evidence that the 1948 strike, as with the 1945 episode, was the result of two
things: an industrial dispute between employers and workers, and the
perception which many dockers held - partly for historical reasons - that
they were inadequately represented in these disputes by their union
officials.
THE 1949 STRIKES
In contrast to 1945 and even 1948, in 1949 charges of political subversion
were more explicit, and made with far greater persistence and certainty.
Chapter Five suggested that it was these charges that have earned the
Canadian strikes their relatively high profile in the historiography of the
1945 Government, with various historians characterising the dispute as an
early domestic episode in the Cold War.27 As Chapter Three noted, it is
paradoxical that historians have devoted far less attention to the much
24PRO: BK 2/72, Port Workers' Strike Committee, The Men's Own Case.
25The Times, 19 June 1948.
2f>Chapter 4, p. 116.
27Kenneth O. Morgan, Labour in Power, pp. 375-8; Peter Weiler, British
Labour and the Cold War, pp. 230-69.
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larger 1945 strike. Yet the very persistent attention which historians have
given to the Government's allegations, without actually refuting them, does
demand that far more attention be given to this aspect of the 1949 affair
than the 1945 and 1948 strikes.
In public Cabinet Ministers and Trade Union leaders expressed the
strong belief that the Canadian strikes were a communist conspiracy, and
these certainties were summarised in the White Paper of December 1949.
Yet having read a draft of this paper, and acting upon the advice of a
junior colleague, the Solicitor at the Ministry of Labour, A.F. Harrison, gave
a stern warning to the Ministry's Chief Industrial Commissioner, Sir Robert
Gould. Harrison said that opinions expressed in its foreword - about the
Canadian Seamen's Union and the character of the stoppage - were both
defamatory and legally dubious.2** The Ministry of Labour duly sought
advice from Sir Hartley Shawcross. He believed that the 'communist
conspiracy' charge was unlikely to stand up in court if the dockers'
unofficial leaders or the CSU decided to sue the Government for libel, and
counselled that the Government would only evade this inevitable
embarrassment by publishing the report under the 1840 Parliamentary
Papers Act as a White Paper. By appearing as a White Paper, the report's
contents - highly contentious as they were - received important and
absolute legal immunity.29 This legal protection was of immense
importance, enabling the Government to deflect public attention from the
serious private reservations which it held, with regard to both the
character of the British stoppages and the merits of the Canadian dispute.
These private reservations greatly undermined the validity of its public
position that the strikes were a 'communist conspiracy'.
THE CANADIAN STOPPAGES: STRIKES OR LOCK-OUTS?
To recall events discussed in Chapter Five, the Canadian conflict essentially
arose from the virulent anti-communism of the American Federation of
Labour, which was engaged in displacing the Communist-led Canadian
Seamen's Union with its own affiliate, the Seafarers' International Union,
as the chief organiser of Canadian East Coast seamen. At the first formal
Ministerial discussion of the Canadian-related troubles, chaired by Attlee
28PRO: LAB 16/97, Harrison to Gould, 31 October 1949.
29Ibid., Shawcross to Harrison, 29 November 1949.
on 23 May, George Isaacs blamed much of the trouble at Avonmouth on the
CSU's communist President, Harry Davis. Davis had persuaded local dockers
not to unload a Canadian ship, the Montreal City, which was crewed by
members of the SIU. However, Isaacs also drew attention to the decision
taken by the Avonmouth employers on 17 May, which was that no fresh
labour would be requisitioned until the Montreal City was manned. Thus, he
added, in voting to go on strike, the Avonmouth dockers had 'been
influenced by the virtual "lock-out" declared by the employers'.3 0
Isaacs's assessment, that the Avonmouth stoppage was an industrial
conflict between workers and employers, was shared by Arthur Bird,
National Secretary of the TGWU Docks Group. Having publicly advised his
members to disregard the 'row between two [North American] unions' and
continue working on all vessels, 31 Bird was secretly furious with the
Avonmouth employers for attempting to coerce his members into working
the Montreal City. He told the employers that they had locked his members
out, and - vainly, as it turned out - demanded a reversal of their position.-5 2
Further anxiety amongst Labour leaders was expressed in the
Emergencies Committee on 25 May, which noted that dockers had refused to
work on the Montreal City and another Canadian vessel, the Gulfside,
because they believed that the SIU crews of these ships were blacklegs.
Ministers evidently sympathised with this belief: 'They [the dockers] had
been confirmed in this attitude by the action of Canadian shipowners in
flying over substitute crews consisting of members of the SIU to man
vessels whose CSU crews had struck.' The view was also put that, with the
workforce willing to work all vessels except the Canadian ones, 'it was the
action of the two groups of employers which had exacerbated the situation
and led to the present stoppage. If that action could be reversed, the port as
a whole could be re-opened and negotiations about the Montreal City and
the Gulfside could go on as a separate and minor issue in a much better
atmosphere.'2 2
The meeting ultimately rejected this course of action, because in
order to preserve the Dock Labour Scheme's credibility, the unofficial
strike had to be defeated. On 26 May the committee's chairman, Chuter Ede,
20pRO: PREM 8/1081, Ministerial meeting to discuss strike over Canadian
ships, 23 May 1949.
21PRO: LAB 10/783, clipping from Western Daily Press, 7 May 1949.
22PRO: LAB 10/833, Whitlock memo to Barnes, 25 May 1949.
33PRO: CAB 134/176, EC, 25 May 1949.
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secured the deployment of service labour at Avonmouth.34 Ede appears to
have genuinely believed that the Canadian strike was a communist
conspiracy, and told Cabinet colleagues that British dockers should be
warned about the dangers of this 'communist exploitation'.3 5 He was
greatly taken aback, therefore, when Arthur Deakin - of all people -
quashed both the idea that the dispute was a straightforward communist
plot, and the notion that British dockers would call off their action if the
facts of the Canadian controversy were put before them. Deakin discussed
the situation with Isaacs and Ede on 30 May. Reporting the meeting to his
Emergencies Committee colleagues, the Home Secretary said that Deakin,
'did not favour the idea of bringing representatives of the International
Seamen's Union [ie. the Seafarers' International Union] to this country to
explain the true facts of the seamen's strike to the dockers here. He was not
altogether convinced (and this was the first time that the Home Secretary
had heard such doubts suggested) that the case of the International
Seamen's Union was entirely sound.' This greatly irritated Ede, who added -
perhaps unnecessarily - that Deakin had lost control of his members and
did not expect them to listen to anything he said on the subject. As a former
schoolmaster Ede had little industrial experience of the labour movement,
but the old trade unionist Isaacs again reminded his colleagues of the
situation's delicacy. The SIU had been engaged by the Canadian shipowners
during a legal strike by the CSU: 'That was why the SIU were regarded by
the CSU and by British dockers as blacklegs and why the Canadian Trades
Union Congress [ie. the Canadian Trades and Labour Congress], although
threatening to disaffiliate the CSU, had expressed almost equally strong
disapproval of the employers and the SIU.'3^ This obviously contradicted
the position which the Government, and indeed the TGWU, took in public,
and it should be re-emphasised that criticism of the SIU, the Canadian
shipowners and British port employers, did not find its way into the White
Paper.
The official report also ignored evidence which contradicted the
Government's insistence that communists had spread the trouble to
Liverpool. Ministry of Labour information on communist involvement in
Liverpool came from local Dock Board and TGWU officials, by way of its
34pro
35pro
36pro
CAB 134/176, EC, 26 May 1949.
CAB 128/CM(49)39, 26 May 1949.
CAB 134/176, EC, 30 May 1949.
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Regional Industrial Relations Officer, A.S. Andrews. Andrews believed that
communists had plotted the action. But even he did not accept their story in
detail: 'TGWU officials allege that the plotting takes place in Bessie
Braddock's office at Liverpool, This is perhaps a libellous statement.'3 7
From the same officials who had apparently cooked up the Trotskyist
conspiracy in 1945, this was more than libellous. It was, in fact, outwith the
realms of common sense, for no less likely communist conspirator against
the TGWU and the Labour Government could have been suggested than
Braddock. This was the same arch right-wing Labour MP who later wrote of
Aneurin Bevan: 'He made it fashionable to be a dissident. He weakened the
National Executive to a point where it could no longer deal effectively with
infiltrating Trotskyists and Communists.'3 8 In questioning this particular
TGWU allegation, Andrews drew attention to the general unreliability of his
Union sources. Nevertheless, he continued to accept their broad contention
that the strike was a communist plot.
The Government was, however, given an alternative perspective on
events by one of its own members, Harold Wilson, the President of the
Board of Trade and a Liverpool constituency MP. Having met some of his
constituents who were on strike, Wilson told Isaacs on 13 June that the
strike was not communist in origin, and only a 'very small minority' of the
strike committee were communists. His constituents claimed that the
employers had deliberately forced a confrontation by directing labour to a
ship, the Dromore, which had sailed from Avonmouth: 'The strike was not
based on any sympathy with, or alleged solidarity with Canadian strikers,
but was based on what they regarded as a point of Union principle in
connection with the working of a ship they regarded as "black" which had
come from a strike-affected port.'3 9
This assessment, that the strikers were merely observing a time-
honoured trade union principle, confirmed Isaacs's private conviction -
shared with TGWU leaders - that the strikes primarily revealed industrial
rather than political concerns. At a meeting chaired by Attlee on 10 June,
Chuter Ede had again criticised Arthur Deakin: 'It almost appeared that Mr.
Deakin was keeping from the dockers the real issues in the case, and also
attempting to obscure the fact that the strike, though not inspired by the
37PRO: LAB 10/832, memo by Andrews, 9 June 1949.
38Jack and Bessie Braddock, The Braddocks, p. 203.
39PRO: LAB 10/832, Wilson to Isaacs, 13 June 1949.
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communists, was being vigorously exploited by them.' Isaacs, on the other
hand, strongly supported Deakin's uncharacteristic refusal to attack
unofficial action. He argued that far from bringing the stoppages in
Avonmouth and Liverpool to an end:
an attempt to expose the fundamental issues might lead to a total stoppage of
work in all the docks in the country. The Canadian employers, when the
CSU first struck, had been only too quick in calling in the SIU, which was
affiliated to the AFL. Any full statement must include the fact that the SIU
had intervened against the CSU, and it was noteworthy that the CTLC
[Canadian Trades and Labour Congress] had expressed almost equal
disapproval of the Canadian employers and the SIU. The dockers in the UK
would only be confirmed in their belief that members of the SIU manning
Canadian ships were blacklegs. This was a fundamental Trade Union point
and to stress it would only do harm.40
Faced with an insistence from Attlee that he broadcast in any case on the
following day, 11 June, Isaacs acted upon his understanding that an
exposition of the dispute's true facts would prolong the strike. Therefore,
he suppressed his misgivings about the confrontational tactics of both the
Canadian and British employers, and simply reiterated the line that the
strike was a communist plot to embarrass the Government and the TGWU,
and to hamper trade and economic recovery. In referring to Canadian
events, he stated only that the communist-dominated CSU had been
disaffiliated by its parent body, the Canadian Trades and Labour Congress.
No mention was made of either the CTLC's attitude towards the SIU, or the
SIU's intervention against the CSU in the latter's argument with Canadian
East Coast shipowners.41 Keith Jeffery and Peter Hennessy have bestowed
great credit on Isaacs's broadcast, pointing out, 'Evidently he convinced the
strikers.'42 Indeed he convinced the men, for the strikes at Avonmouth and
Liverpool ended almost immediately, but it is unlikely that he convinced
himself. The Government had initially planned the broadcast on 26 May to
tell the dockers the plain truth about the Canadian strike, and persuade
them that their own strike action was dangerous and illegitimate. In fact,
the Government realised that the strike would only be brought to an end if
its true origins were obscured rather than clarified.
40PRO: CAB 130/46, Ministerial meeting on strike, 10 June 1949.
41 PRO: LAB 43/150, copy of full text of Isaacs's broadcast, 11 June 1949.
42Keith Jeffery and Peter Hennessy, States of Emergency, p. 202.
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When the Canadian trouble spread to London, the Government's
characterisation of developments was equally misleading. To further recall
events which were discussed in Chapter Five, trouble began in earnest on
27 June after the London port employers echoed the actions of their
Avonmouth counterparts in announcing that no new labour would be
engaged until two disputed Canadian ships - the Argomont in the Surrey
Docks and the Beaverbrae in the Royal Docks - were manned and working.
The employers knew these vessels were a potential source of trouble, and
had avoided directing workers to them since their arrival in London at the
beginning of April. The dockers' unofficial leadership cited the employers'
action, which was supported by the London Dock Labour Board on 29 June,
as a lock-out, and the sole cause of the stoppage. The 'Central Lock-out
Committee' dismissed charges of political motivation: 'it is inevitable that
someone sooner or later will discover that the refusal of the workers to
blackleg or go hungry through low wages and high prices, are really
Communist plots.'43
The main body of dockers apparently supported the committee's
conviction that the employers had effected a lock-out. An attempt by Bob
Mellish, the Labour MP for Rotherhithe, to convince dockers that they had
been tricked by communists into going on strike, was a clear failure.
Following a public meeting which Mellish organised in Poplar on 2 July, a
local Ministry of Labour official reported to the Assistant Secretary, Diack,
that: 'The idea of a "red plot" does not make much impression on dockers.'44
There was little wonder in this. On 7 July Cabinet heard that the
police had 'little evidence about the activities of the Communists in
fomenting the various dock strikes, though strikers were being advised by
persons with legal experience who had Communist sympathies'.43 Legal
advice from Communist sympathisers certainly did not impute a conspiracy
to undermine economic recovery. The Government's public line was also
dismissed by its own law officers. On 6 July Sir Hartley Shawcross discussed
the dispute's character with the Director of Public Prosecutions, Sir
Theobold Matthew, the Solicitor General, Frank Soskice MP, and A.F.
Harrison from the Solicitor's Department at the Ministry of Labour. The
43PRO: LAB 16/201, Central Lock-out Committee, To All Portworkers, undated
but probably printed and distributed at the beginning of July 1949. The
emphasis is original.
44PRO: LAB 10/904, Hull to Diack, 5 July 1949.
45PRO: CAB 128/CM(49)44, 7 July 1949.
four men sympathetically considered the view of the unofficial dockers'
committee, that the stoppage was a lock-out on the part of the employers.
Shawcross felt: 'that the plain object of the employers generally in not
taking on labour was to compel the men to work the Canadian ships and
they were doing this to aid the employers at the Canadian ships to get the
men back to work on these ships.' As Shawcross was, in the course of the
following week, to publicly describe the unofficial strike as 'economic and
political treason' on two separate occasions, this was a remarkable private
admission. Significantly, also, it was an opinion shared by Sir Theobold
Matthew.46 When spelling out an analysis of the dispute in the 7 July
Cabinet, Shawcross emphasised the Director of Public Prosecutions's
feelings on the matter. Given the immense gulf between Shawcross's
private and public views, these Cabinet minutes merit extensive quotation:
The Attorney General said that, on facts supplied to him by the police, he
and the Director of Public Prosecutions inclined to the view that in the
main it was a lock-out by the employers. The employers had tacitly accepted
for some weeks the refusal of the dockers to unload two Canadian ships, on
which there was a dispute between the ship-owners and the crew, but on 27
June they had indicated that men would not be engaged for work on other
ships until work began on the unloading of the Canadian ships. On such
facts as he had been given, he considered that a lock-out must be held to
exist, even in respect of dockers who had been engaged for ships coming to
the port after the dispute had begun.4 7
George Isaacs qualified these remarks by reminding colleagues of the Dock
Labour Scheme's continuity rule, under which dockers who had declined to
finish work on ships for which they had been engaged, definitely were on
strike. Nevertheless, Shawcross's views on the dispute's character,
expressed with the full authority of the Director of Public Prosecutions and
complemented by police evidence that communist involvement was
negligible, possibly contributed to the uneasiness felt by some Ministers
about the introduction of Emergency Powers.4** Shawcross was personally
in favour of using Emergency Powers, but the dissenting Ministers may
well have agreed with him when he told Isaacs after this Cabinet meeting
that the stoppage was, 'both a strike in relation to some ships and a lock-out
46PRO: LAB 10/904, Harrison's note of meeting involving himself, the
Attorney General, the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Solicitor
General, 6 July 1949.
47PRO: CAB 128/CM(49)44, 7 July 1949.
4 8lbid.
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in relation to others. ... The real point is, I think, that the men seem now
anxious to work all ships other than the two Canadian ones.'49
Shawcross repeated this judgement on 8 July, confirming in Cabinet
that the dispute represented a strike in the case of some ships, and a lock¬
out in the case of others: 'It is therefore, not possible in law to give
unqualified support to the view that the present stoppage is a strike.'5 0
That afternoon, in the House of Commons, Chuter Ede announced the
Government's intention to proclaim a State of Emergency under the 1920
regulations. In so doing he contradicted the views of the Director of Public
Prosecutions and the Attorney General, and ignored police evidence by
unashamedly misrepresenting the character of the dispute:
The only reason why we are having to deal with the trouble in this country
is that the Communists see in it the chance of fomenting unrest, injuring
our trade, and so hampering our recovery and with it the whole process of
Marshall Aid on which the recovery of Europe depends. The issue with
which we are faced is not one of a legitimate industrial dispute. We are
faced with a challenge to the authority of the state and it must be met.5 1
This greatly distorted the Government's own view of events. By the
admission of Shawcross, the dispute's central feature was not communist
intervention, the Marshall Plan or political subversion, but 'a lock-out by
the employers'; for those refusing to work, all that mattered was their
unwillingness to unload the two Canadian ships which were subject to an
industrial dispute. Once committed to the State of Emergency, however, the
Government's public position on the character of the dispute grew even
more uncompromising. On Wednesday 13 July, on the morning of the
Parliamentary debate on Emergency Powers, Attlee's Principal Private
Secretary, Osmond, told him that the Opposition intended to press the
Government to clarify whether the dispute was, in legal terms, a strike or a
lock-out. Osmond advised that it 'would be very damaging' if the
Government admitted that it was at least partly a lock-out, and suggested
two alternative courses of action: Ministers could either disregard
Shawcross's advice and emphasise that the stoppage was a strike, given that
under the Dock Labour Scheme the workforce was obliged to accept any
available work; or Eden could be approached before the debate, and
49PRO: LAB 10/904, Shawcross to Isaacs, 7 July 1949.
50PRO: CAB 129/CP(49)148, 8 July 1949.
51 Parliamentary Debates, Vol.466, 2596, 8 July.
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confidentially asked to defer his awkward question.52 It is possible that
Eden's co-operation was duly obtained, for he concentrated instead -
ironically, given the tension between Isaacs and Ede on this question - on
the Government's supposed failure to give the men sufficient information
on the dispute's Canadian origins, and communism's alleged exploitation of
the situation.5 2
Perhaps in response to Eden's likely co-operation in not pressing the
matter, but also in order to bolster its defence of the Dock Labour Scheme,
the Government provided a firmer public definition of the dispute that
evening. In a Ministerial broadcast, Isaacs firmly set Shawcross's views
aside and stiffly informed dockers that their stoppage was a strike, and
definitely not a lock-out. He said: 'Your so-called unofficial strike leaders
[the men were, in fact, led by the 'Central Lock-out Committee'] tried to
change the nature of this dispute. To call it a lock-out instead of a strike is
just playing with words. You know you walked off the job and said you
would return only on the condition that you would not work certain
ships.'54 As an experienced trade unionist, Isaacs ought to have known that
calling a dispute a lock-out rather than a strike was much more than
merely 'playing with words'; and whilst insisting that under the continuity
rule many dockers were on strike, he had not himself dissented from
Shawcross's position that the employers were attempting to force many
others on to ships that were subject to a trade dispute. The basic injustice
that dock workers perceived in this situation was spelt out to journalists by
Albert Timothy, the Lock-out Committee's chairman, on 11 July after an
unofficial mass meeting in Victoria Park had voted to continue the boycott
of the Canadian ships. Timothy's remarks were apparently also addressed to
Labour leaders without trade union experience, such as Ede and Shawcross,
who had failed to recognise - at least in public, and in Ede's case even in
private - the dispute's industrial dimensions:
They will never understand the things that are causing us to do what we
are doing to-day. They will never know the reason, because they will never
understand the position of a good trade unionist down where we live. We
will never go and scab on another man, or blackleg on another man. If the
Government want to take gloves off, if they want to come out and fight
52PRO: PREM 8/1081, Osmond to Attlee, 13 July 1949.
52Parliamentary Debates, Vol.467, 444-452, 13 July.
54PRO: LAB 10/904, text of Ministerial Broadcast, 13 July 1949.
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against anybody, then I say that the Emergency Powers Act should be used
against the employers and not against us.55
These remarks bore a pointed similarity to those offered by Isaacs himself,
during the Ministerial discussion of 10 June, when he had explained that
the reluctance of the Avonmouth men to work a disputed Canadian ship was
a 'fundamental Trade Union point'.56 Isaacs surely understood that London
dockers were equally determined to avoid the 'black' or 'scab' Canadian
vessels; he also knew, from police evidence and advice from his own
Ministry's legal department, that the strike was not a communist
conspiracy. Nevertheless, like the rest of his Government colleagues, he
continued to mislead the public by denying that employers had acted in an
inflammatory manner, and by erroneously insisting that the dispute was a
politically-motivated strike.
GENERAL POST-WAR PROBLEMS
Each of the three large unofficial strikes revealed a serious difference of
opinion between the TGWU and sections of its dock membership on a
specifically industrial issue: in 1945 it was pay and conditions; in 1948 the
alleged victimisation of eleven workers; and in 1949 the question of
intervening in a trade dispute between Canadian seamen and Canadian
employers. The Government and Trade Union leaders were particularly
frustrated by the 1948 and 1949 strikes: Labour's political and industrial
leaders were broadly bound by an unwillingness to concede that industrial
tension - a historical feature of the docks - had survived the introduction of
the 1947 Dock Labour Scheme. The first chapter of this thesis observed that
the Government enjoyed invaluable support from the Trade Union
movement in pursuit of economic recovery; and the second chapter
remarked that the Dock Labour Scheme - with its provision of a regular
workforce in a strategically vital industry - was seen by the Government as
instrumental to Britain's export-driven recovery, with the TGWU's
conception and administration of the Scheme cited as a particular example
of the Trade Union co-operation discussed in Chapter One. Reliant on the
Scheme and the TGWU, the Government duly sought to defend them both
55Manchester Guardian, 12 July 1949.
56pRO: CAB 130/46, Ministerial meeting on strike, 10 June 1949.
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from the attacks which it perceived unofficial dock strikes to represent.
During the three strikes discussed in chapters three, four and five, the
Government invariably sought a course of action that would allow the
Union to reassert its authority amongst its dock members.57 Moreover,
whilst troops were brought in to maintain short-term supplies of essential
food and raw materials, in breaking unofficial strikes they were also
deployed in the interests of longer-term stability in the docks. In
undermining the unofficial movement, troop operations were effectively -
and on at least one occasion, in 1949 at Avonmouth, explicitly - used to
defend the authority of the Scheme, and thereby the reputation of the
TGWU.58
Defending the Union and the Scheme involved attacking unofficial
strikes as politically-motivated. By exploiting a 'red plot' line during the
strikes, in 1948 and 1949 the Government successfully obscured problems
which certainly existed in the docks, most centrally the Union's inability to
overcome its traditional difficulty in commanding the support of its dock
members. The unofficial strikes duly illuminated weaknesses - within the
Scheme and the Union - which the Government was anxious to obscure
because of its economic priorities, and it was probably for these reasons
that Labour's political and industrial leaders adopted such a misleading
public position on the strikes. It is to these problems in the docks which the
discussion now turns.
WELFARE AMENITIES
Britain's straitened circumstances had stiffened the Labour Government's
determination to introduce the Dock Labour Scheme in 1947. However, the
perilous economic position also ensured that the Scheme was not
accompanied by much-needed improvements to the quality and range of
welfare conditions in the docks. The Government was worried by the likely
implications of this at the highest level. On 5 August 1948 George Isaacs
informed the National Dock Labour Board of Attlee's concern that
unsatisfactory welfare conditions had been a contributory factor in the
57PRO: CAB 128/CM(45)41, 15 October 1945; PRO: CAB 134/175 EC, 21 June
1948; PRO: PREM 8/1081, Ministerial meeting to discuss strike over Canadian
ships, 23 May 1949.
58PRO: CAB 134/176, EC, 30 May 1949.
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recent strike in London. For this reason, Isaacs invited the Board to
undertake an inquiry into the state of existing conditions in all ports, and
to offer relevant recommendations for their improvement.59 Material was
compiled by local dock boards during the winter of 1948-49, and the
National Board submitted its findings and recommendations to the Ministry
of Labour on 25 February 1949.60
The report observed that existing welfare provisions were greatly
stretched by the significant social changes which had recently taken place
in the docks. There had been an increased tendency, during and since the
war, for the workforce to live outwith the immediate vicinity of the docks,
which meant greater demand for catering and washing facilities. Evidently
far fewer men could eat their mid-day meal at home, which was in any case
a problem further complicated by rationing; and dockers from Glasgow, on
the Tyne and in Liverpool had commented on the problems associated with
travelling home in dirty clothes on public transport. The report added that
the process of social change, greatly accelerated by the Scheme, had
involved greatly improved living standards and expectations amongst dock
workers; and that this was reflected in more widespread demands for better
canteens, wash-places and toilets. Indeed, on the basis that every local
board had commented on the inadequacy of their sanitary arrangements,
the Board believed that the need for improved toilets was especially urgent.
Dock areas were exempt from the sanitary regulations of existing factory
and public health legislation, and hence the quality of provision was, to say
the least, mixed. The typical toilet appears to have been a pale latrine
which discharged directly into the dock, canal or river, was housed in an
iron or wooden shanty without protection from the elements, and afforded
no privacy to the user. 'It is not surprising', noted the report, 'that the men
avoid the lavatories wherever possible and have a real fear of infection.'
Where decent toilets had been provided, the Board recorded no evidence of
serious misuse or vandalism, and felt that the vast majority of dockers
would respond favourably if improved toilets, along with updated catering
and washing facilities, were instituted on a national basis.1
59PRO: BK 2/149, meeting between Isaacs and National Dock Labour Board, 5
August 1948; Isaacs to Lord Ammon, 6 August 1948.
6°PRO: BK 2/149, Thomas to Isaacs, 25 February 1949.
61 PRO: CAB 124/602, NDLB report, 'Docks Amenities', March 1949.
Having read the report, Isaacs told Morrison - who as Lord President
was to chair ministerial discussions on the subject - that it revealed 'a state
of affairs which demands urgent action'. 62 When the Lord President's
committee discussed the report on 1 April, Isaacs reminded colleagues that
it had been commissioned by Attlee, who was keen that the
recommendations on toilets, canteens and washrooms be implemented at
the earliest possible date. However, despite Attlee's support, the report was
rejected by the committee on the basis that it had neglected to identify the
body responsible for effecting improvements, which, moreover, had not
even been costed. Isaacs attempted to mollify the committee by pointing out
that all financial costs would probably be borne by port users, but this was
not strong enough an assurance for Cripps. He explicitly ruled out Treasury
involvement, either in planning or financing the improvements, and
Isaacs was left to establish an inter-departmental Working Party - without
Treasury representation - to cost the proposals and identify the body
responsible for implementing and financing them.63
The Committee's Working Party reported back on 28 October 1949.
The intervening period had witnessed the Canadian-related strikes and
more pertinently, as it turned out, a serious financial crisis and the
consequent devaluation of sterling on 18 September. The Working Party re-
emphasised that radically improved facilities were required in most dock
areas, and confirmed Isaacs's earlier suggestion that responsibility for
improving the dock amenities rested with port users. However, the
recommended measures would cost around £1,000,000 over three years, and
Isaacs argued that, given the 'present economic pressure', it would be
unfeasible to press for their immediate implementation. His conclusion,
that on economic grounds the measures would have to be shelved, was
supported by the Minister of Transport, Alfred Barnes, and the Financial
Secretary to the Treasury, Glenvill Hall. The Committee meekly concurred
with this assessment.6 4
This decision was further notice of the Government's preoccupation
with economic recovery. Yet the failure to press the port users or the
Treasury to finance the improvements rested uneasily with the
Government's often asserted view that economic recovery required an
62PRO: CAB 124/602, Isaacs to Morrison, 25 March 1949.
63PRO: CAB 132, LP(49)8, 1 April 1949.
64PRO: CAB 132, LP(49)18, 28 October 1949.
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efficient performance from the docks industry. Attlee and Isaacs had both
expressed concern that such a performance was being hampered by poor
dock amenities, with Isaacs describing remedial action as a matter of
urgency. As a proportion of public expenditure, which in 1949 exceeded
£2,000 million,65 the required sum of £1 million represented a modest
investment for a potentially high return. It was hardly surprising, then,
that the National Dock Labour Board was immensely frustrated when
informed of the Government's decision in January 1950. Arthur Bird, the
TGWU Docks Group leader, was particularly concerned, telling his NDLB
colleagues that the postponement would have 'serious repercussions
throughout the country'.66 Isaacs was informed by the Board that the
indefinite postponement of reform fitted uneasily with earlier Government
assertions about the urgency of improving welfare amenities, and asked to
review the situation.67 Isaacs agreed to meet the Board, but did so only in
order to rule out a review of the October decision, and to confirm that no
work involving 'substantial' capital outlay would be sanctioned.6 8
The debate about the supposed relationship between tense industrial
relations and poor amenities, did not end with the Government's refusal to
finance improvements to the latter in January 1950. Four months later,
after another unofficial dock strike in London, Isaacs appointed an official
Inquiry into unofficial stoppages in the Port. This later strike, the
establishment of the Inquiry and the consequent pressure which was
exerted upon the Government's relationship with the TGWU, are all
discussed in detail in the final chapter of this thesis. At this stage it is
enough to note that the Inquiry - which was chaired by Sir Frederick
Leggett, the former Chief Industrial Commissioner at the Ministry of
Labour - paid close attention to welfare amenities. On 28 July 1950 the Lord
President's Committee received an interim report from Leggett. This stated
that substandard provision of canteens, toilets, washing facilities and first-
aid materials had significantly contributed to industrial unrest.69 Leggett's
initial finding was confirmed in his final report, which appeared as a
Command Paper in May 1951. He noted that welfare standards throughout
65Alec Cairncross, Years of Recovery, p. 33.
66pRO: BK 2/255, NDLB, 10 January 1950.
67PRO: BK 2/150, Thomas to Isaacs, 13 January 1950.
68PRO: BK 2/150, Isaacs to Ammon, 30 January 1950.
69pRO: CAB 132, LP(50)14, 28 July 1950.
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the nation's docks were significantly lower than the rest of modern
industry. In London these facilities were particularly poor, and had
appreciably augmented 'the sourness of industrial relations in the port'.
Leggett also criticised the Government for failing to act on the NDLB
survey which it had commissioned. This had aroused the workforce's
interest in the issue, causing fresh impatience and antagonism when the
anticipated improvements had been abandoned.70
These findings on the relationship between amenities and strikes
induced the scorn of Transport Ministry officials. In the wake of Leggett's
interim report in July 1950, their position was summarised for Herbert
Morrison by his Principal Private Secretary, E.M. Nicholson. Mischievously
quoting Leggett's observation that the workforce admired the Scheme,
Nicholson demonstrated his complete agreement with the MoT officials:
[The Leggett Committee] has lost no time in pulling out the usual recipe for
pacifying the dockers by overwhelming them with canteen services,
sanitary conveniences, washing facilities and first-aid. There is no doubt
that by any ordinary standards the dockers are extremely badly provided
for in these ways. On the other hand no evidence is produced ... for the
implied argument that if enough lavatories are suddenly provided the men
will immediately regard the Dock Labour Board as a fairy godmother and
'increase their undoubted loyalty to the scheme' which they demonstrate
by going on strike in defiance of it every few weeks.7 1
Nicholson's doubts about the workforce's evaluation of the Scheme were
altogether misplaced, and very few dockers advocated a return to pre-war
casual conditions. Admittedly unofficial leaders had criticised the
introduction of the 1947 Scheme, arguing for a more wide-ranging reform
of the industry based on the nationalisation of ports, docks, harbours and
canals.72 Nevertheless, they strongly supported the improved job and
economic security which the Scheme had brought, with the London strike
committee of June 1948 recording, 'it is a good scheme and the majority of
Port Workers welcome it'.72
70 Unofficial Stoppages in the London Docks. Report of a Committee of
Inquiry, (Cmd. 8236, May 1951), p.30.
71 PRO: CAB 124/602, Nicholson to Morrison, 27 July 1950.
72MRC/MSS.15B/40, National Portworkers' Defence Committee, The Enquiry
and You! (May 1947).
73PRO: BK 2/72, London Port Workers' Strike Committee, Reflections on the
Strike, July 1948.
However, as the NDLB report on amenities had demonstrated, in
accepting the Scheme's financial benefits, the workforce's expectations
had been greatly enhanced. Where out-dated welfare provisions failed to
live up to these expectations, dissatisfaction was indeed likely. The
Government and the TGWU gave much publicity to the notion that the
Scheme had been a massive breakthrough: this notion of progress was not
necessarily shared by the dockers who had to travel home in wet and filthy
clothing and use some of the most insanitary toilets in British industry. In
fact, the Government continued to accept that the quality of amenities had
contributed to the unrest in the docks. In May 1951 the Lord President's
Committee endorsed a paper to this effect by the new Minister of Labour,
Alfred Robens,74 but there was still no commitment to financing the
improvements which were deemed necessary.
PROBLEMS WITH THE SCHEME?
The survival of squalid amenities should not, however, be seen as an
isolated difficulty, but rather in terms of the 1947 Scheme's general failure
to dispense with the industry's historical problems. The central feature of
this history had been casual employment, and - as chapter two indicated -
neither Bevin's war-time initiatives nor the 1947 Scheme itself had
eradicated this. The survival of the free call on a twice-daily basis, which
ensured that a substantial amount of labour was recruited casually, caused
the Leggett Inquiry to observe that the Scheme had instituted, 'little
change from the habits and practices of casual employment'.7 5 A
subsequent official inquiry into the Scheme's operation, appointed in 1955
by the Conservative Minister of Labour, Sir Walter Monckton, and chaired
by Mr. Justice Devlin, emphasised that the free call was contrary to the
spirit of the Scheme. It allowed employers - through their foremen - to
exercise favouritism; it also promoted an undignified and sometimes
physical competitive scramble amongst the workforce for the more
attractive and lucrative jobs. Devlin also drew attention to the problems
facing dockers who were not employed in the morning, and who were
obliged to attend the afternoon call five hours later: this required a long
wait or double travel expenses for what often turned out to be a fruitless
74PRO: CAB 132, LP(51)11, 11 May 1951.
75Cmd. 8236, p.12.
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return. The report noted that casual recruitment and the problems
associated with the two daily free calls had aroused considerable discontent
amongst the workforce.76 There is evidence to corroborate each of Devlin's
points on this matter. On the eve of the Scheme's introduction in May 1947,
the London unofficial movement had demanded that there be a single daily
call, held each morning.77 On the wider consequences of casual
recruitment, it should also be noted that work was paid largely by the piece,
and the rate generally reflected a cargo's market value rather than the
physical effort involved in shifting it. This naturally bred a great deal of
resentment. In London's Royal Docks there was always immense
competition to handle cargoes of imported meat. Although tough work, it
paid much better than many other cargoes of comparable difficulty, such
as cement. Of those who congregated at the call stands to work on the meat,
foremen saw a natural advantage in recruiting the younger and fitter men
- in one docker's words, 'all the ruckers' - who were duly regarded with
jealousy by older and less fit men.78 The word 'ruckers', it might be added,
conveys something of the physical struggle for the foreman's attention
which Devlin recognised as characterising the free call.
In addition to citing evidence that the free call was an important
source of underlying tension, the Leggett Inquiry reported that the twice-
daily calls significantly contributed to the manner in which strikes started.
In gathering men together, the calls gave men who had a grievance and
were spoiling for a strike a captive audience, and this occasionally allowed
'a few men to sway the rest'.79 During the Canadian dispute Bevin made this
very point to Chuter Ede, in successfully pressing for a temporary
suspension of the call stands in London's Royal Docks: 'It causes such a
congestion and works up mass psychology. It also enables our opponents to
carry out their tasks and keep the men out.'8®
The longevity of the casual tradition was a source of trouble in
another way, however. Chapter Two acknowledged the broad historical
76Port Transport Industry. Report of a Committee of Inquiry, (Cmd. 9813,
1956), p.29.
77MRC/MSS.15B/40, National Portworkers' Defence Committee, The Enquiry
and You! (May 1947).
78Fred Lindop, 'Unofficial Militancy in the Royal Group of Docks 1945-67',
Oral History, Volume 11 Number 2, Autumn 1983, p.27. This is another
reference which I owe to Bob Aspinall of the Museum of London Library.
79Cmd. 8236, p.7.
80PRO: FO 800/519, Bevin to Ede, 11 July 1949.
consensus that under the pre-1940 casual system, dockers enjoyed a
significant advantage which very few other groups of industrial workers
shared: they were free to decide whether or not to try for work on any
given day, and free to accept or reject any work which they were
offered.81 Under the Dock Labour Scheme, these freedoms no longer
existed. Workers had to attend each morning and afternoon, and had to
accept the work which they were offered. Although the bulk of the
workforce supported the Scheme, the loss of this historical privilege - and
Leggett observed that 'dockers have long memories'82 - was keenly felt. In
1986 a TUC review of the Scheme's history emphasised the significance of
these freedoms, and the workforce's perceived sense of injustice under the
post-1940 regime: 'That freedom ended with the wartime schemes, with
their demands that the men report regularly every day for work, or face
disciplinary action ... the 1947 Scheme made these features permanent,
with the disciplinary code being in some ways more severe than the codes
which ruled in other industries.'8 3
If not quite inevitable, it was surely always probable that great
tensions would arise as the workforce adapted from one of the slackest
disciplinary regimes in British industry to one of the toughest. Central to
the strike in the London docks in March 1945, according to Arthur Deakin's
sympathetic biographer, was the rigorous application of discipline under
the war-time decasualisation scheme. This had been operating, 'at the
margin of the men's tolerance'.84 The reaction of the unofficial movement
to the 'Zinc Oxide' affair, which led to the strike of June 1948, is surely also
to be understood in terms of this awkward transition. For their initial
refusal to load a cargo of zinc oxide, Coe's gang were suspended from the
Scheme without pay for seven days. In addition, the men's entitlement to
attendance money and guaranteed make-up was disallowed for three
months, although this was reduced on appeal to two weeks. A workforce
accustomed to casualism might well have agreed with the unofficial
movement's assertion that this was a 'harsh and vicious punishment'.8 ^
81Above, pp.48-9.
82Cmd. 8236, p.5.
83Denis Delay, Myths About the Origins and Effects of the National Dock
Labour Scheme, TUC paper, 1986.
84V.L. Allen, Trade Union Leadership, p. 186.
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The 1948 London strike committee emphasised its support for the Scheme,
but argued that suspending men from seeking work or enjoying
guaranteed maintenance was an unacceptable reversion to pre-war
conditions, a 'throwback to the days of Casual Labour plus Poor Law
Relief.86 Whilst the NDLB acknowledged the men's disquiet on this issue by
reducing to four weeks the maximum period of suspension from the
Scheme's benefits, the general antipathy with which the workforce
regarded the new disciplinary regime was not removed. More than
fourteen years after Bevin's war-time regulations had been introduced, the
1955 Devlin Inquiry found that the dockers' collective resistance to the
Scheme's disciplinary mechanisms remained a significant source of
tension. Devlin noted that, 'the docker who has been brought up to casual
work valued his power of taking a day off if he wanted to - and still more,
no doubt, the sense of feeling that he was free to take a day off if ever he
wanted it - and at the end of a long and strenuous job running over a
weekend he sometimes needed it.'87
It would thus appear that although the Scheme had effectively
banished the worst single feature of casual employment, namely the
financial insecurity which stemmed from unemployment and
underemployment, it had also stripped dockers of casualism's central and
undeniable benefit, namely control over work and leisure patterns.
Informal holidays, such as the London dock worker's annual hop-picking
excursion to Kent, were forfeited under the Scheme which, according to
Leggett, deprived dockers of, 'the pleasant side of a bad system'.88 In
addition, less savoury elements from the past, the wretched welfare
amenities and the lottery of the free call, had not been dispensed with.
Leggett and Devlin both argued that the resultant tension was
additionally aggravated by the actual manner in which the workforce had
attained its greater financial security. This had nothing to do with the
Scheme itself, but was essentially a result of generally favourable post-war
economic conditions, and full employment in particular. Both reports
suggested that these conditions had indirectly undermined the men's
confidence in the Scheme, for few dockers were actually reliant upon its
86PRO: BK 2/72, London Port Workers' Strike Committee, Reflections on the
Strike, July 1948.
87Cmd. 9813, p.17.
88Cmd. 8236, p. 7.
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benefits in terms of the guaranteed minimum income. The daily obligation
to report at the docks and accept any available work appeared all the more
onerous as a result.89 Having to endure the downside of both casual
recruitment and non-casual discipline, and essentially enjoying the
benefits of neither of the two employment methods, dockers thus laboured
under the worst of both worlds.
The unofficial strike of June 1948 directly confirmed that the
workforce was unhappy with the Scheme's disciplinary framework. It
attested also to a deeper problem, namely that the traditionally difficult
relationship between the TGWU and its dock members had been complicated
by the Union's role in the administration of the Scheme, and that the
Union's authority had been particularly damaged by the participation of
Union officials in the exercise of the Scheme's unpopular disciplinary
procedures.
PROBLEMS FOR THE TGWU?
According to the National Dock Labour Board's own statistics, in addition to
the large-scale unofficial strikes of 1948 and 1949, between July 1947 and
October 1951 there were forty-two stoppages which cost the industry at
least 1,000 working days. Significantly, the National Board records that
thirty-one of these strikes were prompted by industrial disputes. At issue
were piece-rates, holiday bonuses, compulsory overtime, the dismissals of
allegedly unfit men, working methods and gang sizes. Of the other eleven,
two resulted from the TGWU's expulsion of three dock members in 1950, and
nine were in protest against the trial of seven dockers at the Old Bailey in
195 1.90 (These latter episodes are both discussed in Chapter Seven). All
being unofficial, the thirty-one 'industrial' strikes defied the industry's
established machinery for the resolution of disputes. But Fred Lindop has
shown that this established machinery inadvertently promoted short
stoppages. The origins of the 1948 strike particularly illustrate Lindop's
argument that:
Following procedure before the institution of shop stewards in 1967 meant
getting a full-time trade union official down to the ship, which might well
take time. Most issues - over piece work or gang size or difficult conditions
89Cmd. 8236, p.8, Cmd. 9813, p.17.
90PRO: BK 2/71, Industrial Disputes, 1947-1951.
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of work - required immediate action: going with procedure - which meant
continuing to work - would necessarily weaken the men's argument, if
only by removing the evidence.9 1
Of course, in the case of Coe's gang on 28 May 1948, the relevant official
attempted to compensate for his distance from the ship by offering an
immediate evaluation of the situation by telephone. Without even viewing
the cargo of zinc oxide he sided with the employer rather than his
members on the question of the appropriate piece-rate. This simply
reinforces Lindop's general point, that the Union's physical distance from
its dock members made an unofficial strike the likely outcome of a small-
scale industrial dispute.
Whilst the unofficial movement sharply criticised Piatt's handling of
the zinc oxide dispute, it also drew hostile attention to the activities of the
Union officials on the London Board's disciplinary tribunal. In an attempt
to save their members from the sack, the outcome which employers on the
tribunal sought, the Union officials had apparently advocated the penalties
which were ultimately imposed. In the gang's own words: 'When the
London Board met, Mr. Parsons [the head of Hay's Wharf Group, acting as
Chairman] apparently asked for our dismissal, but Mr. Condon and other
Trade Union leaders on the Board (who after all are there to defend us) in
their graciousness suggested we should receive this harsh and vicious
punishment.2
The unpopular repercussions of this initiative were felt by Arthur
Deakin, when addressing an extremely restive crowd of dockers in
Southwark Park on 25 June. One heckler apparently shouted at him, 'You
come down to the docks and handle a cargo of zinc oxide. Do you good to get
out of your armchair!'9^ The Manchester Guardian's labour correspondent
suggested that this tension was to be understood in terms of the TGWU's
enhanced political status, which had distanced Union leaders from their
members. The correspondent made this significant judgement on the mood
of the Southwark Park meeting, during which Deakin had made a
characteristic assault on communism:
91Lindop, op. cit., p. 27.
92PRO: BK 2/72, Port Workers' Strike Committee, The Men's Own Case, June
1948.
9^Daily Worker, 26 June 1948.
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It was interesting that there was no outcry at this attack on Communism.
The crowd did not seem to resent it, which suggests that this was not a
Communist crowd. The hostility to Mr. Deakin seemed to derive from lack of
confidence rather than political hostility. 'He is just the agent of the
Government, that's all he is. That's all the Union is nowadays,' commented
one docker to another during the meeting. It was a revealing comment, and
it shows something of the problem that the trade unions have to face.9 4
In a subsequent bulletin from the docks the same correspondent developed
his idea that the strike illuminated a general problem which faced trade
unions in the new situation of a Labour Government and full employment:
'One of the most serious things about the strike is the strength of feeling
that the official leaders of big trade unions have joined a remote and
potentially hostile "they" and are no longer among "us".'95 John Lovell has
demonstrated that an important characteristic of the industry's history had
been the long-term failure of trade unions thoroughly to organise in the
docks, and the national and industrial Union of port and transport workers
which Bevin established in 1922 had been unable to overcome the weight
of this tradition.96 However, the Manchester Guardian correspondent was
surely correct to detect a recent deterioration in relations between the
TGWU and its dock members, and the strike certainly indicated that this
historical tension had been exacerbated by the Union's association with the
Scheme's unpopular disciplinary functions. Harry Fairlie, a correspondent
covering the 1949 strike for The Observer, drew a similar conclusion.
Having asked a striking docker about the TGWU and its insistence that
members work the disputed Canadian ships, Fairlie was told, 'I tell you,
mate, before the war Brother Deakin would have called these ships "black".
It's he that's changed, not us.' Fairlie suggested that indeed Deakin's
attitudes had changed. This was a result of the TGWU's new relationship
with the Government, and this close identification with the power of the
State had cost the Union dearly in terms of declining authority in the
docks.9^
Neither the Government - dominated by the Scheme's principal
architect, Ernest Bevin - nor the TGWU would admit that the Union was too
closely identified with the the State; nor would either of them admit that
94Manchester Guardian, 26 June 1948.
95Manchester Guardian, 28 June 1948.
96John Lovell, Stevedores and Dockers, pp. 214-218.
91 The Observer, 17 July 1949.
the participation of Union officials in the punishment of their own dock
members was a potential source of conflict. This was perhaps natural
enough, given Deakin's earlier description of the Union's role in the joint
administration of the Scheme as 'a great experiment' in 'workers'
control'. 98 On the other hand, the strikes were interpreted by port
employers and the Ministry of Transport as evidence to support their 1947
fears that joint administration of the Scheme would cause trouble in the
docks. In April 1947 the secretary of the National Association of Port
Employers, A.F. Macdonald, had warned the National Dock Labour
Corporation that the employers were in 'profound disagreement' with joint
control. Macdonald had especially anticipated difficulty arising from the
union officials' sharing responsibility for the exercise of discipline, such
managerial functions being, 'alien to their office and must on occasion be
irreconcilable with the natural demands of their constituents'." In 1947
Ministry of Transport officials, most notably the Assistant Secretary at the
Ministry's Docks and Canals Division, Aubrey Clark, had also expressed
concern that union officials - unlike employers' representatives - would be
unable to reconcile efficient administration of the Scheme with their
traditional responsibilities. He had demanded a greater degree of
independent representation to counter the inevitably sectional motivations
of the union men.1"
Despite their formal obligations under the Scheme, port employers
were never fully reconciled to its existence, and they duly used the 1948
and 1949 strikes to open a counter-attack on the system of joint
administration. On 29 June 1948, as the unofficial movement called off the
'Zinc Oxide' strike, the London employers formally established a special
sub-committee to consider possible modifications to the Scheme, were it to
come under review. Sir Douglas Ritchie, a member of the National Dock
Labour Board and therefore nominally committed to the status quo, was
appointed to chair this committee.101 A few days later R.H. Senior, the
chairman of the London employers, told colleagues on the National
Association that he 'considered the present practice of Trade Union
"Above, p.57.
"PRO: MT 81/16, Macdonald to Saunders, 12 April 1947.
100PRO: MT 63/408, Clark to Page, 15 July 1947.
101LML/LWA 73, Port Employers in London, 29 June 1948.
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representatives acting as advocates on appeal tribunals [ie serving a dual
function at disciplinary hearings] highly objectionable'.102
Although desisting from positive action in 1948, after the 1949 strike
the port employers strongly pressed the Government to order the various
unions to withdraw from the Scheme's administration. The need for a
formal approach to the Government was settled by a series of letters in
August 1949 between Macdonald and one of his most senior National
Association colleagues, the Liverpool shipowner J.R. Hobhouse. Hobhouse
was particularly ebullient about the opportunity created by the unofficial
movement's attacks on Deakin, suggesting that this 'may possibly create
conditions under which the Transport and General Union could admit they
were wrong in having gone onto the Board at all'.103 On 11 August
Hobhouse duly wrote to Alfred Barnes, the Minister of Transport,
emphasising that joint control of the Scheme had been 'a great mistake'.
The Unions, he continued, enjoyed ample scope for pursuing controversial
issues on the National and Local Joint Councils, but as an executive body the
Board had to be freed from these sometimes endless and often irresolvable
arguments. In illustrating this point, Hobhouse cited the straightforward
unions/employers division on the Board over the question of directing
labour to the Canadian ships, which had been in Britain for more than two
months before the Board finally ordered their clearance. According to
Hobhouse, the role of the union representatives in ensuring this delay had
caused immense damage to the industry and the country, allowing the
workforce to believe that their action in 'blacking' the Canadian ships was
justified. 'If the men are allowed to get away with this, they naturally think
they can get away with anything and discipline breaks down generally.
One need not be surprised,' he concluded, 'that a jointly constituted
Executive body like the NDLB finds it difficult to handle such a situation
with determination and consistency.'104
There was nothing coincidental in the fact that the Employers'
Association addressed its complaint to the Ministry of Transport rather
than the Ministry of Labour. As noted in Chapter Two, Lord Callaghan
believes that during this period shipowners enjoyed great influence at the
Ministry of Transport, where he served as Parliamentary Secretary from
102LML/LWA 57, National Association of Port Employers, 8 July 1948.
103LML/BPA 244, Hobhouse to Macdonald, 8 August 1949.
104LML/BPA 244, Hobhouse to Barnes, 11 August 1949.
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1948 to 1950.105 This explains the congruence of the positions adopted by
Ministry officials and the employers in 1947, and also provides a
significant insight into the objections to the Scheme which Barnes himself
expressed during the 1949 strikes. Hobhouse received a brief and non¬
committal response from Barnes: 'This is a difficult and complex matter to
which I have given much thought and I very much welcome your
views.' 106 Yet the Minister had indeed been considering the matter. In July
1949 he recommended changes to the Scheme's administration in a paper
submitted for the consideration of Cabinet. Arguing that joint
administration of the Scheme was 'a serious weakness', he advocated - as his
departmental officials had done in 1947 - increased independent
representations on the National and local Boards. He contended that
through becoming too closely identified with the National Dock Labour
Board, the Ministry of Labour had compromised its functions as an
objective conciliator, and recommended that the Ministry of Transport
assume departmental responsibility for the Dock Labour Scheme.107
Cabinet was unimpressed by these proposals, with Bevin informing the
meeting of the likely outcome if it became known that the Scheme was
under review: 'Grave disquiet was bound to be aroused among dock workers
throughout the country, and encouragement would be given to all those
unsettling elements which wished to bring an end to the Scheme and the
benefits which it had conferred upon the Dock Workers generally.'108
In July 1949, the junior Minister Callaghan also attempted to
encourage a reappraissal of the Scheme, focusing on the TGWU's position in
its administration and operation. If Barnes's views on the need for greater
independent representation on the NDLB apparently coincided with those
which Aubrey Clark had voiced in 1947, and seem to have been indirectly
influenced by the employers long before his correspondence with
Hobhouse, Callaghan's position was arrived at independently. Grounded on
advice neither from Barnes nor departmental officials, it was, in his own
words, derived: 'from my own experience in Cardiff [his constituency] and
my observations from visiting all the major Ports in Britain'.109 Based on
105Above, p.67.
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recent first hand experience, Callaghan's identification of a relationship
between unofficial strike action and the TGWU's share in the unpopular
disciplinary functions of management, was particularly significant.
Callaghan spelt out his observations on 15 July in a letter to the Prime
Minister himself:
We all agree that a prior condition of industrial peace in the Docks is to
restore the moral leadership of the Unions. In my view they cannot regain
leadership as long as the local Union leaders have a half share in the
disciplinary machinery of the Ports. As you know, they have equal
representation with the Employers on local Port Committees, and so sit in
judgement of their own members. They are both Judge and Advocate, and I
have seen the consequences both in my own Constituency and in a number
of the 24 major ports I have toured since I have been at this Ministry.
The system has had the result that the Dockers no longer regard the
Unions as springing from them and belonging to them. The 'Union' has
become no more than an organisation that a man must join if he is to hold a
'Card' and get a job. Because of its share in the disciplinary machine the
'Union' is not visibly on his side, and in some places the men stand in awe
of the local Union official who wields so much power over them and can
stop them from getting a job. But such a situation does not yield moral
leadership. What is needed is to amend the disciplinary system so that the
Union returns to its traditional role of acting as advocate, and ceases to be
judge, leaving discipline to be imposed by a body independent of employers
and men.1 1 0
Even from a relatively junior member of the Government, this was a strong
reminder that the Scheme had greatly complicated the TGWU's relationship
with its dock members; it was also an important private refutation of the
administration's simplistic public position on the strikes. Attlee passed the
letter on to Ernest Bevin, who sent a rather confused reply to Callaghan on
19 July. Possibly Bevin had not read Callaghan's letter properly, for he
concerned himself largely with demonstrating that in South Wales a local
decasualisation scheme - established as early as 1918 - which involved joint
administrative control of discipline, had worked very effectively. He did
not acknowledge that Callaghan's intention was to question the validity of
the disciplinary mechanisms on a national scale.1 1 1 With admirable
boldness, Callaghan wrote to Bevin, emphasising that his argument was not
based on the situation in South Wales alone, and nor was it based on
opposition to the Scheme: 'the best thing the Dockers have ever had'. He
added, however, that despite the Union's huge achievement in winning the
110PRO: FO 800/519, Callaghan to Attlee, 15 July 1949.
inPRO: FO 800/519, Bevin to Callaghan, 19 July 1949.
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Scheme, its influence in the docks had genuinely declined, and concluded
by restating the case for independent disciplinary.control: 'The Union is
such a vital element in our industrial life that I want to see it regain its
influence in the Docks, and I believe that changes in the disciplinary
machinery would help it to do so. I would like to see discipline effected by a
neutral body of which the Port Authority could be the nucleus.'112
Bevin's various certainties - with regard to the value of the TGWU,
the Scheme and the wisdom of his personal judgements1 13 - were not
shaken by Callaghan's approach; and he might well have pointed out, as
Victor Allen has done, that the port authorities which Callaghan wished to
have invested with disciplinary powers were seldom 'neutral bodies', but
reflected almost exclusively the interests of the port employers.114 Also of
significance, given Callaghan's insistence that his position had been
arrived at independently, it should be remembered that in 1946 the
Employers' Association had also called for port authorities to assume
administrative control of discipline.115 Callaghan still maintains 'that
disciplinary features of the Scheme were not working well'. In a graceful
concession to his former colleague, he also indicates the prime reason for
the Government's failure to recognise these defects: 'Ernest Bevin, as a
senior heavyweight figure in the Government, obviously carried many
more guns than I did and I know from conversation with him at the time
and later that he regarded the introduction of the Dock Labour Scheme as
one of his great achievements. And almost certainly felt that his
experience and judgement was both longer and better than mine. He may
well have been right.'1 16 Nevertheless, on Bevin's behalf, Attlee told
Callaghan that he had raised a complex issue which the Government would
be keeping an eye on.117
THE UNOFFICIAL MOVEMENT: COMMUNISTS AND FIGHTERS
Bevin's refusal to countenance even minor changes to the Scheme stemmed
from his respect, as a responsible trade union leader, for agreements
112PRO: FO 800/519, Callaghan to Bevin, 20 July 1949.
113Hennessy and Jeffery, op.cit., pp. 192-3.
114Allen, op.cit., p. 180.
115PRO: MT 81/16, Macdonald to Donovan, 8 July 1946.
116Lord Callaghan to Jim Phillips, 3 September 1992.
117PRO: FO 800/519, Attlee to Callaghan, 21 July 1949.
197
which had resulted from collective bargaining. He generally took a dim
view of people who refused to observe agreements, such as the Dock Labour
Scheme, which had been arrived at in this manner. When he spoke, in
opposing Barnes's call for a review of the Scheme, of 'unsettling elements'
on 18 July 1949, he referred not only to the port employers who sought a
restoration of their former administrative powers, but to the unofficial
movement and the strikes which clearly contravened the workforce's
obligations under the Scheme. The unofficial movement was consistently
charged with - to use the favoured contemporary expression - 'fomenting'
strikes in order to wreck the Dock Labour Scheme. This serious enough
allegation was supplemented by accusations of political motivation, with
communist dockers supposedly duping non-communist comrades into
support for action that would damage the progress of Britain's economic
recovery.
It has already been noted that the first charge, that the unofficial
movement wanted to destroy the Dock Labour Scheme, was largely
groundless. Whilst critical of the new discipline, the unofficial movement -
in common with the vast majority of the workforce - welcomed the
Scheme's benefits as a huge advance on pre-war casual conditions.118 The
premise that a relationship existed between unofficial action and political
motivation, is more difficult to assess, but in most ports communist
influence in the unofficial movement was negligible. On the Mersey, the
second largest docks system in Britain, the vast majority of dockers were
hostile to communism. Presumably this partially reflected the Roman
Catholic Church's influence in Liverpool; but one account suggests that it
also resulted from the unofficial movement's suspicion that the Communist
Party generally subordinated 'dock issues and unofficial movements to
political objectives and winning influence in the TGWU'.1 19 Only in
London were a significant number of communist activists prominent in the
unofficial movement. Yet even in London the Party's influence was limited.
The prominence of communists such as Ted Dickens, Harry Constable and
Albert Timothy, was usually portrayed - by Government Ministers, Trade
Union leaders and newspaper editors - as evidence that the London
unofficial committees were motivated by straightforward ideological
devotion to Cominform. Actually, this was far from the truth. Although
118Lindop, op. cit., p. 22.
119Ibid., p.30.
reflecting with unwarranted sentimentality on 'The Lost World of British
Communism', Raphael Samuel has provided the perceptive insight that for
its adherents in the immediate post-war, pre-1956 period, communism was
'a moral vocation as well as a political practice'. Being a communist meant
working on behalf of others, and this moral commitment was central to a
communist's involvement in unofficial trade union activity.120 For
communist dockers, this meant assuming unofficial leadership in order to
defend the interests of their work-mates, and the Communist Party usually
found that members in the docks were not prepared to subordinate these
interests to Party discipline. It is worth remembering, for instance, that
communists were active in the 1945 strike despite the Party's opposition,
and Party influence in the docks was further minimised by the workforce's
parochial outlook. Ironically, perhaps, the occupational and local loyalties
which made dockers such a difficult workforce for the TGWU to organise,
also impeded the Communist Party, and its industrial organisers also
complained that communist dockers shared these loyalties.121 According to
a contemporary Trotskyist activist, in 1952 Harry Constable and Albert
Timothy both left the Communist Party, such was their disillusion with its
insistence that Party interests should always take precedence over dock
affairs.122 The unofficial movement was not interested, it would appear, in
generalising the class struggle, but in furthering industrial issues which
specifically affected dock workers.
A number of contemporary observers also argued that the unofficial
movement had, in any event, emerged from industrial rather than political
circumstances. Reporting from the London docks during the 1948 strike,
the Manchester Guardian labour correspondent lamented:
There is nostalgia for the fighting days of Ernest Bevin and Ben Tillett. At
one meeting I heard a docker say of the official trade union speaker, 'Ernie
smoked Woodbines. I bet he smokes Players.' The social gap between
Woodbines and Players has narrowed, but it is still a psychological chasm.
Losing faith in the official leaders, the dockers are still anxious to find men
to lead them. There is a vacuum of leadership [which] is being filled
temporarily by the strike committee ... .123
120Raphael Samuel, 'The Lost World of British Communism', New Left
Review, No. 154, November-December 1985, p.46.
121Lindop, op. cit., p.30.
122Notes of conversation with Cyril Smith, 5 August 1992. (These notes are
also included as an appendix).
123Manchester Guardian, 28 June 1948.
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The premise that the unofficial movement was an industrial rather than a
political force, performing traditional trade union duties which sections of
the workforce perceived TGWU officials to have abandoned, was repeated in
a report produced by the Field Survey Group of the British Institute of
Management. This research, conducted largely in the London docks after
the 1948 strike, noted that paid trade union officials were not subject to the
same pressures as dock workers, which sometimes caused them to reach
agreements with employers that their members found much harder to
accept. The tension which this created was greatly exacerbated by the
involvement of these officials in the management of the Scheme, which
reinforced the workforce's sense of estrangement: 'many workers have lost
confidence in their leaders and workers' leaders have emerged who
perform the traditional function of fighting the employer, and if need be
the trade union officials and the government as well.'124 Not surprisingly,
the report was condemned by the industry's National Joint Council, which
jealously regarded it as unwarranted outside intervention,125 but Morrison
and Attlee disagreed, feeling that it merited 'serious attention'.126 As such,
the BIM report quite possibly influenced the Government's decision -
discussed in the following chapter - to appoint the Leggett Committee of
Inquiry in May 1950.
The Leggett report confirmed that the Union had damaged its
standing in the docks by administering discipline,127 and the 1955 Devlin
Inquiry re-emphasised that it was this loss of standing which had
instigated the unofficial movement's emergence. According to Devlin, the
movement's political character was of secondary significance. Very few
dockers were communists and indeed most had little time for communism;
but they did not 'regard a vigorous leader as disqualified from expressing
their grievances because he is a communist'. Devlin disputed the perceived
wisdom that every docker who regularly assumed unofficial leadership in
the docks - the 'persistent agitator' - was either a communist or an
124PRO: CAB 21/2653, Field Survey Group of the British Institute of
Management, 'Research in the London Docks', Interim Report 31 December
1948.
125PRO: BK 2/283, National Joint Council for the Port Transport Industry, 12
May 1950.
126PRO: PREM 8/1534, Attlee to Morrison, 3 May 1950.
127Cmd. 8236, p.13.
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especially subversive or dangerous figure. Rather he was perhaps merely
quick to spot a grievance and articulate it for others as well as himself: 'In
short, he is the stuff out of which in the past many trade union leaders
were made and he may be no more than what is called a militant trade
unionist.'1 2 8
These various observations about the difficult and complex
underlying situation in the docks reinforce the argument that essentially
industrial issues were behind the three large unofficial strikes. These
strikes were clearly not politically motivated. The unofficial movement was
not consciously attempting to hamper British economic recovery; nor was
it seeking to strengthen Stalin's icy grip on the world by destabilising
Europe through the disruption of Marshall Aid. To fuse Devlin's
characterisation of the 'persistent agitator' with Lewis Minkin's analysis of
labour movement culture, the unofficial strikes represented a specific
defence of traditional 'trade union values'. Vast sums of loyalty and
solidarity were evinced, not only throughout the remarkable and huge
nationwide strike of 1945, but also in London and elsewhere during the
1948 and 1949 strikes. In 1948 large numbers of men indicated their
determination to stand by the eleven suspended workers. In the more
drawn-out affair of 1949, the motives of the workers involved in the
stoppages were varied: some men probably wished to demonstrate positive
solidarity with the Canadian seamen; others perhaps simply took the
chance of an informal 'holiday' which they no longer enjoyed under the
Dock Labour Scheme. In all ports, however, the over-riding issue was the
unofficial defence of a near-sacred dockland principle, the right to avoid
black-legging in a dispute between another group of workers, the
Canadian seamen, and their employers.129
Arthur Deakin and his TGWU colleagues had an entirely different
understanding of these values: 'loyalty' was a quality which dockers owed
to official union representatives; and 'solidarity' a quality to be
demonstrated with the Labour Government by refraining from the kind of
irresponsible action which unofficial strikes represented. Deakin certainly
had no sympathy with the notion that unofficial leaders were simply
articulating grievances which they shared with their fellows in the docks.
Following the 1949 strike, Deakin had told the Union's Docks Group that
128Cmd. 9813, pp.16-19.
129Cmd. 8236, p.7.
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these men, 'had sought to bring this Union into discredit, they had sought
to dishonour and disrupt'. He had also spoken of his determination that
these activists would 'face the music' and be expelled from the Scheme.13°
In seeking to fulfil this promise by turning the weight of his Union on
these men, Deakin inadvertently brought to the surface the underlying
problems in the docks which he - along with the Government - had
hitherto attempted to obscure by disingenuously ascribing the recurrence
of strike action to political subversion. This provoked the tension between
the Government and the TGWU which is the subject of the final chapter of
this thesis.
130DNTGC, 21 July 1949.
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THE ALLIANCE UNDER STRAIN: THE 1950-51 LABOUR
GOVERNMENT AND THE DOCKS
THE 1950 GOVERNMENT
The Labour Government elected in February 1950 carried nothing like the
confidence or vitality of its 1945 predecessor. The contrast to the glad hopes
of July 1945 was partly due to the party's reduced Parliamentary
circumstances. The General Election gave Labour 315 seats, the
Conservatives and their associates 298: of the other twelve opposition MPs,
nine were Liberals.1 When the new Cabinet met for the first time on 25
February, Attlee told colleagues that with a Government majority of only
five, there would be 'no question of attempting to carry through any of the
major controversial legislation which had been promised in the Party's
Election manifesto'.2 This set the precedent for the one other significant
difference from 1945. Whilst dogged by a range of international and
economic problems, the 1945 Government had maintained labour
movement morale with the range of legislative measures which had
established 'the welfare state' and taken several industries, utilities and the
Bank of England into public ownership. The 1950-51 Government, in
contrast, was not able to offset international and economic difficulties -
which, if anything grew more acute in these two years - in the same
manner. Even more than in the post-1947 years of Crippsian austerity and
Morrisonian consolidation, it seemed that the Government's task was simply
to defend the gains of 1945. Indeed, having rejected the prospect of
bringing 'controversial legislation' forward, by November 1950 the
Government was having difficulty in finding sufficient legislative
business to consume the available Parliamentary time.3
The 1950 Government's main difficulties, economic pressure and
international tension, were intimately connected. Against the background
of escalating international tension, in the spring of 1951 the new
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Hugh Gaitskell, prepared a budget that
Kenneth O. Morgan, Labour in Power 1945-1951, p.405.
2PRO: CAB 128/CM(50)5, 25 February 1950.
3Morgan, op.cit., p.462.
allowed for a huge increase - £4,700 million for the three years 1951-54 - in
defence spending. The budget also brought to a head a long-running
internal Government debate about the funding of the National Health
Service. Gaitskell resolved this debate by introducing charges for dental
and optical treatment, and prescriptions. These charges amounted to an
annual saving of some £13 million, which was a sizable fraction of the
NHS's overall budget of approximately £400 million. They were also the
occasion of a Government split which was to have damaging long-term
implications for the Labour Party. As Minister of Health, Aneurin Bevan
had accepted the principle of prescription charges in October 1949, but he
had vigorously resisted pressure to introduce them - along with other
charges - in practice for more than two years. On 22 April 1951, following
the Third Reading of the Bill which enshrined the introduction of these
charges, Bevan resigned from the Government.4
Thus were the divisive internal party battle lines of the 1950s drawn.
The 1951 Budget was also to jeopardise economic recovery, diminish the
Government's popularity, and so bring nearer the days of Opposition in
which these internal party divisions were manifested. Attention was drawn
to the serious economic damage which the programme would cause by the
other Cabinet Minister to resign, Harold Wilson. In his personal statement
to the House of Commons, Wilson remarked that Gaitskell's rearmament
programme was physically incompatible with the available raw material
resources. The consequence of this was that, 'the basis of our economy is
disrupted and the standard of living, including the social services of our
people, is endangered.This pessimism proved to be amply justified, for in
the course of 1951 a massive set-back to the country's economic recovery
was indeed revealed. From its healthy surplus of £300 million at the close of
1950, by the end of 1951 the balance of payments was once again running a
huge deficit, the total negative balance exceeding £400 million. Admittedly
this was the consequence of several other factors, such as a sudden
increase in import prices and increased dollar purchases by other sterling
area countries.6 Yet for Alec Cairncross, the fundamental cause of the
balance of payments crisis was the stress placed on the British economy by
4Charles Webster, The Health Services Since The War. Volume I, pp. 133-77.
5Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 487, 228, 24 April 1951.
6Morgan, op.cit., p.477.
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the rearmament programme which the Government adopted to fall in with
American wishes.7
In its economic and international policies, the 1950 Government
continued to enjoy the Trade Union support which had kept the previous
Labour Government on course after the 1947 financial crisis. However, in
September 1950, with the immediate trade deficit problem apparently
resolved, the TUC loosened formal economic support for the Government by
dropping its commitment to the wage freeze. This deprived the Government
of important support when it embarked upon the rearmament programme
in 1951. Between 1945 and 1950 the Government had found no greater Trade
Union supporter than Arthur Deakin and the Transport and General
Workers' Union. Deakin avidly maintained his loyalty to the Government
after 1950, remaining a committed advocate of the wage freeze until the last
in September 1950. This loyalty he apparently offered as his side of the
great labour alliance bargain which had under-pinned the movement's
work since 1945, but it was, in fact, given despite a considerable amount of
private strain between Ministers and the TGWU. This tension was caused by
the Government's growing reluctance to allow the TGWU sole responsibility
for maintaining the workplace discipline of its dock members. In
disturbing the labour alliance's informal 'rules' of behaviour, the
Government inadvertently provoked tension with one of its most important
supporters.
THE EXPULSIONS STRIKE, APRIL 1950
In July 1949, in the immediate aftermath of the unofficial strike in London,
Arthur Deakin had informed Union colleagues that he was determined to
take action against the 'certain people' who were prominent in the
unofficial movement.8 This stated ambition clearly had some bearing on a
resolution which was jointly put by the Union's London Area and London
Docks Group Committees to the TGWU General Executive Council on 15
December 1949. This called for an Inquiry into the involvement of eight
7Alec Cairncross, Years of Recovery. British Economic Policy 1945-51, p.233.
8DNTGC, 21 July 1949.
dock members in the 1949 strike. The resolution was carried,9 and the
Inquiry took place at Transport House on 27 January 1950.
Like the official TGWU investigation into the 1948 strike which had
taken place in February 1949, the Inquiry was held under the auspices of a
special five-man committee, chaired by Union President Fryer and
including Arthur Deakin as an ex-officio member. The hearing was
attended by members of the Union's London Area and London Area Docks
Group Committees, and the eight London dockers whose activities on the
unofficial movement had aroused the Union's wrath: Blomberg, Constable,
Cronin, Dash, Dickens, Kirby, Marney and Saunders. The London Union
officials' case against the eight consisted essentially of two points. Firstly,
the 1949 strikes had breached the TGWU's agreements with employers, and
the obligations of the Union and its members under the Dock Labour
Scheme. Secondly, membership of the unofficial committee - which
continued in existence after July 1949 as the Port Workers' Defence
Committee - was incompatible with membership of the Union. In pursuit of
the latter point, the example of an unofficially convened meeting at
Canning Town Hall on 7 August 1949 was offered, 'at which the Union and
certain of its officers had been vilified and the policy of the Union held up
to ridicule'. The officials were especially critical of Dickens, Constable and
Saunders, whose involvement in the strike evidently contradicted an
assurance which they had given to the February 1949 investigation, that in
future they would not associate themselves with unofficial activity. In
their defence, the three argued that this assurance had been falsely given
on their behalf by a spokesman at the previous hearing who had not
represented their views properly. In answering the charges, Dickens also
restated the unofficial movement's position that the Canadian-related
stoppage had not been a strike, but a lock-out on the part of the employers,
with the lock-out committee being formed to maintain organisation in lieu
of official recognition. In giving further evidence of their defiance, four
of the 'accused' illuminated the essentially industrial character of the
unofficial movement which was discussed in the previous chapter.
Constable, Marney and Dash, along with Dickens, 'openly stated that their
actions in relation to any particular issue arising in dockland must be
governed by the circumstances therewith'. As practical men concerned
9MRC/MSS. 126/T&G/1/1/27, TGWU General Executive Council, 15 December
1949.
with defending what they perceived to be the interests of their fellow
dockers, they consequently refused to offer any assurances as to their
future conduct and observation of the Union's rules and constitution. In
the words of Dickens, apparently the unofficial leader of the unofficial
leaders, 'he would continue to support the Port Workers Defence Committee
while it was doing its best, in his opinion, to further the fundamental
principles of trade unionism'. Only Cronin dissociated himself from the
movement and its activities.10
The Committee of Inquiry reported on 7 March, and reminded the
General Executive of the February 1949 Investigation's warning that
'serious notice' would be taken of members who maintained their
involvement in unofficial activity. Given the previous appearance of
Dickens, Constable and Saunders at an Executive Inquiry, and their
persistent 'complete disregard for the obligations resting upon them as
Members', it was recommended that all three be immediately expelled from
the TGWU. The Committee was also highly critical of Dash and Marney, but
as their actions had not previously been the subject of an official inquiry,
they - along with Blomberg and Kirby - were only to be debarred from
holding Union office. The Committee advocated that Cronin, who had
apologised for his unofficial activities, simply be given a warning as to his
future conduct. One further recommendation was added, namely that the
Executive declare the Port Workers' Defence Committee to be, 'a subversive
body created and fostered with the object of sabotaging the constitutional
procedure and policy of the Union'.1 1
The General Executive accepted these recommendations on 7
March.12 The personal implications for the disciplined men were, and
indeed remained, unclear. Noting that he and his six comrades were all
communists, Jack Dash believed the Inquiry to have been part of the
Union's general anti-communist campaign. As this had already involved
the 1949 ban on communists from lay and delegate office, all seven were in
any case ineligible for office. Thus, the punishments exacted on himself,
Blomberg, Marney and Kirby, were of symbolic rather than practical
10MRC/MSS. 126/T&G/1/1/28, TGWU General Executive Council, 6-10 March
1950, Appendix III, 'Unofficial London Docks Strike (1949). Report of the
Special Committee etc.'
11 Ibid.
12MRC/MSS.l 26/T&G/1/1/28, TGWU General Executive Council, 7 March
1950.
importance.13 For the three expelled men, however, there did appear to be
practical problems. At unofficial meetings held in the ensuing period, the
fear was frequently expressed that without a Union card, Dickens,
Constable and Saunders would be unable to find work in the docks.14 These
three, along with Blomberg, therefore appealed against the Executive's
decision, and set about developing support for their position in the docks.
That they could count on considerable support, in the form of
unofficial industrial action, had already been evinced by an unofficially
organised ban on overtime held to coincide with the TGWU Inquiry on 26
and 27 January. Of 4,331 men required to put in overtime on 26 January,
2,872 refused to do so. In the Royal Docks, where the seven men worked,
more than 2,000 men supported the ban, against 519 who did not.15
With the appeals of the four due to be heard on 14 April, the tense
enough situation in the London docks was suddenly complicated by an
unexpected dispute between the port's other trade union, the 7,000 member
National Amalgamated Stevedores and Dockers' Union, and a large ship-
owning firm, the Shaw Savill and Albion Company. In general terms,
despite having failed to secure a review of the Scheme in August 1949, port
employers still remained committed to an overhaul of the Scheme and other
changes in working practices. At the Annual General Meeting of the
National Association of Port Employers on 31 March, the Executive's yearly
report was presented by the Liverpool shipowner, J.R. Hobhouse. The
preceding year had, he said, 'shown few notable achievements', with the
industry's central problem being the workforce's lack of discipline. Only
greater discipline would ensure a quicker turn-around of shipping, but for
this end employers would have to fight: 'They should not hesitate to insist
upon an important matter of principle, even if it led to a stoppage, because
every stoppage where the employer could be proved right meant less
stoppages in future.'16 In seeking a restoration of discipline, Hobhouse was
particularly concerned that the Unions should withdraw from the NDLB. In
extracting greater efficiency from the workforce, one of his London
colleagues, Sir Basil Sanderson, had a more practical solution.
l3Daniel Ballard and David E. Martin, 'Jack Dash', Dictionary of Labour
Biography, Volume IX (1993), p.60.
1477ie Times, 27 April 1950.
15PRO: LAB 10/940, London RIRO to Headquarters, 26 January 1950.
16LML/LWA 57, National Association of Port Employers, 5th Annual General
Meeting, 31 March 1950.
On Wednesday 12 April Sanderson announced that his company,
Shaw Savill and Albion, intended from Monday 17 April to engage an
unspecified number of dock workers on weekly rather than daily terms,
and that these workers would be recruited inside rather than outside the
dock gates. For a number of reasons this proposal was highly controversial.
Shaw Savill's existing recruitment policy reflected traditional occupational
divisions, with members of the Stevedores' Union employed to load and pack
cargoes, and TGWU men employed for unloading. Elsewhere in the port,
many TGWU men were already weekly employees, and some TGWU members
indicated that they were willing to accept weekly terms from Shaw Savill.
But the Stevedores' Union, which had never accepted weekly terms,
regarded the plan as an unacceptable alteration of established working
customs. Since the end of the nineteenth century, stevedores had claimed
the right to undertake the most skilled aspects of dock work, the loading
and packing of cargoes on board ships. An additional claim, the right to be
engaged outside the dock gates and not on employers' premises, also dated
from this period, and stevedores had resisted previous attempts to revoke it,
most recently in March 1945. Stevedores apparently believed that the loss
of these 'rights' would substantially dilute their Union's independent status.
Accepting a greater regularity of employment, as the TGWU had done,
would be tantamount to accepting 'dockers' terms', and would invite a
strengthening of the TGWU's position at the Stevedores' expense. 17 These
difficulties were aggravated by the particular position of Sanderson's
company. According to the Manchester Guardian's labour correspondent,
the Stevedores' Union had 'provided workers for Shaw Savill and Albion for
generations'. 18 The NASDU suspected that if Shaw Savill, which was one of
the largest employers in the Royal Docks, was prepared to review practices
which had prevailed for so long, then other employers would certainly
attempt to revise their employment arrangements. Ministry of Labour
officials who were monitoring the situation duly concluded that a dispute
between Shaw Savill and the Stevedores' Union was inevitable, and that it
would be entirely of Sir Basil's making.19
On 11 April Arthur Bird, the TGWU Docks Group Secretary, told the
Ministry of Labour's London officer, A.S. Andrews, that the appeals had 'no
Manchester Guardian, 14 April 1950.
18Ibid.
19PRO: LAB 10/955, A.S. Andrews to J.A. Diack, 11 April 1950.
chance of success', and added his fear that with the Shaw Savill problem
blowing up at the same time, an unofficial stoppage in the docks was
likely.20 Each of Bird's forecasts proved to be correct. On Friday 14 April
the Shaw Savill scheme was rejected by the Stevedores' Executive, which
hinted that an official strike would take place if the company followed out
its threat to operate the plan on the Monday. In the event, the company
postponed the scheme's introduction, submitting it for further discussions
with the Union, which were to be chaired by the Ministry of Labour.2 1
However, instead of going on official strike, during the following week
many stevedores did find themselves taking unofficial action in support of
the expelled TGWU men. On the same day that the Stevedores rejected the
Shaw Savill scheme, 14 April, the TGWU's Rank and File Appeals Committee
was convened to hear the dockers' cases. There were no dockers on this
Committee, which consisted of six rank and file members who had been
elected by the Union's Biennial Delegate Conference. On the first day of the
hearing, the appellants presented a petition which had been signed by
several thousand dockers, calling for their punishments to be revoked.2 2
The petition and the appeal which it supported were both in vain, however,
and on the following Tuesday, 18 April, the Executive Council's original
verdicts were upheld.23 The next day, 19 April, saw the start of an
unofficial strike after an early morning mass meeting of around 3,000 dock
workers at Connaught Fields in East London's Canning Town. According to
the Union's London Docks Group officer, Condon, the meeting's resolution
in support of strike action, strongly condemned the TGWU Executive.24
However, as Bird had anticipated, the unofficial movement - which
comprised members of both unions - used the Shaw Savill problem to
maximise trouble arising from the TGWU disciplinary tribunal. The
meeting on 19 April was addressed by the Stevedores' member and
chairman of the 1949 Lock-out Committee, Albert Timothy, and also by Ted
Dickens. Two days later, on 21 April at an unofficial meeting in Victoria
Park, Dickens explicitly linked the Stevedores' dispute with Shaw Savill to
his own expulsion from the TGWU. He argued: 'the attack on the stevedores
20Ibid.
21 The Times, 18-21 April 1950.
22The Times, 15 April 1950.
23DNTGC, 20 April 1950.
24PRO: LAB 10/955, Stillwell to Whitlock, 19 April 1950.
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and the attack by Deakin on his members are one and the same thing. Both
are aimed at worsening port workers' conditions.' The meeting passed a
resolution demanding a ballot of 'all port workers' on the question of
whether the expulsions should be ratified or overturned.2 ^
In the face of this renewed unofficial pressure, Deakin was
characteristically defiant. Drawing attention to his personal determination
to see through the campaign against the unofficial movement, he told the
Union's Docks Group Committee that there was no question of the
expulsions being reversed: 'He had had to suffer a good deal of abuse but his
work over a very long period for this Union would speak for itself.'2^ As
support for the strike gathered momentum, with the total of 6,000 strikers
on 20 April increasing to around 12,500 on Monday 24 April,22 Deakin
reiterated his attack on the unofficial movement. On 23 April strike leaders
gathered outside Transport House and demanded an audience with Deakin
who was not, in fact, inside the building. After this farcical incident had
taken place, he issued a statement condemning 'this indefensible strike'. It
was contrary to the national interests, extremely damaging to food supplies
and exports, and also: 'a challenge to those principles upon which trade
unionism rests, to the right of trade unions to make their own rules and
constitution. Those who advise trade unionists to defy their own union are
guilty of reckless and irresponsible conduct.' Deakin added that in
favouring a ballot on the expulsions - which clearly had no place under
the rules of the Union - the strike leaders were seeking to save face. No
such compromise was possible, however, and the dispute would only end
with the men going back to work, the expulsions and the Union's authority
intact.2 8
The strike ended on 29 April, six days later, after the London Dock
Labour Board had issued an ultimatum to the men on strike: those not at
work on Monday 1 May would be summarily dismissed from the Scheme. In
Victoria Park an unofficial meeting resolved to resume work 'after ten days
powerful protest', and pledged that the fight to reinstate the expelled three
to the TGWU would continue in Union branch meetings. The ultimate
futility of this campaign was tacitly conceded by the expelled three,
25PRO: LAB 10/955, London RIRO to Headquarters, 21 April 1950.
26DNTGC, 20 April 1950.
27The Times, 21 and 25 April 1950.
2 8 77ze Times, 24 April 1950.
however, with Constable, Dickens and Saunders all declaring their
intention to apply for membership of the Stevedores' Union.29 Whether
they did so or not will remain unclear until Mr Andrew Flinn of the
National Museum of Labour History has completed the process of properly
sorting the NASDU's records. Nevertheless, the evidence of a contemporary
Trotskyist activist in London might at least be recorded. He believes that
whilst Dickens and Saunders did join the National Amalgamated Stevedores
and Dockers Union, Harry Constable remained for a number of years the
only working docker in the Port of London without a union card.3 0
The strike's important related feature, the dispute between the Shaw
Savill shipping company and the NASDU, was apparently also resolved
during the first week of May. Again, the Union's unsorted files make it
difficult to ascertain the precise outcome and aftermath of this dispute, but
on 2 May Shaw Savill did agree to the scheme's indefinite postponement.3 1
THE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE: A WHOLESOME DETERRENT'
The ten day unofficial strike had cost the industry 93,750 working days,3 2
and had clearly caused fresh damage to the Union's already tarnished
reputation in the docks. In noting that Deakin had described the unofficial
leaders as 'reckless and irresponsible', The Times correspondent pointed out
that the men on strike strongly supported these men and had little time for
their official leaders: 'Rightly or wrongly, the men on strike had for a long
time felt little loyalty towards the elected representatives, but regarded the
"reckless and irresponsible" leaders as vigilant in their interests.'3 3
This apparent disdain with which the strikers regarded the Union,
confirmed the Government's growing belief that the TGWU was unable to
command a satisfactory level of authority in the docks. Throughout the
strike Deakin continued to enjoy the loyal support of his former TUC
colleague, George Isaacs, who told the House of Commons that the stoppage
was a 'communist inspired' attack on the TGWU's democratic and
29PRO: LAB 10/955, London RIRO note of meeting, 29 April 1950.
3®Notes of conversation with Cyril Smith, 5 August 1992. Constable and
Smith became political comrades after the former had resigned from the
Communist Party in 1952.
3177ie Times, 3 May 1950.
32PRO: BK 2/71, Industrial Disputes, 1950.
33The Times, 24 April 1950.
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constitutional position.34 Displaying his customary determination to allow
the Union to restore order itself, on 21 April Isaacs urged his Cabinet
colleagues to avoid any action - particularly the introduction of troops -
that would prejudice developments.35 During previous strikes such caution
had characterised the Government response, but fewer Ministers were
willing to support Isaacs on this occasion. On 20 April Maurice Webb, the
Minister of Food, told the Cabinet Emergencies Committee that - negligible
quantities of eggs and bananas aside - there was no danger of losing
perishable items before 27 April. Nevertheless, the Committee decided that
matters should not be allowed to slide: if the strike had not ended by
Monday 24 April, troops would be deployed immediately to discharge non¬
food and food cargoes.3^ Troops accordingly began work in the Royal Docks
on 24 April, a development which Cabinet endorsed on the following
morning, undeterred by its awareness that the presence of soldiers had
caused many more dockers to stop work in protest. Indeed, Ministers
ordered that tented accommodation be made available in London parks so
that, if necessary, up to 20,000 soldiers could be employed in the docks.37
This would have been the largest single post-war commitment of
troops in the London docks, exceeding by several thousand the total of
12,792 which was deployed in July 1949.38 But the Government's tough
response involved more than the use of troops. At the Emergencies
Committee meeting on 20 April, consideration had been given to the
question of whether criminal proceedings could be taken against the
strikers. Sir Hartley Shawcross, the Attorney General, contended that this
would not be possible. Under a 1940 emergency regulation that was still in
force, Order 1305, which provided for the compulsory arbitration of trade
disputes and forbade strikes and lock-outs in connection with trade
disputes, the stoppage was not strictly a 'trade dispute'. However, this did
not rule out the possibility of civil action against the strikers for breach of
contract or, for that matter, criminal action against the 'ring leaders' for
conspiring to procure a breach of contract. Despite the numbers involved,
civil proceedings were strongly supported by Aneurin Bevan who, in an
34Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 474, Col. 331, 20 April 1950.
35PRO: CAB 128/CM(50)23, 21 April 1950.
36PRO: CAB 134/177, EC, 20 April 1950.
37PRO: CAB 128/CM(50)25, 25 April 1950.
38Above, p.152.
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echo of the tough line which he had taken during the 1948 and 1949
strikes, stated that for the striking dockers, 'the mere fact of having to
attend court, and of having financial penalties imposed would constitute a
wholesome long-term deterrent'.3 9
This development denoted a significant departure from the informal
'rules' which governed the relationship between the Labour party and the
Trade Unions. Wherever possible, the party was expected to leave the
responsibility for dealing with trades disputes to the movement's
'industrial' wing, the trade unions.40 These 'rules' had largely determined
the 1945 Government's attitude to the docks: whilst using troops to protect
the wider community from the effects of unofficial action, the Government
had left the job of restoring discipline amongst the workforce to the TGWU.
The 1950 strike demonstrated that the Union's internal disciplinary
mechanisms had palpably failed to restore order, and in discussing the
prospect of legal proceedings against unofficial strikers, Ministers
indicated that the Government might be willing to take disciplinary
matters out of the Union's hands. On 21 April Cabinet decided to defer legal
action which would, if it was successful, have required the London Dock
Labour Board to dismiss thousands of strikers for breaching their
obligations under the Scheme.41 Nevertheless, in expounding their views,
Shawcross and Bevan anticipated the unprecedented legal action which the
Government was to take under Order 1305 against seven dockers less than
twelve months later.
In the meantime, an alternative initiative by the Government did
effect a positive breach in the labour movement's informal 'rules'. In
Cabinet on 24 April it was finally - and remarkably - conceded that, 'quite
apart from Communist agitation', the recurrent unofficial action in the
docks suggested wider industrial problems: 'It was said that dockers were
not clear who was their employer and with whom authority rested: there
seemed to be a considerable element of ambiguity about the respective
positions of the Dock Labour Board and of the employers who used dock
labour.'42 On 1 May, as the workforce voted to resume work, there was
general Cabinet agreement that the stoppage had raised a sufficient
39PRO: CAB 134/177, EC, 20 April 1950.
40Lewis Minkin, The Contentious Alliance, pp.27-40.
41PRO: CAB 128/CM(50)23, 21 April 1950.
42PRO: CAB 128/CM(50)24, 24 April 1950.
number of complex industrial matters to merit a thorough and formal
inquiry for the purpose of identifying the causes of unrest in the docks.4 3
Such an investigation would inevitably draw attention to the Scheme's
defects, and the fact that the workforce was recurrently willing to strike in
defiance of its Union leaders. Yet Ministers apparently failed to realise that
its decision would certainly draw the wrath of the TGWU, the troubled
guardian of both the Dock Labour Scheme and the restive workforce.
Perhaps suspecting an outbreak of collective Cabinet insensitivity, on 2
May the Cabinet Secretary, Norman Brook, briefed Attlee on the delicacy of
the situation. He pointed out that when a review of the Scheme had
previously been suggested, by Alfred Barnes in July 1949, Bevin had been
adamantly opposed. 'In these circumstances,' he doubted the wisdom of
appointing a formal inquiry with wide terms of reference, recommending
a private Ministerial investigation instead: 'The constitution and procedure
of the Dock Labour Boards, the efficacy of trade union leadership, the
docker's relations with his union leaders and his employers, and the
improvement of the general psychological situation in the docks - are all
matters on which practical recommendations could be formulated as well
by Ministers as by independent outsiders or experts.'44
Thus advised, and indeed in the company of Brook, on 5 May Attlee
met Isaacs and Barnes to discuss the proposed inquiry. Barnes repeated the
point which he had made the previous July, about the Ministry of Labour's
close association with the Scheme diminishing its ability to conciliate on
dock matters effectively. More importantly, on this occasion he gave new
emphasis to the problem of joint control of the Scheme. Whereas in 1949 he
had spoken of the need to bolster dock boards with independent
representatives, he now spoke explicitly about the Union's conflicting
priorities. The primary function of a trade union official was to safeguard
the interests of his members, but officials who administered the Scheme,
particularly its disciplinary functions, had become estranged from their
members. Adding that the dock labour boards obscured the relationship
between worker and employer, making it difficult for the latter to take
responsible action when trouble arose, Barnes argued in favour of a
'searching inquiry into the working of the Dock Labour Scheme'. This
would be undertaken by the Ministries of Labour and Transport in
43PRO: CAB 128/CM(50)27, 1 May 1950.
44PRO: PREM 8/1534, Brook to Attlee, 2 May 1950.
consultation with the dock labour boards, employers, trade unions, the
British Transport Commission and port authorities. Isaacs was strongly
opposed to such an inquiry, which would give the impression that the Dock
Labour Scheme had collapsed throughout the country, and cause grave
offence to Arthur Deakin, who had already stated his opposition. In its
place, Isaacs favoured a 'survey' into the causes of industrial unrest in the
London docks alone. With counsel divided, Attlee concluded the meeting in
characteristic fashion. Leaning, it would seem, slightly towards Isaacs, he
tactfully advised his colleagues to pursue the idea of a 'survey' with Bevin,
and make recommendations in the light of the latter's views.45
A meeting between the three Ministers was held later on the same
day, 5 May. Bevin naturally rejected the type of inquiry envisaged by
Barnes, but was only marginally less annoyed by Isaacs's proposal. His
disapproval was based on the fact that any kind of inquiry would ill reward
his beloved TGWU after its strenuous efforts to support the Government.
Bevin seldom wrote to other Ministers about dock matters, presumably
preferring to buttonhole colleagues for an informal chat between
meetings. Thus, the fact that on this occasion he set out his objections to an
inquiry in a formal letter to Isaacs, suggests that he viewed the situation as
being particularly serious. He told Isaacs that subsequent to their meeting
on 5 May, he had spoken to Arthur Deakin (mysteriously referred to as 'our
mutual friend'), who bitterly resented the imminent appointment of an
inquiry into the docks. Having battled to win the Dock Labour Scheme,
which was a vital weapon in the battle for economic recovery, and having
courted the unpopularity of his members by throwing the TGWU's full
weight behind strategies designed to support the Government further -
most notably the wage freeze and the anti-communist campaign - Deakin's
anger and disappointment were keenly felt. As Bevin pointed out, 'after the
Unions have fought the Communists and struggled with the employers, the
Government now seems to be siding with the latter, and in fact, however
much it may be covered up, advantage is being taken to interfere with the
basic principles of the scheme, and in this the employers are supported by
the Ministry of Transport.' In apparently supporting this attack on the
Scheme by sanctioning an inquiry, Bevin told Isaacs that the Government
was jeopardising its relationship with the Union: 'I see in this problem all
45PRO: PREM 8/1534, Meeting in Prime Minister's Room in the House of
Commons, 5 May 1950.
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the elements of a first-class difference between the Union and the
Government, which will reflect itself in the industry and be very awkward
indeed.' Given the immense bitterness felt by his TGWU comrades, Bevin
urged Isaacs to limit the damage by confining the inquiry's terms of
reference to the causes of unofficial strikes in the Port of London.4 6
In the House of Commons on 11 May, Isaacs did announce that a
formal inquiry would be held. But, in accordance with Bevin's wishes - and
indeed as he himself had suggested on 5 May - the Committee of Inquiry
appointed under Sir Frederick Leggett was commissioned on a narrower
basis than that requested by Alfred Barnes. It was only to investigate the
'problem' of unofficial stoppages in the London docks, 'with a view to
reporting what steps can be taken to avoid further unofficial action of the
type that has taken place during the last three years and has proved so
injurious to the trade of the country'.4 7
Deakin was publicly relaxed about this development, telling
journalists that as the Union had been given prior notice of the
committee's terms of reference, he had never held any objection to its
appointment.48 The narrowing of the inquiry's terms of reference, had
not, however, appreciably diminished the TGWU's bitterness. The
leadership feared that the investigation, whilst undermining the Union's
standing, would bolster that of the unofficial movement. On 15 May the
TGWU Finance and General Purposes Committee agreed that the Union
would give evidence to the Inquiry, but only on the strict understanding
that 'there would be no question of the unofficial element being given a
status in the hearings'.49 Having subsequently given evidence to the
Inquiry for the first time, Deakin assured colleagues on the Finance and
General Purposes Committee that he had done so, having 'definitely laid
down the principle that the Union did not regard itself as being on trial'.^ 0
In the meantime, Deakin contributed a lengthy article to the Transport and
General Workers' Record, entitled, 'Docks and the Nation; Our Problem - We
Can Find the Answer.' This strongly affirmed the Union's right to put its
4f>PRO: FO 800/495, Bevin to Isaacs, 6 May 1950.
47Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 475, 581, 11 May 1950.
48The Times, 12 May 1950.
49MRC/MSS.126/T&G/l/l/28, TGWU Finance and General Purposes
Committee, 15 May 1950.
50MRC/MSS.126/T&G/l/l/28, TGWU Finance and General Purposes
Committee, 29 June 1950.
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own house in order. Deakin implied that the Government had been sorely
mistaken in appointing the Leggett Committee, with Ministers swayed by
the unjustified 'critical atmosphere' which guided present analysis of the
Scheme. In restating the commitment of the workforce and the Union to
the Scheme, he attempted also to ward off critics by emphasising the
inestimable value of joint control: 'The unions stood for joint control. This
is where we still stand and we shall remain in that position. Time has long
passed when workers in industry are prepared to accept the idea that they
are not entitled to have a "say" in the conditions under which their
employment is regulated.'5 1
Deakin's principal anxiety, which Bevin had voiced in his
representation on the Union's behalf to Isaacs, was that the employers
would exploit the 'critical atmosphere' in which the Leggett hearings were
being conducted, to secure Government support for the termination of joint
control. The employers indeed took great satisfaction from Leggett's
appointment. In pursuing increasingly confident overtures to the
Government, the employers secured the support of Sir John Anderson, the
former Conservative Cabinet Minister who in 1950 was Chairman of the
Port of London Authority. As if to illustrate Victor Allen's argument that
the interests of port authorities and port employers were effectively
synonymous,52 on 15 May Anderson led a deputation of employers to
discuss the Scheme's future with Attlee. Anderson envisaged the encounter,
which was apparently arranged by his former Treasury official, D.H.F.
Rickett, as a chance for port employers to set forth their ideas on how
improved industrial relations in the docks could best be effected.52 It would
appear that Anderson approached this task with a spirit of confrontation
rather than conciliation, for he included in his delegation Sir Basil
Sanderson, the Shaw Savill Company Chairman whose most recent
contribution to industrial relations in the London docks had been the
dispute which he initiated with the Stevedores' Union. Anderson and
Sanderson were joined by C.E. Wurtzburg of the British Chamber of
Shipping and Sir William Currie of the P&O Steam Navigation Company, and
Attlee was accompanied by Barnes, Isaacs and Rickett.
5^Transport and General Workers' Record, June 1950.
52V.L. Allen, Trade Union Leadership, p. 180.
53PREM 8/1289, Anderson to Rickett, 8 May 1950.
Anderson spoke first, arguing that without an immediate restoration
of the discipline which had collapsed in the docks, the Scheme would
continue to operate ineffectively. As remedial action, he recommended
three revisions to the Scheme: firstly, that the system of joint control be
terminated; secondly, that the Government assume powers - by an Act of
Parliament if necessary - to deal effectively with 'known agitators' in the
docks, by imposing heavy fines or even imprisoning them; thirdly, that the
legislation which framed the 1947 Scheme be amended so that men
withholding their labour in an unofficial strike would be automatically
expelled from the industry. Attlee spoke next, and attempted to defuse the
employers' anger. Stating that the matter was one of great delicacy, given
the communists' determination to exploit the differences between the
respective sides of industry, he added that Anderson's observations would
be fully considered by the Leggett Committee. Isaacs, predictably, was less
emollient, restating his belief that problems in the docks owed little to
specific failings of either the Scheme or the TGWU, but to the communists'
undoubted determination to 'break the authority of the TGWU'. In referring
to Anderson's proposals, he admitted the possibility of adding to the NDLB's
independent representation, but dismissed the idea of ending joint control.
He questioned also the efficacy of prosecuting or dismissing the thousands
of men who could potentially be involved in an unofficial strike, to which
Anderson responded by urging again that the Government should at least
be able to remove the 'ringleaders' from the Scheme. The meeting ended
there, with only one item subject to agreement: in view of the Inquiry
already underway, neither side would make a statement to the press.54
In limiting the scope of the Leggett Inquiry to unofficial strikes in
London, and continuing to offer the type of strong support for the Union
which he voiced in this meeting with Anderson and the employers, Isaacs
clearly sought to paper over the cracks which were emerging in the
Government's relationship with the TGWU. Yet, as has already been noted,
the TGWU continued to resent the Leggett investigation, which necessarily
drew attention to the Union's failure to exert authority amongst its dock
members. When the report eventually appeared in May 1951, as a Command
Paper, the TGWU . was indirectly criticised on several points, most notably
54PREM 8/1289, Meeting in Prime Minister's Room in the House of
Commons, 15 May 1950.
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that the association of Union officials with discipline had damaged their
standing with the workforce.5 5
In linking this criticism of the Union to the incidence of unofficial
strikes, the report added weight to the employers' argument about the
consequences of the Union's dual functions under the Scheme. This greatly
infuriated the TGWU; yet at the same time its leaders saw an opportunity to
bolster the popularity of joint control by appealing to their members'
adversarial attitude to employers. Delivering his quarterly report to the
Docks Trade Group in September 1951, Bird observed that the employers'
response to the Leggett report had, predictably enough, been to emphasise
its suggestion that joint control was the main cause of trouble. He urged the
Union's officers to remind dock members that the employers were firmly
opposed to joint control, and were seeking to 'force a change of the Scheme
in their favour. It must be understood by all Officers and .Members the
Employers do not like the Scheme.'5 6
Whilst the Leggett Committee's appointment - and subsequent report
simply intensified bitterness in the port transport industry, wider
developments in the second half of 1950 appeared to assuage the
Government's difficulties with the TGWU. Renewed international tension,
stemming from the outbreak of war in Korea, was accompanied by a revival
of the Government's pre-Leggett assumptions about the political character
of unofficial strikes. This ostensibly restored the unity of the Government
and the TGWU with regard to the causes of the docks unrest.
KOREA AND THE RENAISSANCE OF SUBVERSION
On 25 June 1950 North Korean forces invaded South Korea. The Labour
Government responded by condemning the invasion as an unwarranted act
of aggression; and on 27 June the United Kingdom strongly supported the
United Nations Security Resolution - passed in the temporary absence of
the Soviet delegate - which urged the repulsion by force of the North
Korean troops. The British Government believed that the Korean war
signalled a genuine threat to international peace and Britain's own
security, with Attlee fearing that the Soviet Union would exploit the
55 Unofficial Stoppages in the London Docks. Report of a Committee of
Inquiry, (Cmd. 8236, May 1951), p.13.
56DNTGC, Bird's Quarterly Report, 30 September 1951.
diversion of British and American troops to the Far East in order forcibly to
press claims elsewhere in the world. Nevertheless, Britain committed troops
to Korea on the basis that the UN had to be given the teeth which had been
lacking in the League of Nations.57 After a trebling of defence estimates on
3 August, the Government ordered the landing in Korea of the first British
battalions on 29 August.58
With British troops committed in a war that aggravated existing fears
about the perceived international communist threat, the Government
regarded domestic industrial developments with increasing suspicion. In
August Philip Noel-Baker, who by this time was Minister of Fuel and Power,
drew Attlee's attention to the activities of Frank Foulkes, the communist
who led the Electricians' Trade Union. According to Noel-Baker, along with
other ETU leaders Foulkes had gone on a trip to Moscow, 'no doubt to get
instructions'. Noel-Baker urged Attlee to remove 'active and suspected'
communists from important positions in power stations.59 The Government
viewed industrial unrest in the docks with even more vigilance. An
explosion in Portsmouth docks aboard a barge loaded with ammunition
bound for Korea, which Royal Navy scientists in 1952 found to have been a
complete accident,6° was characterised by Attlee on 24 July in the House of
Commons as a probable act of industrial sabotage.61 At the end of August
unofficial pamphlets appeared in the London and Liverpool docks
demanding the implementation of the TGWU's 'Docker's Charter'.62 This
was, of course, the package of unrealised demands for improved pay and
conditions which the Union had voted for in August 1945, and which had
under-pinned the huge unofficial strike of October 1945. National Dock
Board officials believed that in order to drum up wider unofficial support
for the Charter, Dickens and Timothy were planning to visit Glasgow,
Grimsby and other northern ports.63 This information was conveyed to the
Ministry of Labour, and as Parliament re-convened in the middle of
57Kenneth Harris, Attlee, pp. 454-5.
58Peter Hennessy, Never Again. Britain 1945-1951, p.466.
59Morgan, op.cit., p.437.
60justin Davis-Smith, The Attlee and Churchill Administrations and
Industrial Unrest 1945-1955, p. 17.
61 Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 478, 35-37, 24 July 1950.
62PRO: BK 2/79, copies of the Liverpool and London Port Workers
Committees' untitled and undated pamphlets, filed by the National Dock
Labour Board on 7 and 9 September 1950.
63PRO: BK 2/79, Parkin to Gould, 28 August 1950.
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September to discuss the Korean crisis, Isaacs advised Cabinet colleagues
that communist-inspired strikes in the London docks were probably
imminent. He based this assessment on the coincidence of the unofficial
agitation for improved pay and conditions with a recent trip which three
members of the unofficial movement had made to Poland. Estimating this
venture in identical terms to Noel-Baker's evaluation of the Electricians'
journey to Moscow, Isaacs said that the visitors to Warsaw, Timothy, Cowley
and Copland, 'doubtless had been given a plan of campaign'.64 The three
men had indeed been to Poland, but their visit had hardly been the covert
exercise which Isaacs's conspiracy-laden remarks implied. Rather it
appears to have been a typical Communist Party-organised trip, designed to
instil in members a conviction of the general superiority of life in the
'Popular Democracies'. Thus did the three write in glowing terms about
their Polish experiences in the unofficial journal, Port Workers' News5
Having consulted his Cabinet colleagues, on 15 September Isaacs took
his accusations to the House of Commons. Despite the almost certain
innocence of the dockers' Polish trip, he cited it, 'at a time when our men
are facing serious risks in Korea', as evidence that the unofficial
movement was planning to interfere with military supplies.66 For this
effort Isaacs was damned with faint praise from his press critics, with The
Times interpreting his statement as evidence, 'that the Government are for
once making ready to meet the threat instead of waiting until a serious
stoppage has again been engineered by the agitators'.67
The Government's response to the Korean crisis and the renewal of
unofficial activity in the docks enjoyed the TGWU's full support. In August
its General Executive Council resolved, 'that we must stand right up to
aggression from whatever quarter it comes and not allow the United
Nations Organisation to fall by the wayside.' Such were the circumstances
surrounding the initiation of hostilities by 'Communist Imperialism', that
the Government's 'great scheme of re-armament', regrettable though it
64PRO: CAB 128/CM(50)58, 14 September 1950.
65PRO: BK 2/79, copy of Port Workers' News, October 1950. As an example of
the favourable impressions which the three recorded, Timothy, who
described himself as a Roman Catholic, stated that in Poland religious
freedom was absolute.
66Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 478, 1405, 15 September 1950.
67The Times, 16 September 1950.
was, would enjoy the Union's full support.68 The debate about unofficial
activity and political subversion which Isaacs began with his Commons
statement on 15 September, was intensified by Deakin on the following day.
When Harry Pollitt, the Communist Party's General Secretary, issued a
statement calling for a change in the TGWU's leadership, Deakin said that
the Government should introduce legislation to ban the Communist Party:
'The party is not a political party in the sense that British people know
politics. It is a conspiracy against the country and the British people.'69 In
the Transport and General Workers' Record, Deakin added that the demands
being put forward in the docks for the Dockers' Charter were part of this
conspiracy, and were a front for agitation which was actually designed to
disrupt the supply of war materials to Malaya as well as Korea.70
In calling for a ban on the CP, the Union took a harder line than the
Government, with Ministers deciding at the end of September that British
public opinion would not tolerate such a move.71 Yet coming hard on the
heels of Isaacs's speech, Deakin's pugnacity indicated that the TGWU and
the Government once again shared a public determination to characterise
the unofficial movement as a subversive body. Thus, any outstanding
difficulties between Labour's political and industrial partners arising from
the establishment of the Leggett Committee, were apparently resolved.
However, the general concurrence of opinion that the agitation for the
'Docker's Charter' in September 1950 was politically-motivated, in the
longer term actually increased pressure on Government-TGWU relations.
This renewal of tension arose from the Government's growing conviction
that a political problem required a political solution.
Amongst the Attlee Governments' literally dozens of ad-hoc
committees, in July 1950 a Ministerial group was established to draft a bill
entitled Overseas Operations (Security of Forces). The purpose of this
intended legislation was spelt out in a paper which Chuter Ede presented at
the Committee's second meeting on 31 July. Ede proposed to criminalise all
industrial acts - whether sabotage of the type supposedly witnessed at
Portsmouth, unofficial strikes or incitement to strike - deemed prejudicial
6 8MSS. 126/T&G/1 /1/28, TGWU General Executive Council, General
Secretary's Quarterly Report, 21 August 1950.
69T/re Times, 18 September 1950.
I^Transport and General Workers' Record, October-November 1950.
71 PRO: CAB 130/63, General Purposes Committee, 29 September 1950.
to the conduct of the war effort.72 Given this emphasis on an act of
sabotage which was subsequently proved to have not actually taken place,
the intended Bill was clearly ill-conceived. This the Committee
acknowledged at its next meeting, two months later, with one Minister
pointing out that since the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, there had been
no further attempt to prevent supplies from being dispatched in support of
military operations. However, given the unsettled nature of international
developments and the likelihood of prolonged UN operations 'against
aggression', the Committee remained committed to the idea of taking out
some kind of legal insurance against unofficial action. Thus, whilst ruling
out the suppression of the Communist Party, Shawcross and Isaacs both
wondered whether a viable alternative might be to enlist TUC support for a
permanent measure, based on Order 1305, which would outlaw unofficial
strikes.7 3
The continued existence of the 1940 regulation represented a vexing
problem for the Government. On 16 October Sir Hartley Shawcross pointed
to trouble ahead, informing Cabinet that so long as the Order remained in
operation, he would find it increasingly difficult to refrain from using it.
An inconclusive discussion followed, with Bevin arguing against
maintaining compulsory arbitration in the longer-term.7 4
This indecision on unofficial strikes reflected the Government's
general inability to take effective legal action against opponents of the war
in Korea. On 6 November Shawcross told Cabinet that the only way to
suppress the anti-war propaganda which was regularly appearing in the
Daily Worker, would be to institute a prosecution for treason. But as this
offence carried a mandatory death sentence, Ministers naturally concurred
that it was far too heavy a weapon to use.75 The possibility that the Daily
Worker might be prosecuted under new legislation had already been
eliminated, when the relevant Cabinet Committee had decided not to
proceed with the Overseas Operations Bill on 3 November. However, in
ruling out tougher measures against anti-war propaganda, the Committee
reiterated its insistence that the continuation of unofficial action was not
72Ibid„ 31 July 1950.
73Ibid., 29 September 1950.
74PRO: CAB 128/CM(50)64, 16 October 1950.
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permissible.7^ For these Ministers, the attitude of their Trade Union
partners was unacceptably complacent. In September Shawcross had
written to Morrison in order to qualify Isaacs's recent assertion that
unofficial action was primarily a political problem. According to
Shawcross, most of communism's industrial initiatives since 1945 had only
been possible because of the TGWU's inactivity. He had added that the
maintenance of unofficial committees beyond the span of strikes was, 'a
most dangerous situation requiring the Union to take really stringent
steps'.7 7
For Shawcross and others, frustration caused by the Union's
inactivity continued to mount. In lieu of an agreed strategy to counter
unofficial strikes, on 16 October Cabinet had decided to open up discussions
with the TUC on two questions: firstly, how were further communist-
inspired strikes to be prevented; and secondly, how was machinery for
long-term negotiation of industrial settlements to be developed.78 Isaacs
and Morrison duly discussed these matters with TUC leaders over an
informal dinner in a London restaurant on 22 November, but no new
proposals were produced. This confirmed the Government's growing
suspicion that the Unions were either unable or unwilling to initiate action
against unofficial strikes.7 ^
The debate precipitated by the Korean crisis about the supposedly
subversive nature of unofficial action in the docks, had thus reinforced the
Government's conviction, evident during the Expulsions strike of April
1950, that the TGWU could no longer be relied upon to prevent unofficial
strikes and enforce effective discipline in the docks. These were matters
which the Government itself would have to assume responsibility for. In
November Shawcross gave notice of the means by which the Government
would eventually seek to improve discipline in the docks, by carrying out
his threat to institute legal proceedings under Order 1305. Following a ten-
day unofficial strike by North Thames Gas Board workers in London gas
stations, ten men were prosecuted and sentenced to a month's
imprisonment, which was reduced on appeal to a £50 fine.80 The Ministry
76pRO: CAB 130/63, General Purposes Committee, 3 November 1950.
77PRO: CAB 124/1196, Shawcross to Morrison, 15 September 1950.
78PRO: CAB 128/CM(50)64, 16 October 1950.
70PRO: LAB 43/152, Isaacs to Morrison, 28 November 1950.
80Morgan, op.cit., p.437.
of Labour considered that the original prison sentences were a great shock
both to trade unionists and the general public.81 In December, following a
dispute between members of the Electricians' Trade Union and the airline
company BOAC, Cabinet considered additional prosecutions. An unofficial
strike had begun after BOAC had attempted to force electricians to work
alongside two non-union members, and Ministers pointed out that the
criminal prosecution of trade unionists who refused to work with non-
trade unionists, would jeopardise relations with the Trade Unions.8 2
During a second Cabinet discussion of the subject, which rejected
prosecutions, the wider difficulties of enforcing Order 1305 were raised.83
These had long been recognised. Shortly after the Order's introduction in
1940, Sir Frederick Leggett - in his then position as Chief Industrial
Commissioner at the Ministry of Labour - had warned Bevin that it would be
virtually impossible to enforce the legal ban on strikes and lock-outs. The
Order would have to serve as a 'substantial deterrent' only, for: 'A large
number of workpeople cannot be sent to prison and it is undesirable to
make martyrs by selecting a few for prosecution.'84 Leggett's initial
misgivings had been borne out by the Coalition Government's futile 1942
attempt to prosecute 1,200 miners who struck work at Betteshanger Colliery
in Kent. Thwarted in their attempts to collect fines which the miners
refused to pay, local magistrates had also been unable to imprison the men
for lack of gaol accommodation.8 5
With Shawcross insisting that so long as the Order remained law, and
so long as he remained responsible for upholding the law, he would have to
enforce it again sooner or later, in January 1951 Cabinet decided to
consider the regulation's future. In the absence of any other instrument
for dealing with unofficial strikes, Herbert Morrison's influential Private
Secretary, E.M. Nicholson, urged that it be retained. Nicholson, who in
October 1950 had described industrial unrest as 'a kind of social disease,'86
told Morrison on 13 January that a permanent anti-strike settlement was
plainly indispensable: 'In modern social and economic conditions a strike is
81 PRO: LAB 10/1006, Memorandum on Order 1305 for Minister, 24 January
1951.
82PRO: CAB 128/CM(50)83, 7 December 1950.
83PRO: CAB 128/CM(50)83, 11 December 1950.
84PRO: LAB 10/116, Leggett to Bevin, 8 September 1940.
85Henry Phelps Brown, The Origins of Trade Union Power, pp. 98-9.
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226
just as anti-social and almost as obsolete a method of settling disputes as a
duel between two individuals.' The Ministry of Labour had to emphasise
that strikes and lock-outs were not part of a rational future, 'and any
implication that compulsory arbitration is an exceptional and temporary
measure pending the restoration of the right to strike should be firmly
resisted. '87 Two days later, Cabinet decided broadly in favour of
maintaining a permanent system of arbitration machinery, emphasising
that it, 'would be undesirable to delete the provisions of the Order relating
to the prohibition of strikes and lock-outs.' In the wake of the BOAC and gas
disputes, it was conceded that disputes relating to recognition or non-
unionism ought to be excluded from the Order's scope, and that breaches of
the Order would be punishable only be fines and not by prison sentences.**»
With Cabinet evidently coming round to the position held by the
Attorney General, that the law would have to be used persistently against
unofficial strikers, a further step had been taken away from the idea that
unofficial action was a matter to be dealt with by the Trade Unions
internally. On 17 January Isaacs was moved to the Ministry of Pensions and
replaced as Minister of Labour by Aneurin Bevan. This marked another
significant breach to the 'separate spheres' approach. In contrast to his
predecessor, Bevan had recurrently demonstrated his impatience with the
TGWU's attempts to impose discipline amongst recalcitrant dock workers. As
recently as the previous April, he had argued that legal action against
several thousand striking men in London would prove to be a 'wholesome
long-term deterrent'. Attlee's biographer has suggested that Bevan was
appointed Minister of Labour for three related reasons. He would have to
support the Government's economic policy, and thus be forced to confront
rather than lead its left-wing critics; and in this new defensive role he
would be confirmed through having 'to come to terms with the powerful
right-wing trade union leaders'.89 In fact, Bevan's three month career as
Minister of Labour hardly fulfilled any of these criteria, the most patent
departure from Attlee's plan being his celebrated resignation from the
Government on 21 April over the NHS spending cuts. However, Bevan's one
significant act as Labour Minister, did owe something to Attlee's intention
that the Ministry's new occupant would absorb left-wing criticism of the
87PRO: CAB 124/1195, Nicholson to Morrison, 13 January 1951.
88PRO: CAB 128/CM(51)3, 15 January 1951.
89Harris, op.cit., p.470.
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Government. Paradoxically, however, it also revived the tension between
the Government and the TGWU that had first explicitly emerged in May
1950.
THE FAILURE OF LEGAL SANCTIONS
Bevan's arrival at the Ministry of Labour coincided with the conclusion by
the National Joint Council for the Port Transport Industry of a new pay
agreement. With TUC support for the wage freeze collapsing in September
1950, on 16 November Arthur Bird notified employers' representatives that
the TGWU wished to open negotiations for a pay increase. He observed that
the present agreement had lasted for five years, and had been greatly
overtaken by a 21 per cent increase in the cost of living. The employers
responded by suggesting that Bird's request had been directly influenced
by the recent unofficial agitation for the Dockers' Charter, a charge which
Bird explicitly denied.90 Despite the employers' initial resistance,
negotiations did proceed, and in January the NJC reached agreement on a
flat-rate increase of 2s per day, thus increasing the guaranteed daily
minimum to 21s. On 31 January a special meeting of the TGWU National
Docks Trade Group Committee recommended that the award be accepted, and
the agreement was adopted by the National Docks Delegate Conference
which gathered on 1 February.9 1
With the settlement again falling short of the Docker's Charter's
central tenet, a daily guarantee of 25s, the Merseyside unofficial movement
immediately called for a protest strike. Although relatively prolonged,
support for the ensuing stoppage on the Mersey was much thinner than
when the Charter had previously been invoked, in October 1945. The
seventeen day affair cost the industry more than 100,000 days, but this
figure suggests that only approximately one-fifth of the 18,000 or so
Merseyside workers supported it.92 Attempts to give the strike a national
footing comparable to 1945 were also unsuccessful. According to Jack Dash,
the Birkenhead strike committee contacted members of the London Port
Workers' Committee by telephone, and asked for support. The London
90PRO: BK 2/283, National Joint Council for the Port Transport Industry, 16
November 1950.
91MSS.126/T&G/l/l/29, TGWU Finance and General Purposes Committee, 15
February 1951.
92PRO: BK 2/71, Industrial Disputes 1951.
228
committee were fairly sure that very few London men were interested in
striking over the settlement, but in a spirit of loyalty to their Mersey
comrades, they nevertheless organised a mass meeting on 6 February. The
London committee's reservations were fully justified, as only 500 men
attended the meeting and only a few hundred more supported the
unofficial strike which began in the Royal Docks, also on 6 February.
Indeed, Dash emphasised that the general lack of support for the six day
strike was unprecedented,93 and only 16,000 working days were lost.
Additional unofficial action against the new wage agreement began on 5
February in Manchester; lasting eight days, this strike cost the industry a
further 16,500 days.94
The Cabinet's Ministerial Emergencies Committee discussed these
developments at 9.30 am on Wednesday 7 February. Five Ministers were
present: Ede, Bevan, Shawcross, Barnes and Hector McNeil, the Secretary of
State for Scotland. Whilst Shawcross indicated that there was sufficient
evidence to allow criminal proceedings against the London and Liverpool
strike leaders under Order 1305, Ede reported that their attempts to spread
the strikes had failed. Nevertheless, the Ministers concluded that the very
fragility of the unofficial movement meant that, for once, prosecutions
would weaken rather than strengthen its position with the rank and file.
Shawcross was authorised to institute prosecutions against the appropriate
individuals in the event of the respective unofficial committees' failing to
terminate their strikes that afternoon.9 5
Both of Bevan's distinguished biographers have explicitly distanced
Bevan from this decision to prosecute the strike leaders. In refuting Bessie
Braddock's assertion that during the meeting of 7 February Bevan had
stated, 'the strikers are on their knees, now is the time to strike them',
Michael Foot noted, 'No one knew better than Bevan what might be the
dangers for the Labour Government of the involvement of other Ministers
in the decision about a prosecution which rested solely with the Attorney-
General.' Foot added that it was actually Hector McNeil who argued in
favour of delivering a knock out blow to the strikers.9^ John Campbell's
version of events simply has Shawcross ordering the prosecutions,
93Jack Dash, Good Morning Brothers!, pp. 80-2.
94PRO: BK 2/71, Industrial Disputes 1951.
95PRO: CAB 134/177, EC, 7 February 1951.
^Michael Foot, Aneurin Bevan. Volume Two 1945-1960, pp.318-19.
apparently without consulting any of his Ministerial colleagues." Each of
these biographers have dismissed too readily the support which Bevan
surely gave - and there is nothing in the minutes of the meeting to suggest
that he did otherwise - to the case for prosecutions in the Emergencies
Committee. Moreover, his compliance with Ede and Shawcross in accepting
that the TGWU was itself incapable of dealing with the problem, was in
marked contrast with the line usually adopted by Isaacs. On frequent
occasions during unofficial strikes the latter had restrained colleagues
from premature action, urging that the Union be given the maximum
opportunity to reassert its own authority.
As the Labour Government's leading socialist, Bevan at first sight
might appear to be an unlikely supporter of tough strike-breaking
measures. But the man who had been expelled from the Labour Party in
1939 for sponsoring a Popular Front with communists," was now operating
in a very different post-war world. It was as a passionate defender of
democratic socialism that he urged the dispatch of land troops to break the
communist blockade of Berlin in June 1948;" and his frequent advocacy of
tough measures against unofficial strikers was couched in similar terms.
There was no contradiction between Bevan's socialist convictions and his
opposition to unofficial strike action, as his remarks about the
'sectionalism' of the unofficial dockers' movement indicated. Those who
threatened the unity of the labour movement, he argued when criticising
the London dock strike in July 1949, jeopardised the security of its future,
and allowed the Tories the prospect of regaining power.10® In 1951, with
the Labour majority in the House of Commons reduced to only five, the
threat which unofficial action posed to the Labour Government, and
therefore to the continuing project of establishing a democratic socialist
Britain, was all the more pervasive. In further explaining Bevan's
determination to confront the unofficial movement, a useful parallel might
be drawn with the White Paper introduced by a subsequent Labour
Government in 1969, In Place of Strife, which was widely perceived to limit
Trade Unionism's freedoms. The White Paper's author was the the one-time
Bevanite Barbara Castle, herself one of the few prominent left-wingers in
"John Campbell, Nye Bevan and the Mirage of British Socialism, p.224.
98Ibid., pp.82-3.
"Foot, op. cit., p.230.
lOOpor instance, Bevan's speech to the annual Northumbrian miners'
picnic at Morpeth, reported by the Manchester Guardian, 18 July 1949.
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Wilson's administration. Castle shared Bevan's determination to eliminate
unofficial strikes which, they both believed, advanced sectional aims with
two consequences: firstly, they disrupted the Labour movement's unity; and
secondly, they threw any attempts at strategic economic planning by a
Labour Government into chaos. More notoriously than Bevan, however,
Castle provoked intense opposition from Union leaders who believed that it
was not for the Government to arm itself against unofficial strikes, which
they continued to regard as a matter of internal union discipline. Deprived
of support from Cabinet colleagues in the face of such stiff TUC opposition -
the most notable defector being the 'Keeper of the Cloth Cap', James
Callaghan - Castle's proposals fell to the ground in June 1969.101 In 1951
Bevan and his Government colleagues experienced nothing like the
hostility which Castle endured in 1969. However, the prosecutions which
followed the Emergencies Committee on 7 February did greatly antagonise
the TGWU leadership which, like the TUC in 1969, strongly believed that the
Government had no proper place in imposing industrial discipline upon
union members.
With the unofficial stoppages continuing on 7 February, Shawcross
ordered the arrests of seven alleged ringleaders. Three of the men - Robert
Crosbie, Joseph Harrison and William Johnson - were from the Mersey
ports. The other four were familiar names from the London unofficial
movement: the two expelled TGWU men, Harry Constable and Ted Dickens;
Joseph Cowley, reprimanded in February 1949 by the TGWU Executive for
his role in the 1948 strike, and a visitor to Poland several months
previously; and Cowley's fellow traveller to Poland, Albert Timothy, the
Stevedore who had chaired the 1949 lock-out committee. On the evening of
8 February these seven were arrested at a pub in the Stepney area of
London, taken to Bow Street Police Station,102 and charged thus: 'on and
between 8 October 1950 and 6 February 1951, they conspired with other
persons unknown to incite dock workers to take part in strikes in
connection with trade disputes,' this action being illegal under Order
101 Barbara Castle, Fighting All The Way, pp.413-21. This marvellous
characterisation of Callaghan was provided by Peter Jenkins, cited in
Minkin, op.cit., p.112.
102Dash, op.cit., p.83.
1 305.103 The men were held overnight, but released the next morning on
bail, pending an appearance at Bow Street Police Court on 20 February.
Far from weakening the relationship between the unofficial
movement and the workforce as Ministers had intended, the arrests
actually increased support for the original strike which had been petering
out. On 9 February Ministers found that virtually nobody was working in
London's Royal Docks, where 10,000 men were usually employed.1 04
Workers in all ports except Birkenhead and Liverpool went back to work on
or around 13 February, but the London unofficial committee resolved to
take a further course of one day strikes to coincide with the accused men's
court appearances. Thus on 20 February, when the seven appeared briefly
at the Bow Street Police Court, one day strikes affected work in London,
Manchester, Glasgow and Greenock. With the London committee adopting
the slogan, 'When They're in the Dock, We're out of the Dock!'1®3,
subsequent hearings of the case were accompanied by strikes in London on
27 February, 16 March, 9 and 16-19 April. Whilst the general Mersey
stoppages were called off after 20 February, dockers at Birkenhead
supported the three day strike in London. From 20 February until the trial's
conclusion, the Government's decision to prosecute the seven cost the
industry an approximate total of 70,000 working days in all ports.106
Given the obvious relationship between the case of the seven and
the renewed incidence of unofficial activity, the TGWU did not view the
Government's intitiative favourably. Whilst the Government's previous
intrusion into internal Union disciplinary matters, the appointment of the
Leggett Committee of Inquiry, had only taken place after Bevin had
attempted to smooth the ground with Deakin, the arrests on 8 February had
taken the Union completely by surprise. Deakin told colleagues that his
first intimation of the legal initiative had not come from labour movement
colleagues in Government, but when he had read about it in the
newspapers on 9 February.107
103MSS. 126/T&G/1/1/29, TGWU Finance and General Purposes Committee,
Docks Group: National Wage Settlement Report, 15 February 1951.
104PRO: CAB 134/177, EC, 9 February 1951.
105Dash, op.cit., p.83.
106PRO: BK 2/71, Industrial Disputes, 1951.
107MSS. 126/T&G/1/1/29, TGWU General Executive Council, General
Secretary's Quarterly Report, 5 March 1951.
In November 1950, Deakin had argued that the Union was facing a
war on two fronts. Not only was it targeted by communists who saw it as the
major obstacle to increased communist influence in the TUC, but in
supporting the Labour Government the Union also faced heavy criticism
from Beaverbrook's Tory press.108 This had, of course, been the basis of
Deakin's disappointment with the Government over the Leggett Inquiry.
Having fought successfully against two of the Labour Government's
principal opponents, the communists and the port employers, the Union
had not expected to have attention drawn to its own alleged shortcomings.
Now, in March 1951, Deakin was angered by the opportunities which the
Government had once again presented to both opposition groups. Deakin
rightly insisted in the Union's Executive meeting of 8 March that, without
the arrests, there would have been no serious trouble. Thus the
Government had inadvertently aided the unofficial movement's attack on
the Union leadership. Deakin evidently viewed this attack with great
bitterness, stating, 'I know the drive is against me personally.'109 Whilst
the communist elements had drawn comfort from the on-going court
proceedings, Deakin added that the trial had allowed employers to reopen
debate about the joint administration of the Dock Labour Scheme. He
implied that members of the Government who believed joint control to be a
source of trouble in the docks were actively supporting the port employers
against the Union.110
Meanwhile, the case of the seven accused dock workers was lurching
towards its conclusion. The final hearings began at the Old Bailey on 9
April under Lord Chief Justice Goddard, with Shawcross prosecuting on
behalf of the Government. Shawcross disingenuously opened by asking the
jurors not to be swayed by the possibility that sinister communist forces
were at work in the docks, for no doubt 'the accused men had a deep and
sincere belief in the justice of their demands'. However, in pursuit of these
demands, they had been 'prepared to hold the nation to ransom and defy
the law of the land'.111 The seven faced two main charges: firstly, and most
significantly, that they had conspired to incite dock workers to strike in
connection with a trade dispute, contrary to the law under Order 1305;
108Transport and General Workers' Record, October-November 1950.
109MSS. 126/T&G/1/1/29, TGWU General Executive Council, 8 March 1951.
11°Ibid.
111 The Times, 10 April 1951.
secondly, that 'otherwise than in contemplation or furtherance of a trade
dispute', they had conspired to induce men to break their obligations under
the Dock Labour Scheme by absenting themselves from work without the
permission of their employers. On 18 April the jury declared that the seven
were guilty on this second count; but, apparently uncertain that the strike
had actually involved a 'trade dispute' - and for a successful prosecution
under Order 1305 this definition was absolutely essential - announced its
failure to agree on the first one. Stating the impossibility of reconciling a
disagreement on the first charge with the verdict on the second charge,
Shawcross had to discontinue proceedings. He entered a nolle prosequi, and
the men were acquitted. Pressed on this subject recently by Anthony
Howard, Shawcross said that the jury's 'perverse verdict' was greeted with
considerable relief by some of his Government colleagues, who had held
'mixed feelings' about prosecuting the men. He added that the outcome was
welcomed 'with great triumph by the dissident trade unionists who were
gathered outside'.112 Led by a jubilant Jack Dash, several hundred dockers
carried the acquitted men shoulder high through the streets of London,112
and the Ministry of Labour's London regional officer gloomily recorded
that the case's 'damp squib' conclusion had been interpreted by dockers as
'a victory for "collective action'".114 Bevan, who had been discussing Order
1305's future with representatives from both sides of industry on the
Ministry of Labour-sponsored Joint Consultative Committee,115 decided that
the regulation would have to be abolished. This was duly accomplished by
his successor as Minister of Labour, Alfred Robens. In June 1951 Robens
informed Frank Soskice, who had become Attorney General after Shawcross
was appointed President of the Board of Trade on 24 April, that the Order
was no longer operable, as the Unions were no longer prepared to support
it. Together Robens and Soskice compiled a replacement, Order 1376, which
made provision for legally-enforcable arbitration in disputes, without
prohibiting strikes and lock-outs.116 This new regulation was approved by
Cabinet on 26 July.117
112'Brothers', broadcast BBC Radio 4, 5 January 1993.
112Dash, op.cit., p.87.
114PRO: LAB 10/1039, London RIRO, departmental memo, 18 April 1951.
115PRO: LAB 10/1006, Joint Consultative Committee, 24 January and 4 April
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116Morgan, op.cit., p.439.
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The decision to prosecute the seven dockers had backfired
completely. Where the unofficial movement had been facing its first
serious defeat, with very few dockers interested in a strike over the new
wage agreement, the trial ultimately brought it a highly publicised victory.
This victory certainly caused sufficient tremors within the TGWU for
Deakin and Bird to request a vote of confidence from the Union's Docks
Trade Group Committee, which they received on 19 April.118 In addition,
the trial, in drawing renewed public attention to the TGWU's problems in
the docks, had placed fresh pressure on the Government's relationship
with the Union at an extremely inopportune moment. It was a bitter coda to
Ernest Bevin's life that at the time of his death - Saturday, 14 April 1951 -
members of the Union which he had created and led for twenty years, were
being prosecuted by the Labour Government. On 21 April the Government
was further shaken by the resignation of the Minister of Labour, Aneurin
Bevan. Bevan's opposition to the rearmament package had, as Morgan
demonstrates, been privately stated as early as 1 August 1950.110 But
Morgan also believes that the unaccustomed criticism from the left which
Bevan encountered as a result of the dockers' prosecutions, 'had a direct
bearing on his later response to the issue of National Health Service
charges'.120 Indeed, it was at a public meeting primarily attended by
London dockers at Bermondsey on 3 April, that Bevan first hinted in public
that he would resign on this matter. Responding to a heckler he said, 'I will
never be a member of a Government which makes charges on the National
Health Service.'121 This suggests then, that in addition to straining the
patience of the TGWU leadership, the Government-instigated crisis in the
docks had also significantly influenced Bevan's eventual resignation. With
Gaitskell's chief critics, Bevan and Wilson, no longer in Cabinet, there was
little further resistance to the over-inflated rearmament package that
proved to be the Government's ultimate undoing.122
118DNTGC, 19 April 1951.
110Kenneth O. Morgan, Labour People, p.214.
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The developments in the docks which have been discussed in the preceding
chapters re-emphasise the general observations which were made about
the 1945 Labour Government in the first chapter. To recap, the Government
set itself two central tasks, economic recovery and the international
containment of communism. In pursuing these goals it was greatly
supported by the TUC, which, given the labour alliance's informal 'rules' of
behaviour, accepted responsibility for marshalling working class support
behind both the wage freeze and anti-communism. As the first chapter
further indicated, historians have broadly recognised this important
contribution which the labour alliance made to the successes of the 1945-51
Governments. Peter Hennessy, for instance, describes the TUC's support for
the wage freeze as, 'a measure of the never-to-be-repeated unity of the
labour movement.'1 However, the subsequent chapters also demonstrated
that historians have been slow to acknowledge an equally important
feature of the 1945-51 labour alliance, namely the tension between the 1950
Government and its largest union ally, the Transport and General Workers'
Union. This slow build up of tension arose not so much from the 1945 strike
- when the Government's response to the largest strike was relatively
relaxed - but from subsequent strikes in the 1945-50 period, with disruption
in this vital area of the industrial economy holding obvious implications
with regard to the Government's increasingly urgent economic and
international priorities.
The Government characterised these later strikes as communist
conspiracies, but they actually had nothing to do with political subversion.
The real causes of the strikes - direct and indirect - were industrial in
character. Chapters four and five related the fact that the 1948 and 1949
stoppages - like the huge 1945 strike - were directly produced by a
difference of opinion between the TGWU and some of its dock members on a
specifically industrial issue. In Chapter Six, the underlying causes of the
strikes were discussed: poor amenities, the persistence of casual
recruitment, the workforce's antipathy to the new discipline introduced by
the Dock Labour Scheme, the TGWU's unpopular association with this
discipline, and the particular working culture of the docks, where workers
traditionally relied on each other rather than the Union. These too, denoted
'Peter Hennessy, Never Again. Britain 1945-1951, p.382.
industrial, as opposed to political, problems. Yet the Governments' wider
priorities were such that Ministers expended little sympathy on dockers
who went on strike. In disrupting economic activity, the strikes seemed to
delay the process of Western European economic stabilisation, which - in
concert with American and Western European allies - the Government
perceived as the first step to halting communism's post-war progress. In a
prospering Europe, it was believed, the ground would be cut from
underneath communism's feet.2 The Government duly regarded the
unofficial movement with great hostility, and viewed the TGWU's inability
to maintain discipline amongst its docks membership with mounting
frustration. It was this frustration which persuaded the 1950 Government
to establish an inquiry into the London unofficial strikes in 1950, and then
to order the prosecution of the seven dockers in 1951. These actions
blatantly contradicted the labour alliance's 'rules', and although
predictable, the ensuing annoyance felt by the TGWU leadership was
immensely significant. In evincing tension between the Government and
Arthur Deakin, its most loyal trade union supporter, the docks-related
developments certainly qualify the conventional historical understanding
of the general relationship between the 1945-51 Governments and the
Unions.
At the same time, however, it should be noted that these strains were
largely self-inflicted. In disregarding the industrial origins of the
unofficial strikes, and instead emphasising their allegedly political
characteristics, the Government created trouble for itself. George Isaacs
continually sought to excuse the TGWU for failing to maintain order in the
docks by arguing that the trouble was inspired by Deakin's communist
opponents in the docks. Yet by drawing attention to the Union's internal
weaknesses, this only served to convince Isaacs's Cabinet colleagues that
they themselves would have to take action against the strikers. That
Ministers would have to intervene in a more active manner than simply
deploying troops to maintain supplies, was also in some ways made
inevitable by the Government's increasingly strident public attitude to the
strikes. Eventually, and following some particularly reckless Ministerial
statements which were made after the outbreak of war in Korea, the
2David W. Ellwood, Rebuilding Europe. Western Europe, America and
Postwar Reconstruction, p.92.
Government was obliged to take action commensurate with the assertion
that dock strikes were a political rather than an industrial challenge.
The Government caused the Union a great deal of embarrassment by
establishing the Leggett Inquiry and taking the seven dockers to court, for
both of these developments brought public attention to the Union's
problems in the docks. The Union was clearly anxious to divert attention
from its inability to command authority in the docks, especially as its
critics cited the TGWU's assumption of managerial responsibilities under
the Dock Labour Scheme as being the hub of the problem. Having fought
long and hard for the Scheme, the Union was understandably sensitive to
attacks upon it, particularly as much of the criticism came from the port
employers. This criticism of the Union's role in the Scheme was, in any
case, misplaced. The port employers' position, shared by the Ministry of
Transport, was that industrial relations in the docks had deteriorated as a
result of the Scheme. Yet such indiscipline was not simply a mechanical
consequence of the Union's participation in the Scheme's managerial or
disciplinary functions, however unpopular this was with Union members.
The deeper explanation - the real cause of the trouble - was the Union's
long-term inability to put down solid organisational roots in the docks. As
John Lovell has shown, history always counted for much in the closed
world of the docks, and history was always working against the TGWU.3
This real situation was no less damning for the Union, and its
persistent attempts to deflect attention from its historical weakness meant
that, although the Government's actions in 1950 and 1951 were insensitive,
the later tension was largely of the Union's own making. Whilst the
Government may have been under pressure from the British secret
services to accept that the strikes were communist conspiracies, and the
obvious absence of documentary evidence means that this can neither be
established nor ruled out, one definite source of red plot rumours was the
TGWU. It is highly significant that whilst police and Government law
officers generally dismissed evidence of political involvement, the TGWU
continually encouraged the public and the Government to believe that
there was an important political dimension to the unofficial strikes. In
insisting that the dockers' unofficial movement was politically motivated,
Deakin inadvertently induced the Government to respond in a 'political'
manner. Given that Deakin took this position in order to ease the pressure
3John Lovell, Stevedores and Dockers, especially pp.214-18.
on his Union, and given the strain which the Government's eventual
response placed the labour alliance under, this was an ironic, and
ultimately unfortunate situation.
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[I] Transcript of notes of conversation between Cyril Smith,
Terry Brotherstone and Jim Phillips, Edinburgh, 5 August 1992.
WW II: Given the opposition of British Trotskyists to the war effort, I
asked Cyril what position British Trotskyists intended to take in the event of
Nazi invasion. He said that the position was to arm the workers, who would
fight fascism; in 1940 there was little difference between 'democratic
capitalism' and 'fascist capitalism', other than the willingness of
'democratic workers' to fight fascism. I asked about Trotskyists' attitude
towards the British army. Terry stated that Trotskyists believed that the
forces would save the working class if they were rid of the 'officer class'
which had been responsible for the collapse of France.
1945: Cyril said he was a teenager in the 1945, and his father was a
great supporter of the Labour Government. Cyril's misgivings about the
Government's viability (ie whether Labour in office was worth supporting)
first arose when troops were used during the dock strike of October 1945. By
1949 his opposition to social democracy was absolute, and he attended the
Trafalgar Square demonstration during the 1949 Canadian Seamen's strike.
Docks: Cyril recognised several names on the 1948 "'No Name'
Organisation" list. He said that Harry Constable had left the CP in 1952, and
become a Trotskyist. After being expelled from the TGWU, he had not joined
the NASDU, and was the only London docker to be working without a Union
card. No man would accept employment until 'Harry' had a job. Cyril
confirmed my suggestion that employers co-operated in order to prevent
the trouble that would have occurred had it appeared, as the unofficial
movement had forecast in April 1950, that the expelled men were
unemployable. Cyril said that Albert Timothy also 'tore up' his CP card in
1952, being fed up of the CP's attempts to subordinate dock interests to those
of the Party. Of the unofficial leaders, he suggested that Ted Dickens was
the only serious Communist. Jack Dash, for instance, was not really a
serious intellectual figure, and in general communist dockers were
theoretically illiterate. This reflected the relatively low-level of political
consciousness amongst dockers as a whole. Whilst conversant in
'dockology', they were often extremely reactionary, racist etc.
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[II] Text of letter from The Rt. Hon. Lord Callaghan of Cardiff,
K.G. to Jim Phillips, 3 September 1992.
Dear Mr Phillips,
Thank you for your letter of 24 August in which you ask me to recall
events that took place nearly half a century ago. I am afraid I have no
recollection at all as to whether there was a difference between the
Ministries of Labour and of Transport about the workings of the Dock
Labour Scheme, but I can recall very clearly that the position I took up was
derived, as you surmise, from my own experience in Cardiff, and my
observations from visiting all the major ports in Britain. I would not accept
your view that there was a climate of general dissatisfaction at the time in
the docks. Certainly not in South Wales where the dockers regarded the
Dock Labour Scheme as a very welcome reform. As you would expect,
references to the disciplinary functions of the Scheme affected only a
handful of dockers at any one time. The advent of the "Call Stand" removed
much of the arbitrary nature of choosing dockers to work on a ship, and
was certainly appreciated by the great number of men outside of what was
called "The Blue Eyes". On the other hand, at all levels there was very
slipshod management and long standing work practices had existed - for
example in Liverpool - which could not be defended, and should not have
been implemented. I refer, for example, to "Spelling".
As regards Mr. Attlee's proposal to establish an official Committee, as
you may know, I left Transport and went to the Admiralty in February, 1950
and I have no recollection of what happened about the Committee and, of
course, had no official standing at the time to follow it up.
As to the reason for my letter [his letter to Attlee, 15 July 1949], it
derived from the fact that disciplinary features of the Scheme were not
working well. Ernest Bevin, as a senior heavyweight figure in the
Government, obviously carried many more guns than I did and I know
from conversation with him at the time and later that he regarded the
introduction of the Dock Labour Scheme as one of his great achievements.
And almost certainly felt that his experience and judgement was both
longer and better than mine. He may well have been right.
As regards your question as to whether the problems in the docks
were related to the general dilemma facing the trade unions, you will
certainly have discovered that the docks are always sui generis. At the time
I do not recall that the unions felt they were faced with a "general
dilemma". Rather, they felt they were trying to work out a new partnership
in the post-war atmosphere working hand in hand with a sympathetic
government.
I hope your work will be very successful in throwing light on some
of these matters.
Yours sincerely
James Callaghan
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